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Preface
The automobile is a convenience of civilization. Accidents that they cause, however,
take more than a million lives over the world each year. The Tangshan earthquake in
1976 caused 240,000 to 650,000 deaths in China, and the 2004 Indian Ocean
earthquake killed as many as 280,000 people. The 9/11 terrorist attacks in 2001 to
the US World Trade Center and Pentagon left about 3000 people dead. Every year,
accidents, natural disasters, terror attack, wars, and other causes leave a large number
of victims.
Societal safety science aims at preventing accidents and disasters that threaten
human societies, reducing the damages caused by such events, rescuing the victims,
and promoting recovery and reconstruction of the disaster-struck areas. It is a new
field of study that contributes to the enhancement of societal safety through aca-
demic fusion of study fields in natural science, social science, and humanities.
International communities have recognized the importance in taking academic
approaches to problems in societal safety. Societal safety science, however, has not
quite yet established itself as a new field for studying problems in safety. Kansai
University, in Osaka, Japan, proposed the field, for the first time, in 2009 and
established a faculty and a graduate school with the same title. The facts tell us
that societal safety science is a leading field in the studies of disaster prevention.
Countries in northern Europe, however, had proposed a similar research field called
societal safety in the late 1990s. Our undergraduate and graduate schools use the
name societal safety science that attached “sciences” to the title “societal safety.”
A new study field needs a sufficient accumulation of researches in the field by
specialists. Upon such research accomplishments, the establishment requires publi-
cation of an exhaustive and systematic textbook. This book is the first introductory
textbook publication for those that study societal safety science for the first time.
When the GDP per capita is small and the country is poor, the societies look to the
administration for securing clothing, food, and residence for the people, building
infrastructures, and targeting economic growth. For some advanced countries, the
years from the end of World War II to the mid-1960s were such times, and the
priority was placed on quantitative expansion rather than enhancing quality of living.
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Then after the period of high growth, advanced countries accomplished econom-
ically wealthy societies in the latter half of the 1960s. After the oil shock, infrastruc-
tures like roads and highways, water supply and sewage, and housing matured, and
then the social demands turned their interests to quality than quantity and securing
safety for the people. In the academia, Ulrich Beck published Risk Society (SAGE
Publications Ltd., 1992) and discussed that modern societies forced to emphasize
production and distribution risks instead of those of wealth, and James Reason, well
known in the field of accident theory, published Managing the Risks of Organiza-
tional Accidents (Ashgate, 1997).
As we described above, Kansai University, for the first time in Japan, opened the
Faculty of Societal Safety Sciences and the Graduate School of Societal Safety
Sciences in 2010. A 2000 report “For the Establishment of Safety Sciences” by
the Science Council of Japan contributed to the idea of building a new faculty. The
report stated:
“Safety Engineering has made great accomplishments for realizing safety through engineer-
ing efforts. Simple engineering efforts, however, are now facing difficulties in dealing with
the enormous sizes of technical products and globalization of our living environments. We
now need to establish a field of Safety Sciences to counter safety problems from a wider
standpoint beyond simple engineering approaches.”
This book of 5 parts and 19 chapters is the English edition of our book published
in Japanese in March 2018 from Minerva Shobo. Part I “Human Societies and
Societal Safety Sciences” gives overviews of what societal safety sciences aim at,
development of scientific technologies and changes in human societies, how people
are coping with risks in the modern societies, and how safety engineering and studies
of disaster prevention and risk management developed. Part II “Events that Threaten
Human and Its Societies” explains natural and social disasters and their histories,
environmental risks, wars, crimes, and terrorisms. Part III “Risk Analysis and
Management” discusses problems related to risk, like methods of risk analysis,
risk management, risk communication, crisis management, and so on. Part IV
“Social Mechanisms for Disaster Management” analyzes public systems for disaster
prevention, reduction, and mitigation, government activities for disaster manage-
ment, private systems for such purposes, and systems for supporting disaster victims.
Part V “For Advancement of Societal Safety Sciences,” in the end, discusses the
future of societal safety sciences through governance and agreement formation for
societal safety.
Societal safety sciences tackle a big diversity of problems including natural
disasters, accidents, environmental destruction, food safety, illnesses including
pandemics, crimes and international terrorism, and information security. Translating
this book into English, therefore, is only successful with not just high abilities in
English as a language but also through work by someone with skills and knowledge
to understand these problems in their own special fields. The translator of this book,
Dr. Kenji Iino, met the task beautifully.
vi Preface
This book is the first systematic textbook in societal safety sciences. The authors
will be greatly delighted if it spreads internationally and helps the world make steps
forward in building safer societies.
Finally, we would like to express our gratitude to Professor Takashi Inoguchi for
his valuable suggestions in publishing this book. We are also grateful to Springer
Japan and Minerva Shobo for allowing the publication of the English version
Science of Societal Safety: Living at Times of Risks and Disasters of the Japanese
book Shakai Anzengaku Nyumon.
Takatsuki, Osaka, Japan Seiji Abe
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Part I
Human Societies and Societal Safety
Sciences
Chapter 1
What Do Societal Safety Sciences Aim at?
Seiji Abe, Mamoru Ozawa, and Hideyuki Shiroshita
Abstract Societal safety sciences are new academic systems of interdisciplinary
studies that combine specialized fields of social science and humanity in addition to
those of science and technology for the purposes of preventing accidents and
disasters that threaten human society, containing their severity and frequencies,
reducing damages, rescuing the victims, and recovering and reconstructing the
disaster areas. This chapter explains the position of societal safety sciences in issues
related to our safety and outlines their methodologies and scopes.
Keywords Accident · Disaster · Incident · Risk · Societal safety
1.1 Is the Unexpected and the Unpredictable on the Steady
Increase in the Twenty-First Century?
1.1.1 Unexpected Accidents
Every person wants to lead a safe and happy life. Advancements in science and
technology have made our society convenient and comfortable. On the other hand,
however, a variety of accidents and events take place to threaten our safety.
About 1.3 million people (2015) die annually in Japan. The Japan Ministry of
Health, Labour and Welfare (MHLW) published in its “2017 Vital Statistics of
Japan” (MHLW 2017) that the first cause of death was malignant neoplasms (cancer)
followed by heart disease in the second place, then by other diseases of pneumonia,
and cerebrovascular disease. Among the causes of death, “unexpected accident”
ranks number six or so each year.
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Unexpected accidents are causes of death listed in the 10th revision of the
International Statistical Classification of Diseases and Related Health Problems
(ICD-10. Version 2010) by the World Health Organization (WHO) including “trans-
port accidents”; “accidental suffocation”; “slipping, tripping, stumbling, and falls”;
“accidental drowning and submersion”; and so on (WHO 2010). The death toll due
to unexpected accidents include victims of earthquakes or tsunami and those who
died of food poisoning during their normal lives, and the total figure reached as high
as 38,306 in 2015. In other words, among annual deaths in Japan, about three out of a
hundred are due to unexpected accidents. As we will explain later, unexpected
accidents in societal safety sciences are not just natural disasters or accidents, but
they also include a wide range of events like terrorism, war, influenza pandemics,
and drug toxicity. Reducing the number of deaths caused by unexpected accidents is
one of the primary targets of societal safety sciences.
MHLW translated “transport accidents” by WHO to the Japanese phrase “traffic
accidents” commonly used narrowly for accidents involving automobiles (traffic
accidents on roads). The wide meaning of traffic accidents in Japan also includes
those with railway, aircraft, and watercraft. “Vital Statistics of Japan” by MHLW
uses the phrase “traffic accident” in this wide sense. In this book, we use the word
traffic accidents to mean automobile accidents in the narrow sense and stick to the
original phrase byWHO “transport accidents” for all transportation-related accidents
including automobiles.
The historic transition of deaths due to unexpected accidents shows an annual
count about 20,000, i.e., about 2% of the total deaths, in the late 1800s to the early
1930s but jumped above 30,000 before World War II. During the high-growth
period of the mid-1950s to mid-1970s, the large number of traffic accidents pushed
the deaths by unexpected accidents up, and in the mid-1960s to the early 1970s, the
count exceeded 40,000. In the mid-1970s to the early 1990s, the number dropped to
about 30,000; however, it came back up to about 40,000 in the later 1990s and has
stayed at this level till today.
The current death count of about 40,000 annually seems significantly larger than
the 20,000 in the late 1800s to the early 1930s; however, we must recognize that the
population back then was about 40–50 million, i.e., less than half of our population
now. The ratio of deaths due to unexpected accidents among the total death count,
however, at about 3% now is much higher than the 2% back then. The higher rate is
probably due to the large number of post-World War II transport accidents including
traffic accidents that were almost none back then.
A major natural disaster temporarily boosts up the deaths caused by unexpected
accidents high. In fact, the year of the Great Kanto earthquake, 1923, saw 71,322,
about 2.8 times the number in the previous year; the year 1995 of the Great Hanshin-
Awaji earthquake marked 45,323, a little over 9200 more than the previous year; and
2011 with the Great East Japan earthquake had a sudden increase of over 20,000,
compared to other years, leaving 59,416 dead.
4 S. Abe et al.
1.1.2 Unexpected Accidents and Societal Safety
In 2010, MHLW published “Mortality Statistics from Accidents” with detailed
analysis of unexpected accidents from 1995 to 2008 (MHLW 2010). It was the
second publication of this type following the 1984“Mortality Statistics from Acci-
dents and Adverse Effects.” These statistical data are effective in understanding the
detail of unexpected accidents.
Reviewing the accidental deaths in 2008 by type, “suffocation” by, for example,
choking on food, ranked first with 9419. Then “traffic accident (transport accident)”
at 7499, “fall” at 7170, and “drowning” at 6466 followed. These four types of
accidents caused over 70% of the total number of accidental deaths. Other accidental
death types in 2008 were 1452 due to “smoke inhalation or exposure to fire” and
895 caused by “poisoning from or exposure to hazardous material.”
During post-War Japan, transport accidents stayed at the first type of cause of
accidental deaths for an extended time. At its peak in 1970, the transport accident
deaths exceeded 20,000 annually, amounting to 55% of the entire count. Today, the
number of traffic accident caused deaths has dropped significantly to about 1/3 of the
number back then.
In general, transport accidents occur away from home; however, about 40% of
accidents of deaths of other types take place in home, and about 80% of those victims
are elderlies at 65 or over. The breakdown of types of in-house accidental deaths was
85.3% fire, 63.1% drowning (mostly in bathtubs), 58.2% poisoning, 42.4% suffo-
cation, and 35.7% falls. These numbers indicate that home, where safety and security
have to be assured, is, in fact, the place where the biggest dangers hide.
By the way, some point out that the numbers of accidental deaths in MHLW’s
statistics are underestimated and that they should be greater in reality. For example,
the real number of accidents during medical treatment is unknown and such type of
death counts is unknown. The real number of accidental deaths may well exceed
40,000; however, published data from MHLW make a certain powerful measure for
evaluating the degree of societal safety.
1.2 Alleviating and Living with Disasters?
1.2.1 Purpose of Societal Safety Sciences
As we live our daily lives, we are surrounded by a number of possible hazards
including earthquake, transport accidents, fires, food poisoning, environmental
contamination, and health disorders.
1 What Do Societal Safety Sciences Aim at? 5
If we look around us, there are a great number of highly capable and complex
industrial products. We take the high convenience these products offer for granted
without knowing their detailed structures or operational principles. Machines, how-
ever, fail. Some industrial products, like an automobile, can turn into a deadly
weapon if we mishandle them. Once an industrial product has some kind of failure,
in the worst case, we may not only lose our lives, but it can cause damage to lives and
properties of others.
The 1995 Great Hanshin-Awaji earthquake and the 2011 Great East Japan
earthquake took away large numbers of lives and properties, and they destroyed
the infrastructures. During the Great East Japan earthquake, tsunami waves attacked
the Tokyo Electric Power Company-owned Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant
(NPP), and loss of the nuclear reactor core cooling function led to devastating core
meltdowns. We have been repeatedly exposed to disasters caused by natural phe-
nomena, that we have no control over, like earthquakes, tsunami, typhoons, and
torrential rain. Japan is a “country of earthquakes” with about 20% of all magnitude
6 or bigger earthquakes in the world occurring in and around Japan.
Industrial products, various machinery and apparatus are called artificial prod-
ucts. In general, events that cause bodily injury or property damage are “accidents.”
When sizes and capacities of artificial products are large, the magnitudes of suffering
grow accordingly.
James Reason categorized accidents into two types: an “individual accident” that
causes effects only on individuals and an “organizational accident” that affects the
entire organization or the society (Reason 1997).
On the other hand, damages caused by natural phenomena like earthquakes or
typhoons are generally called “natural disasters.” We call accidents that take place
while at work “labor accidents.” In Japan, we sometimes call such accidents
“industrial disasters,” that is, to call an accident a disaster. In Europe and the
USA, they are called work accidents or occupational accidents.
The purposes of “societal safety sciences” involve preventing accidents and
disasters that threaten human society from occurring, controlling their magnitudes
and frequencies, reducing damages caused, saving the victims, and promoting
recovery and reconstruction of disaster-struck areas. Problems that societal safety
sciences face are all not simple with complex facets. For analyzing the processes and
recommending policies for resolving and improving problems, as we will detail
later, we need interdisciplinary approaches that combine not only the fields of
engineering, but also specialized fields of law, economics, sociology, psychology,
science, information technology, social and occupational medicine, and all.
1.2.2 Hazards, Incidents, Accidents, and Disasters
Physical or chemical factors or dangerous sources that cause accidents or disasters
are called “hazards.” Earthquake hazards, for example, are the inter-plate forces. The
hazard of poisoning accidents from incomplete combustion is carbon monoxide
6 S. Abe et al.
(CO) produced during combustion processes. Whether a hazard directly or indirectly
causes damage to humans or the society depends on its size, strength, environment,
and intervention with social organizations or human.
An “incident” is an event of temporary minor damage to human, society, or an
organization caused by a hazard. Incidents include narrow escapes that are worth
investigating their causes (Reason 2008) to events of major damages like human
death or injury or loss of property values caused by not avoiding such critical crises.
When, especially, damages to people or their properties are serious, we call such
cases accidents. For example, a near miss between airplanes is an incident because
there were no human or physical damage, whereas, if they actually collide, it is an
accident. Accidents vary in their magnitudes from small ones to those that lead to
hundreds of victims. Especially, NPP accidents that spatially affect wide areas for
extended long times are sometimes called mega-accidents or mega-disasters.
As we will discuss in Chap. 6, suffering and damages to the human society caused
by natural phenomena are called “natural disasters.” This book, in contrast,
calls human-caused disasters, like aviation accidents, NPP accidents, or major
explosions, “social disasters.” The phrase social disaster has a different meaning in
English, and in Europe and the USA, such accidents are called “man-made
disasters.”
A disaster that affects a nation, beyond what a social organization can handle, is
called a “mega-disaster.” When the disaster causes huge sorrow and destruction to
the society, we sometimes call such an event a “catastrophe.”
1.2.3 Reducing and Coping with Risks?
Hazards, whether they affect us or not, are always around us. They are hard to
control and suppress in case of natural disasters. Preparatory actions to prevent
incidents causing hazards from developing into accidents or disasters are “disaster
prevention,” and suppressing the severity and spread of damages after accidents or
disasters that have taken place is called “disaster mitigation.” For example, setting
automatic train stops (ATS) on railways are acts of disaster prevention to prevent
collision or derailing. Seatbelts and airbags in cars are types of disaster mitigation for
reducing the severity of human suffering in case of collision accidents.
Human and material resources our societies possess are finite. In modern society,
social agreements determine where and how to distribute the resources. These
agreements take certain quantitative scales for their settlements. “Risk” is one of
the concepts that affect these agreements. The International Organization for Stan-
dardization (ISO) and International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC) define risk
as the “effect of uncertainty on objectives” (ISO/IEC 2014). Risk is a quantitative
measure that depends on projected magnitudes of damages and their probabilities of
occurrence. Risk is the sum of products of the magnitude and chance of events;
however, in some cases it is determined just by the size of damage or frequency.
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ISO further defines “safety” to mean freedom from intolerable risk. Here, free-
dom from intolerable risk does not necessarily mean zero risk, but it evaluates minor
dangers as risk and, however in turn, allows certain level of risk (Slovic et al. 2000).
The society determines the tolerable range of risk which varies depending on time
and cases.
Direct comparison of different measures is difficult. Risk is a method of relative
evaluation among a variety of measures. “Risk assessment” is the safety of systems
or their parts by, for example, identifying relative weaknesses. There are two types of
risk assessment: “deterministic risk assessment” and “probabilistic risk assessment”
(Lee and McCormick 2011).
Deterministic risk assessment qualitatively evaluates risks of accidents and disas-
ters with conformance or other qualities to safety standards. Probabilistic risk
assessment, on the other hand, evaluates risks associated with a system or its specific
part with all scenarios that lead to accidents or disasters from hazards by calculation
based on reliabilities of parts, elements, and operator interventions related to each
scenario. Probabilistic risk assessment is often used for evaluating risks with com-
plex systems like NPPs or airplanes.
Scenarios in probabilistic risk assessment are generally called an “event tree.”
The safety and reliability of an entire system largely depend on probabilistic
reliability of each elements of the system as well as the construct of the event tree.
Probabilistic risk assessment, thus, requires evaluating errors, that is, the uncertainty
evaluation of the risk assessment itself. In that sense, probabilistic risk assessment
works well in identifying weaknesses of a system instead of as a tool in evaluating
the safety of an entire system.
1.3 Building Safe and Secure Society Together
1.3.1 Events That Threaten Human and Examining Them
We do not call a tsunami attack on a deserted island a disaster. The same applies to a
major avalanche in an uninhabited forest area. When the event affects people or the
society, it is an accident and a disaster.
Figure 1.1 shows issues that societal safety sciences handle among problems that
pose threats to people or their societies. They cover a large variety from accidents
and natural disasters to terrorism and wars. In facing these issues, we have to not
only analyze the characteristics, features, and structures of them but also have to
propose policies to resolve and improve them.
We cannot select or control sizes or regions of natural disasters, like torrential
rain; thus, we need to quickly evacuate disaster-struck areas to avoid dangers.
Nevertheless, no matter how urgent the situation may be, whether the people actually
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evacuate the area or not depends on past individual experiences and their psycho-
logical states. Quite a number of people, in fact, ignore evacuation orders by local
administration offices. Such reality suggests that authorities have to consider psy-
chological factors in deciding whether to enforce evacuation. On the other hand,
matters for saving disaster victims and supporting reconstruction of disaster-struck
areas relate to socioeconomic evaluation, legal systems, and financial constraints;
thus, they require approaches from economics and public administration.
Preparing against a large-scale tsunami disaster, like the one that hit during the
Great East Japan earthquake, takes an enormous amount of budget for hardware
preparation. If we want to reduce the hardware preparation cost, we have to build
software measures, like educating the residents about disaster prevention and clar-
ifying the evacuation routes, and, at the same time, prepare improved systems for
resident notification and develop procedures for helping those that require assis-
tance. Such preparations require not just engineering knowledge but also specialized
knowledge over a wide range of specialties. The same applies to accidents as well.
Airplanes are means of transportation through the air, and damage to their engines or
fuselages caused by aging, poor maintenance or bird strikes, as well as stalls due to
pilot error or turbulence can immediately lead to their falls. Preparing against them
means to have knowledge in not only aviation engineering, mechanical engineering,
and human engineering but additionally in biology for countering bird strikes and
public administration for safety regulations. Dealing with problems that surround
societal safety, thus, requires not only revealing the physical and chemical mecha-
nisms of accidents and disasters but also studying human, social, and economic
environments that the problems relate to.
Fig. 1.1 Topics in societal safety science
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1.3.2 Societal Safety Sciences as a Field of Synthetic Science
Conventionally, academic fields that study natural disasters include civil engineering
and architecture, and those that study accidents and industrial safety are engineering
fields of mechanical, chemical, safety, and so on. All these specialized fields handle
disaster and safety issues with engineering methodologies. In modern days, complex
and diversified problems in safety revealed limitations with such engineering
approaches alone. Yoichiro Murakami advocated “safety studies” (Murakami
1998) to cover a wide range of safety issues including drug toxicity, medical
accidents, and food safety in addition to those industrial safety concerns like nuclear
accidents. In fact, the Science Council of Japan (SCJ), in February of 2000,
published the following recommendation (SCJ 2000). “Safety engineering has
made large contributions in realizing safety from engineering standpoints. With
such changes, however, of our technology growing much larger and our living
environment globalizing, simple engineering analytic approaches alone are facing
difficulty in handling safety problems. We now need to construct “safety studies,” an
academic field that deals with safety problems from a wide viewpoint beyond the
conventional scope of safety engineering.”
Various problems within nature, our environment, artificial structures, and func-
tions cause accidents and disasters. These problems turn into incidents following
some physical or chemical laws and finally break out. We also design and manu-
facture artificial products following some physical or chemical laws; however,
before they enter the market as industrial products, factory workers and organiza-
tional activities of quality and value evaluation affect them. Solving societal safety
problems that relate to people’s safety and security, thus, requires multi-angled
viewpoints over a synthetic framework that covers human, society, scientific tech-
nology, and nature.
Societal safety sciences offer a new multi-angled integrated field of study about
safety and security. Technical prevention and mitigation of disasters are insufficient
for building a safe and secure society. This study has to involve regulation by
standardizing artificial products, provide compensation through insurance if
human and physical damages are foreseen, and also look into saving victims as
well as regional recovery and reconstruction. In contrast to safety engineering that
empathizes safety measures, societal safety sciences not only study accidents and
disasters, but form a synthetic field of science that comprehensively and practically
approaches common social and economic effects and their mitigation caused by such
accidents and disasters.
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1.3.3 Methodologies and Problems with Societal Safety
Sciences
Kansai University advocated societal safety sciences in 2009 and, to promote
research and education in the field, established new Faculty of Societal Safety
Sciences and the Graduate School of Societal Safety Sciences. For reducing disasters
and mitigating the damages to the minimum, we need to first understand their risks
and then establish policies and systems to prepare against them. The Graduate
School of Societal Safety Sciences at Kansai University is actively involved with
research and education of disaster prevention and mitigation, i.e., disaster manage-
ment, with three basic fields of science and engineering systems, societal systems,
and humanities systems.
The science and engineering systems consist of fields in science and engineering
that contribute to preventing and mitigating disasters by clarifying their mechanisms.
Conventional academic fields they cover are earth science, system engineering, civil
engineering, mathematics, and so on. Societal systems cover administrative policies
about disasters and damages, their underlying laws, economics and operations,
social system design, and so on. Conventional academic fields they involve are
law, public administration, economics, operations research, public health, and so
on. Finally, humanities systems handle the psychology and ethics of people in
disasters and victims, people-to-people and people-to-society communications, and
so on. Corresponding conventional academic fields are psychology, theory of
communication, sociology, ethics, and so on. We designed our schools for these
three areas to overlap and synthesize with overlaps instead of having exclusive
visions.
As we can see from the establishment of the Integrated Disaster Risk Manage-
ment (IDRiM) Society, the importance of an integrated approach to safety-related
problems is a globally recognized movement. Societal safety sciences, however, is
not an internationally recognized academic field of “new safety studies.” Kansai
University first advocated it in 2009 and built a faculty with the name in 2010.
Societal safety science is a new academic field born in Japan.
Some countries in northern Europe gave birth to a research field, in the late 1990s,
with the name “Societal Safety” with scopes similar to those of societal safety
sciences. When Kansai University writes societal safety sciences in English, it
uses the phrase Societal Safety.
Researchers concerned with safety all recognize the need for an interdisciplinary
approach to handle problems in the field. Researches about safety in Europe and the
USA merely cross existing academic fields. If we describe these methods with trees,
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there are multiple trees, one for each academic field, with branches of problems
related to safety. The researches collect all these branches keeping them at levels of
simple additions of the problems.
Our studies form a trunk of societal safety sciences with branches extending to
their own fields of study and the branches are fused into the trunk (Fig. 1.2). In the
state of fusion, a safety section of the tree trunk shows an organic combination of the
existing academic fields. The authors aim to develop into this direction that synthe-
sizes multiple academic fields to give birth to a new academic field of fusion. This
book is an experimental publication of our direction.
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Chapter 2
Advancement in Science and Technology
and Human Societies
Hiroshi Nishimura, Emiko Kanoshima, and Kazuhiro Kono
Abstract As the phrase civilization of science and technology suggests, modern
societies are built on top of highly sophisticated advancement of science and
technology. This chapter reviews how societal safety sciences relate to problems
in human societies and overviews challenges in modern societies.
Keywords AI · Automobiles · Elevators · Information security · Power generation ·
Railway · Vulnerability
2.1 Advancement in Science and Technology and Changes
in Human Societies
2.1.1 Human History and Transition of Population
This section overviews characteristics and problems of modern societies from the
viewpoint of human history. A view over characteristics and problems with a
subject, from a level higher than daily viewpoints and metrics, is an imperative
preparation for scientific discussions in societal safety. Modern societies have plenty
of debates in whether to accept or deny senses of values or technological evaluations;
thus, having the habit of taking long-term overviews over discussions with different
viewpoints and metrics is worthwhile. This act resembles looking for the Polar Star
when lost. The Polar Star does not show which direction to take; however, it is a
guide for us to confirm which direction to head into after all.
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In general, growth and decline of population are said to represent the ups and
downs of societies. We will start our discussion with the transition of world
population (estimate) in Fig. 2.1. The world population with nearly a flat small
growth for years, throughout the long human history, shows a rapid increase in
recent years.
Despite this rapid rise in population, if we now divide the worldwide food
production by our population, the amount exceeds what we need per person. This
means, although it is an over simplified calculation, the modern society has secured
an ample supply of food and we are enjoying the prosperity. Our population only
showed slow increase for a long time until the industrial revolution; thus, modern
scientific technology has made large contribution to increasing our food production.
Our current birth rate shows a decrease; however, our longer lives resulted in
United Nations’ projection announced in June of 2017 that the world population
would reach 9.8 billion in 2050 and 11.2 billion in 2100. Science and technology
will keep advancing into our future; however, when we recognize that habitable
space on earth is limited, we need to feel the higher sense of crisis toward the rapid
growth of population.
The key in projecting how the world population will change in the future is how
we interpret the transition of shifting into rapid increase. Statistics show that our
population showed such transitions twice in the past. The first such point was the
eighteenth to nineteenth centuries when the industrial revolution started, and the
second point was the 1950s to the 1960s after World War II. The time after the
industrial revolution to today is a short period within the long history of mankind.
Factors that led to rapid population growths during these years were the energy
revolution and power revolution. In the rest of this chapter, we will overview the
energy revolution and power revolution in relation to the increase in food production
that directly contributed to the rises in population.
Fig. 2.1 Transition of
world population. (Drawn
based on the data of UNEP
2011)
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2.1.2 Background of Population Increase During Early
Stages of Industrial Revolution and Its Historical
Meaning
United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs showed that the world
population at 580 million in 1600 increased to 680 million in 1700 and 790 million
in 1750. Once the industrial revolution started, the growth rate rose further, and the
world population reached 980 million in 1800, 1.26 billion in 1850, and 1.65 billion
in 1900. The rate is clearly different from that up to the sixteenth to seventeenth
centuries.
The industrial revolution started in the mid-eighteenth century in the UK. Its
driving forces were “inventions of machines” and “invention of steam engine” that
used coal for its power source. Especially improvements of spinning machines and
Cartwright’s power loom powered by a steam engine greatly improved the industrial
production centered around the cotton textile industry. The movement required
factory workers and large capital. Around the eighteenth century in the UK, Norfolk
four-course crop rotation, that allowed agricultural production throughout the year,
started to spread over the three-field system and led to tremendous increase in
agricultural production. This “agricultural revolution” made population growth
possible and secured sufficient labor for the industrial revolution. The nineteenth
century saw advancements of heavy industries, like the machine, steel, and coal
industries, and new ways of transportation like steam boats and locomotives, to
allow mass transportation of material and products.
During the mid-nineteenth century, the industrial revolution spread to other west
European countries starting rapid industrializations in Germany and France. The
revolution triggered colonialism in the late nineteenth century among the countries
that wanted their hands-on cheap material for industrial production and looked for
new market development to sell their products. The colonization race among the
empires led to World War I in the twentieth century.
2.1.3 Problems We Face in the Modern Society
The world population kept growing into the twentieth century. The count 1.65 billion
in 1900 kept rising at a rate of about 0.6% a year to reach 1.86 in 1920. After World
War I, the annual rate increased to about 1% pushing the world population to
2.07 billion in 1930 and 2.54 billion in 1950. After World War II, the rate further
rose to about 2% a year, and the population exploded to 3.7 billion in 1970 and
5.3 billion in 1990. Later, the rate dropped; however, the population kept growing to
exceed 7.0 billion at the end of October 2011 and reached 7.4 billion at the end of
May in 2017.
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The primary sources of energy and power during the early stages of the industrial
revolution were the combinations of coal and steam engines, but they drastically
changed after World War II. People developed new energy sources of oil, natural
gas, and nuclear material like uranium. The use of methane hydrate is now catching
the attention as the energy source for the future. Machines to produce power started
with the external combustion-type steam engine, and later human invented the
internal combustion-type gasoline and diesel engines. Automobiles with the internal
combustion types spread around the world, and the societies developed modern
traffic management systems. We then moved on to invent motors in a variety of sizes
that use electrical energy. Then the development of technology to distribute elec-
tricity led to its application in all aspects of our activities like production and
transportation to consumption areas, and productivity, our lifestyles, and conve-
nience were all improved. As a result, the lifestyle in advanced countries turned to
the modern style of mass production and mass consumption.
The latter half of the twentieth century, as it is called the green revolution (Hesser
2006), was the time when mass production of grains started. Mexican wheat and
Indian rice are well known. As we explained in Sect. 2.1.1, the world is producing
food in an amount that far exceeds what are needed for the entire world population.
The development of high-yielding varieties largely made possible a big increase in
grain production. In addition, securing irrigation water, development of fertilizers
and pesticides, and farming machineries to cover huge farming fields all contributed
to the increased production. Crop breeding today has even started to reach into the
genes. An increase in food production also affected other fields including chemical
industries of pesticide, fertilizer, and food additives, civil construction industries of
irrigation water management, machine industries of manufacturing farming machin-
eries, and transportation industries of transporting the products.
On the other hand, we are faced with a number of problems we cannot ignore as
the negative side of developing new technologies. They are the problems of envi-
ronmental contamination caused by pesticide and fertilizers, pesticides for long post-
harvest transportation, and food additives. These problems are new concerns with
food safety fundamentally different from the food problem of famine in the old days.
Developing new technologies always involve risks. We are at a stage where we have
to rethink how far we want to take the food production technology with these risks.
Mass production and mass consumption result in mass disposition. The world
started to recognize the problem of waste around the 1970s together with the other
problems of environmental destruction and resource drainage. These problems of the
modern societies that affect our environment may lead to concerns with the global
environment and harsh weather conditions due to global warming. Nuclear power
generation, once expected to be free of drainage in its breeding principle, is no
exception. The delay in developing technologies for nuclear waste management and
environmental contamination caused by NPP accidents further add to the complica-
tion in discussing energy resources.
UN Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO 2017) reports that about 815 mil-
lion people in the world suffer famine in 2016 (777 million in 2015). The number is
less by 132 million than 947 million in 2003; however, 1 out of 9 of the world
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population is struggling with famine. The modern world is under a complicated
situation with “societies suffering malnutrition” and “societies that enjoy excessive
supply but suffer health problems from the satiation” that share the same earth and
tightly relate to one another. As globalization makes progress, gaps between the rich
and poor are spreading over the world. We need to start building global systems to
eliminate the gaps of famine and wealth by stepping over the differences in culture,
religion, and political systems.
Modern societies are built on top of energy and power from production, trans-
portation, and consumption to waste disposal. For us to make use of resources and
energy forever, we need to make fundamental changes to the way of human
activities. There is a movement in Europe that claims the need to construct sustain-
able societies; however, the reality is that only few people recognize the need. We
have not yet developed the technologies to make sustainable use of energy and
power. To make the changes in our modern societies, we have to first acknowledge
that forms of modern production and life are overly dependent on energy and power,
and then we need to start active discussions on creating new sustainable styles of life
and production.
2.2 Birth of Megacities and High-Speed Mass
Transportation
2.2.1 Modern Societies and Megacities
About 10,000 years ago, when human settled and started farming, the communities
faced the need for controlling large-scale erosion and flooding. Thus, human formed
cities as the hub for politically organizing regions. People that control and use
relatively stable supply of storable excessive products lived in the cities. The
concentration of people led to large buildings, culture, and civilization and gave
authorities to the controllers in the cities. Concentration of people, on the other hand,
gives rise to risks of epidemics, fires, and famine. City sizes, thus, had their limits
with populations about 100,000 on lands with diameters of 1–2 km. Exceptions like
Edo (now Tokyo), during the seventeenth to nineteenth century with a population of
about 1 million within a radius of 4–5 km, went through multiple occurrences of fires
and epidemics.
The start of the industrial revolution in the late eighteenth century led to devel-
opment of manufacturing industries, and their productivities made great leaps with
cooperation and division of labor among people in the cities. The movement
changed cities from controllers of excessive stocks to manufacturing cities. In
addition to controlling and consuming excessive farming products, people in the
cities started to produce properties and services and consume them. The disadvan-
tages of epidemics and fires caused by concentration of people were then controlled
with advancement in medicine and construction of social infrastructures. The
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development of new ways of transportation eliminated spatial limitations, and out-
skirts of cities went through rapid expansions, to bring populations of the areas up to
1 to several millions, and in the twentieth century, megacity areas with populations
that exceed 10 million emerged.
Functions to control societies in the cities, on one hand, were pushed aside by
decentralized market-driven economics; however, on the other hand, the cities still
needed central controllers to manage complications from multiple decentralized
systems. Cities were the hubs to control regions, and with the advancement of
people’s economics, they turned into structural elements for people’s nations and
went through reorganizations.
Jacobs claimed that instead of being built after national economics, city econom-
ics grew by taking on functions that national economics could not control. Economic
activities grow by innovation, and for healthy growth, corporations within a city
have to execute their creations within creative and cooperative networks. National
economics expand when a corporation within it innovates a new value. Without it,
national economics will decline. Jacobs clearly showed the gradual influence of
innovation within a city extending to the surrounding regions and eventually leading
to advancement of the national economy (Jacobs 1984). The advancement of global
economy is casting light onto this argument through re-recognition of surplus
management function and creativity of cities.
2.2.2 Transportation Systems That Support Modern Societies
The transportation system is one of the social infrastructures in modern society that
takes for granted ways for repeatedly and regularly transporting people, products,
and information in massive quantities. Railways and steam boats were the main
players in the nineteenth century, and in the twentieth century, automobiles
expanded the range of people’s daily livings and airplanes made the world narrower.
Especially railways and automobiles made great changes to cities.
The railway was born in the nineteenth century as steam railways to connect
cities. Within cities in Europe and the USA, horsecars debuted in the early nineteenth
century which were taken over by electrically powered trams later in the same
century. Cities, where people used to travel on foot, showed gradual increase in
their spatial spread. Geographical spread of cities led to further concentration of
economic activities and then even bigger expansion of city coverages. People who
disliked city-specific problems that came with concentration of people moved out
along railways extended to the outskirts and started to commute on railway net-
works. City areas then radially grew to radii over 10 km adding further complication
to their problems of large-scale and dense population. Howard, in his theory of
garden cities, suggested to link midsized cities with railways to resolve problems
with overpopulated large cities (Howard 1902). The movement, however, whether
intended or implemented without plans, led to giving birth to megacities with radii of
tens of kilometers.
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People started to buy automobiles after Ford’s Model T debuted in 1908. Narrow
roads and public transportation already in existence delayed their acceptance to city
areas; however, the people and economics of cities were attracted to them, and every
city started to construct road networks and build parking areas. The constructions,
however, could not catch up with the rapid growth of the number of automobiles.
People, with their automobiles, started to move to suburbs without railway service.
Spatial expansion of cities overloaded road facilities. Developing low-population
cities to lessen the load on roads made city areas grow even wider. The cities that
used to grow radially then kept growing like galaxies into sizes that even exceeded
radii of hundred of kilometers. When cities expand, the original attraction of them is
lost. Today, we can probably say that there is no city free of problems related to
automobile transportation.
Modern megacities are supported by two types of transportation systems: the
railways and automobiles. There is another means of transportation always in place
within megacities, and that is the elevator. Without elevators, skyscraper buildings
cannot be built. Le Corbusier (1933) was the first to discuss the importance of them
in his book “La Ville Radieuse (The Radiant City),” also known as “The Vertical
Garden City.” The reality of modern megacities with large numbers of skyscrapers
built in random manners is not what he idealized; nevertheless, elevators are
indispensable for them.
2.2.3 Disasters and Vulnerability of Megacities
Concentrated population is one of the attractive features of a city; however, it is also
a factor of expanding the magnitude of damage in case of natural and social
disasters. There have been a great number of cases where cities were attacked by
large fires or serious epidemics as well as many cases of large city damages caused
by natural disasters. The case of disaster in Pompeii in ancient Rome is well known,
but more recently, for example, the 1755 Lisbon earthquake devastated the city of
Lisbon and is said to be a factor for the decline of the Kingdom of Portugal.
Rousseau, who lived in the same time, claimed that the damages would had been
smaller if people were more scattered with less property. He emphasized the
man-made disaster aspect of earthquake damages pointing to the large condensed
population and people, to protect their properties, not fleeing (Rousseau 1756).
There are plenty of other cases of natural disaster attacks on cities, and every time,
people suffered great damages. These cases put us into deep contemplation about
whether concentrating people to cities is really desirable.
There are many of conditions for establishing cities in the modern society. Means
of transportation like railways, roads, and elevators are such conditions together with
other indispensable infrastructure of information communication, electricity, gas,
and water supplies. Also, cities have various structures including underground
shopping centers, skyscrapers, and developed coastal areas. When such structures
suffer large damages, not only the city functions are interrupted, but a great number
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of lives and properties are lost; in other words, cities have natural vulnerabilities.
Vulnerabilities of cities are evident with larger size cities. In fact, when we compare
the 1995 Great Hanshin-Awaji earthquake with a death toll of over 6000 and the
2016 Kumamoto earthquake that took 267 lives in Japan, the level of damages was
quite different even though the earthquake sizes were about the same.
Damages from disasters on cities depend not only on the level of concentration
but also on their quality. One lesson from the Great Hanshin-Awaji earthquake was
the damage grew largely due to concentration of wood-made houses that did not
meet today’s Building Standards Act in Japan. Natural disasters do not target areas
with high population concentration. If we are to give up concentration by
abandoning cities, we have to think about the values of what we will be losing.
There are many lessons to learn from past experience of disasters, and some of the
countermeasures are possible only in cities.
People have worked on controlling erosion and flooding and have built seawalls
and breakwater. They were efforts to build robust cities against disasters. For cases
that such systems and structures cannot prevent damage, we have prepared evacu-
ation facilities and built systems for cooperation among civil organizations to
counter disasters. If we continue to accept benefits from concentrating in cities, we
have to think how to, at the same time, develop multifaceted systems of disaster
prevention, mitigation, and reduction. The preparations by New York against hur-
ricane Sandy, after learning from hurricane Katrina, were a success case. We have to
avoid excessive concentration and monocentric concentration; however, if we
acknowledge the vulnerabilities and take necessary measures, we can continue to
enjoy the benefits of concentration to cities.
2.3 ICT, AI, and the Modern Society
2.3.1 Development of ICT and Highly Advanced Information
Society
The history of modern industries consists of the time of farming up to the early
eighteenth century, the time of manufacturing from the mid-eighteenth century to the
twentieth century, and the time of information and knowledge in the twenty-first
century. The world is making great changes from societies that valued farming and
manufactured products to information societies that place importance in information
and knowledge formed from them.
In the modern information society, where an enormous amount of information is
generated, stored, and processed daily, information is generally processed at high
speed by the computer and transferred to a wide audience via a variety of commu-
nication methods. Information and Communication Technology (ICT) that supports
the information society showed rapid advancement in the 40 years starting in 1980.
The personal computer first introduced in 1974 spread throughout the societies in the
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1980s and the 1990s. The spread of personal computers led to digitalization of
information enabling not only mass reproduction of information but also greatly
enhanced accuracy, efficiency, and reliability of information processing and com-
munication. During the mid-1990s to the 2000s, the Internet spread around the world
explosively, and broad-band communication was made available allowing large
volume communication at high speed. The high-speed Internet realized access to
enormous quantities of multimedia contents at anytime from anywhere in the world,
and in addition, everyone has the hands-on ways for broadcasting of information;
that is, communication without limitations of time and space has been made avail-
able. As information systems and the Internet were shaped as one of the societal
infrastructures, such functions as electronic trading or electronic government turned
available, and economics, society, and government are all heading toward efficiency.
Technologies for safety and security systems are also on the rise, e.g., keeping eyes
on children with monitoring cameras and global positioning systems (GPS).
As computers turned smaller and faster like smartphones as well as the recording
media, cloud computing popped up, and ICT is now accessible anywhere. The
advancement into the time of ubiquitous network enabled anyone to access infor-
mation at anytime from anywhere and any device and now into the era of Internet of
Things (IoT) where a variety of things themselves hook up to the Internet to
exchange information for automatic recognition, measurement, and control. How
to make use of information and technologies is important in the advanced informa-
tion societies. New attempts that apply state-of-the-art technologies like artificial
intelligence to analyze big data are being tested, e.g., a new financial service
“Fintech.”
2.3.2 Information Security in the Information Society
As the societies are rapidly advancing into the information age, “digital divide” is
now a social problem, which is the inequality among individuals in their abilities to
make use of information and their communication environment. The advanced
information society is also facing new problems including a variety of cybercrimes
that misuse computers and networks, net troubles of careless slandering and
bad-mouthing of others on the Internet, copyright infringement from reproducing
digital information, and health problems from excessive dependence on Internet or
smartphones.
In general, information security means to keep information in its complete form,
so only the proper user with access rights can use it at any time. Events that threaten
information security or that are highly likely to do so are called “information security
incidents.” Information security incidents are caused by cyberattacks; unauthorized
access; transfer of malware; intended acts by malicious people, and further in
addition by unintended acts due to operation errors or carelessness; and even natural
disasters or malfunctions.
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Today, a large number of cyberattacks are around with knowledge of human
abilities and typical behavior for the purpose of stealing confidential information or
money. An example is password list attack (list-based attack) that is one form of
password cracking and is frequently reported. The attackers know people tend to use
the same password because they have limits to how many they can memorize. A
targeted threat or an advanced persistent threat pretends to be a customer and sends
malware to members of target organizations. It is one of the cleverest ways of
deceiving people among the number of cyberattacks. The amount of damage from
illegal remittance via Internet banking amounted to over 30 billion yen in 2015 in
Japan. Organized crimes of unintended withdrawal using fake cards do not fade out.
Individuals and corporations suffer since 2015 from ransomware sent to users with
programs that lock up computers or encode files and demand ransom to unlock the
access.
We need countermeasures from technical, physical, organizational, and personal
aspects to protect information assets from these threats. Over 80% of information
leakage in Japan are caused by human errors. Protecting information assets in the
advanced information society requires raising the information literacy of the users.
The administration and corporations have to protect huge amounts of information
compared to those of individuals, and thus they have to take proper measures against
risks in relation to their possibilities and intensities. Furthermore, any countermea-
sure can be cracked sometime, and the idea of “defense in depth” that we protect
information assets by taking multiple measures in multiple layers is important. We
need to take these countermeasures at the entrance and exit points of a network and at
each point within the network.
2.3.3 AI and Safety and Security in Human Society
One of the technologies that is making advances in an astonishing speed is artificial
intelligence (AI). The 2010s saw a number of AI topics that caught the attention of
the public, e.g., AI, at times, beat active professional Go (strategy board game) and
Shogi (Japanese chess) players, or a novel written by AI passed the first round
judging of a literary contest.
According to the 2016 white paper on information and communications in Japan
(MIC 2016) up to the 1990s, AI mostly consisted of software that made guesses by
searching simple rule bases or knowledge-based systems that stored various infor-
mation in searchable formats; they were way far from computers that “behave almost
like human.” In the 2000s, the technology of machine learning was developed that
once people teach features to identify and distinguish data, computers could then on
learn rules and knowledge to categorize data without human intervention. In the
2010s, deep learning with models that resemble human neural network was devel-
oped. Deep learning extracts features from sample data; thus, AI itself understands
and expresses the data concept (meaning), i.e., it executes information processing,
that humans unconsciously perform within their brains, to certain extents.
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AI is applied not only to information systems like search engines on the Internet
but also to speech recognition and synthesis or voice-activated search systems with
smartphones, and it is making changes to our daily lives. AI technology is making its
way into appliances around us like robots that effectively clean the floor based on
sensor data or convection microwave ovens that learn the user’s preference. Fintech
we touched about in Sect. 2.3.1 cannot perform its financial services without
AI. There is no doubt that AI will continue to make large influences in various
industries. It is said that AI will put automatically driven automobiles on the roads in
2020. Expectations are high for AI to contribute to improvements in convenience
and safety of our societies by diagnosing illnesses and suggesting treatment plans in
the medical field, building individual personality-based study plans for students in
the education industry, crime prevention by detecting abnormality with surveillance
cameras in the security industry, and application to decision-making support for
disaster prevention.
Oxford researchers C. B. Frey and M. A. Osborne predicted (Frey and Osborne
2017) that with AI making its way deep into our societies, among the over 700 types
of occupations in the USA, about 47% are likely to be replaced with AI or robots
within the next 10–20 years. As people and AI start to head into their separate
directions, people’s work will be more creative leading to possible economic
problems. We will have to start making multifaceted discussions about various
problems that we can see coming in the future. They involve humans’ sense of
ethics and values being affected by AI judgments, responsibilities about accidents
caused by AI judgments, legal issues related to using and protecting personal
information and privacy, concerns about education to bring out creativity through
learning the advantages and limitations of AI technologies, qualification of
researchers in AI research and development, and many other problems that lie
ahead of us (CAO 2017).
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Chapter 3
Contemporary Societies and Risk
Shoji Tsuchida, Seiji Kondo, and Kenji Koshiyama
Abstract We plan our safety measures under economic, personnel and time con-
straints. The extent of how far we take these measures depends on our acknowl-
edgement of risk of whether we “stop because it is risky” or we “cannot stop because
of its benefits despite its risks”. This chapter discusses our risk recognition and
concerns about mass media that strongly affect our risk recognition. It also over-
views differences in risk evaluation about natural disasters and social disasters.
Keywords Disaster frequency · Mass media · Risk assessment · Risk recognition ·
Vulnerability approach
3.1 How People Cope with Risks in Contemporary Societies
3.1.1 Risk Perception by Human
Advancement of scientific technologies has given a great number of convenience
and benefits to human. The power, however, that scientific technologies produce is
far greater than what we, a mere biological being, are born with. We thus started to
have anxiety against risks associated with scientific technologies going out of our
control. In fact, the 2010 Gulf of Mexico oil spill and the 2011 Tokyo Electric Power
Company’s Fukushima Daiichi NPP accident, although such events are rare, had us
experience the great dangers and damages that accompany the introduction of
scientific technologies. ISO defined risk as “effect of uncertainty” (ISO 2009).
Risk perception is about acknowledging future dangers with uncertainty in whether
they will actually take place or not and, at the same time, acknowledging future
benefits with uncertainty in whether they can be gained or not.
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Humans are not good at making probability-based judgements of uncertain
events. And we tend not to carry conflicting emotions about an event at the same
time; thus, if we try to perceive the negative side of an event (danger) and its positive
side (benefit), we get exhausted. We, therefore, tend to fall into the pitfall of
perceiving risk based on partial information about an event, unless we have high
motivations to evaluate the event. We also lean towards single-sided judgements that
there are no benefits with dangerous matters or no dangers with profitable ones by
ignoring one or the other, i.e. danger or benefit. This tendency is called affect
heuristic because it is an emotional judgement of “bad things (matters disliked) are
dangerous” or “good things (favored matters) are profitable” (Finucane et al. 2000;
Tsuchida 2011). Also, not limited to risk perception, we have the habit of only
looking at information that support our judgements (self-justification). We carry our
own ideas (schema) about the reality, and we tend to perform risk perception based
on our own ideas.
Another bias in making a judgement is that it is affected more by information that
is easier to remember. Tversky and Kahneman reported results of an experiment
where Americans were asked if more English words starts with “r” or have “r” as the
third character, and although there are more of the latter, most Americans answered
that there are more that start with “r”. The reason was because the former is easier to
recall compared to the latter (Tversky and Kahneman 1974). Similarly, those with
strong memories of airplane accidents, tend to think there are more airplane acci-
dents than automobile accidents.
When we make judgements about risk, “dread risk” and “unknown risk” are
clearly the especially dominant factors. We tend to judge matters that are more
frightening and matters that we lack knowledge about as more dangerous (Dimen-
sion of risk perception: Slovic 1987). People basically have a logical and conscien-
tious judging system (fast thinking) and an intuitive and emotional judging system
(slow thinking) (Kahneman 2011). Risk perception relates to emotions of fear,
anxiety and desire; thus, it receives strong effects from the intuitive and emotional
judging system. This tendency is one of the reasons for our risk perception to differ
from objective facts. There are about 126 psychological models and theories, in
addition to the one discussed above, that cause distortion in our risk perception.
3.1.2 Significance of Risk Perception for Resolving Social
Problems
We want to live in societies that offer more safety; however, when we implement
safety measures to resolve social problems, we have restrictions in budget (economic
restrictions) and human resources (personnel restrictions) and when to complete the
work (time restrictions). The more budget, personnel and time we spend, the level of
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safety goes higher; however, we end up spending the best within reasonable and
rational ranges. This is called the “as low as reasonably achievable (ALARA)”
standards. Our risk perception, at the end, determines the levels of “reasonable and
rational ranges that are possible”. In other words, the extent to implement safety so it
is “safe enough” depends on our risk perception of whether we “stop because it is
risky” or we “cannot stop because of its benefits despite its risks”.
A measure to reduce the danger of an event often increases the odds for another
risk in realistic safety measures, like not using preservatives which are food additives
will increase the danger of food poisoning. Also, a strategy to lower risks often
results in reducing the benefit, e.g. driving slower delays the time of arrival at the
destination. The final decision to prioritize which risk to lower among all dangerous
events or how far to reduce the risk when the cost has to be balanced with profit
depends on our risk perception.
Our risk perception is affected by the situation that surrounds us. For example,
developing countries with large crop damage by locusts could face starvation to
deaths in the following year. Under such circumstances, if it can effectively control
the outbreak of insect pest, the carcinogenicity of pesticide is often unrecognized. In
general, under poverty conditions, people develop strong feelings to make profit and
tend to recognize present dangers as within safety limits. In contrary, when
surrounded by wealth, people do not have an urge to make profit and recognize
even the smallest danger as unacceptable.
There are two styles of risk governance in securing safety for the society; one is
top-down and the other is bottom-up style. The top-down style typically has skilled
administrators, researchers and engineers to plan and implement safety measures by
giving instructions or orders to the general public. On the other hand, in a matured
democratic society where democracy has penetrated the society with a large number
of citizens armed with advanced education, the people want to build their own safety
measures. This style is bottom-up. If the general public in the bottom-up style forms
risk perception that match those of experts, i.e. researchers, engineers and adminis-
trators, the results are the same safety measured with top-down style.
Slovic, however, pointed out that risk perception between experts and the general
public is largely different (Slovic 1987). For example, experts recognize that auto-
mobiles carry higher danger than NPPs based on death toll data; however, the
general public tends to recognize that NPPs are more dangerous. These differences
in risk recognition often lead to the general public refusing the safety measures
suggested by experts in bottom-up type policies. For bottom-up-type policies to
function reasonably, therefore, risk governance or risk communication plays impor-
tant roles in balancing risk perception for the whole society.
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3.1.3 Contemporary Societies and Mass Media
In the contemporary world, the mass media largely affects risk recognition by the
people.
One of the phrases that describes today’s societies is “advanced information
society”. The advancement of information communication technologies allows us
to transfer various information over the world in split seconds. We can now easily
place our hand on the information we want anytime and from anywhere using these
technologies.
The information generator takes a variety of forms including the central or local
government, a corporation, a non-profit organization (NPO), a school, a hospital or
local residents, but among them all, those that carry information broadcasting as their
occupation and send out information towards the mass are the mass media. Many of
them take an enormous amount of information, edit and process them into their own
shapes (Tuchman 1978) and constantly and continually send them to the audience
and readers via the television, radio, newspaper and magazines. These conventional
style media are called legacy media which are losing chances of reaching the youth
after the internet made its way to the world. Nevertheless, they, in fact, still have
large influences.
The mass media carry with them the “agenda setting function” to select what to
discuss at the time and present them, the “gatekeeping function” to guide the mass to
look at specific topics and the “watchdog function” to keep eyes on actions by power
organizations like policy decisions by the government, executions by the adminis-
tration or judgements by the judicial system. The mass media, however, tends to
shape public opinions along the lines of the mass interest, thus, often end up causing
social confusion themselves. Especially when a large number of reporters gather at
the scene of disasters or accidents, they tend to corner and torture the victims. These
problems of mobs of overheated reporters are sometimes called “media scrum” in
Japan extending the meaning of the original English phrase to such happenings. It
has also been pointed out some years ago that the media after “sensationalism” often
focus on the pain and grief of victims and produce exaggerated information at the
price of exposing privacies (Virilio 2005).
Information transfer by the mass media, if conducted effectively, can lead to swift
actions against approaching dangers, or it can also cause amplification of initially
minor troubles leading to serious situations. In Risikogesellschaft (Risk Society),
Beck pointed out that where risk has spread to individuals and societies, the role of
the mass media cannot be ignored (Beck 1986).
Events with social impact like disasters or incidents turn into “social events” only
after they are publicized by the media. For example, when victims of a major
earthquake living in temporary housing die one after another with earthquake-
related deaths, if the media does not cover the happenings to transfer and share the
information with those that did not suffer from the disaster, the serious events are the
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“same as never happened”, and there will not even be the desire to learn lessons from
them. In contrast, composing a “media event (Dayan and Katz 1992)” in a way so we
can learn lessons can expect more supporters and thorough preparations throughout
the nation even in case of local disasters. The risk society and the information society
develop in an interrelated manner. Risk is heard of as information, and the relay of
information always has some risk. We need to acknowledge these facts to survive
through the contemporary society.
3.2 Evaluation and Measures Against Risks
in Contemporary Societies
3.2.1 Purpose of Risk Evaluation
Whether the disaster is natural or social, the concept of risk covers a wide range and
there are a number of evaluation methods about it. For example, the effect of
chemical substances to the human body or cancer risk on health with food items
are evaluated with dose-response relationships that relate the biological reaction to
dosage of chemical substances to set the guidelines for standards of making judge-
ment. New disaster preparations are often discussed with the damage volume (cost of
damage) and probability of damage causing disaster (exceedance probability). Other
practices include setting standards for part strength from the relation of damage
(destruction) to strength and frequency of force applied on the part or developing
insurance plans based on the relation of magnitude of damage from an accident and
the frequency of the accident.
All these evaluation methods share the same purpose of setting quantitative
guidelines (1) against an event that is likely to happen, (2) to implement some
countermeasure, (3) so proper comparison and judgement are made. Risk evaluation
is nothing but a probabilistic (quantitative) description of a damaging event that is
likely to happen in the future for the purpose of making a judgement. At each point in
history, human society has recognized actual risk through risk evaluation and
executed measures to reduce the risks. The safety of our society now is the accu-
mulated result of such efforts.
3.2.2 Understanding Disasters
A natural disaster is “a damaging event caused by natural phenomena”, meaning just
a natural phenomenon alone does not mean a disaster. Today’s social sciences have a
mainstream concept about the relation between natural disasters and human society
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that “natural disasters are caused by the combination of external force from the
nature and vulnerability of the society” (Wisener 2003). Thus, in expressing natural
disasters as risks, the expression is
risk½  ¼ hazard½   vulnerability½ 
where [hazard] means a natural phenomenon and [vulnerability] the social environ-
ment. If we apply this formula to general risk evaluation, it means
probability of a natural phenomenon over a set strength½ 
 amount of damage due to social vulnerability½ 
and it is unique in combining natural and social phenomena. This expression shows
us that a same size hazard would result in different magnitudes of damage depending
on where it happened, and a hazard with physical size of twice as big does not
necessarily mean the amount of damage is also twice. Damage from a natural
disaster is not only dependent on the magnitude of the natural phenomenon, but it
also depends on strengths in prevention and response to it at each region that is hit
and also on the interrelated effect of the natural and social phenomena.
A social disaster is “a man caused disaster that causes damage to people and the
society”, and we may want to formulate it similarly to a natural disaster with the
cause being the [hazard] and people and the society that suffers damage the [vul-
nerability]. Today, however, such a formulation is not common in evaluating risks of
social disasters.
In the contemporary society, natural phenomena change slowly; however, human
life and social environment change so rapidly. For both natural and social disasters,
human- and society-side factors have stronger effects on risk evaluation.
3.2.3 Difference in Evaluations of Natural and Social
Disaster Risks
The most common risk evaluation takes the form
amount of damage caused by the event½   probability of event½ 
As we discussed earlier, clear distinction of natural disasters and social disasters
is difficult; however, this section will discuss the differences between the two.
In general, in the contemporary society, natural disasters are less frequent than
social disasters. Their low frequencies make it difficult to predict occurrences of
natural disasters in a timeframe. Damages that local areas suffer from natural
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disasters are diverse; thus, estimating the amount of damage to local communities is
extremely difficult as well. Evaluating risk from natural disasters, therefore, takes the
form of assuming several scenarios that can take place and estimating the amount of
damage for each scenario instead of carrying out strict calculations. Summing up
[magnitude of damage probability of occurrence] for all expectable cases gives the
expectation of damage that serves as the basic evaluation metrics for discussing
measures and their extent.
Natural disasters also have different effects depending on the regions. Sociology
of disaster offers ways to clarify which societies are vulnerable to what disasters and
how such vulnerability is born. This method allows relative comparison of how
susceptible each region is against a disaster, and it gives the guideline for regional
risk evaluation against natural disasters. Kenneth Hewitt, on the other hand, warns
against determining risks of natural disasters only by reviewing social vulnerabilities
and ignoring external forces of the nature. He claims natural phenomena are hazards
that cause damages; thus, their attributes should affect risk evaluation (Hewitt 1997).
Estimating levels of damage is not easy; however, natural phenomena and geological
features are analysable with physics, and the results can be probabilistically
expressed. The National Seismic Hazard Maps for Japan (HERP 2005) is one such
example that gives the guideline for risk evaluation of natural disasters with relative
assessment for each region based on probabilities of occurrences of natural phenom-
ena, the risk factors. Both reports are useful in promoting preparations against them
at local regions.
Most risk evaluations of social disasters are limited to events with relatively
simple relations between cause and effect (damage). Data on frequencies of such
events are readily available, thus, statistical analyses are feasible with high accuracy.
Limiting the events also make ways for experiments and observation-based analyses.
These evaluations are much more accurate than risk evaluations of natural disasters.
On the other hand, among social disasters, those with low frequencies like wars to
global pandemic apply methods similar to risk evaluation of natural disasters.
As scientific technology advances, phenomena are better clarified, and analysis
methods are enhanced and significances of risk evaluation for both types of disasters
are higher. At this point, however, from cause and effect relations, risk evaluations of
social disasters tend to lead to direct and actual measures and preparations. Since the
two risk evaluations differ in their purposes and accuracies, comparing the two by
putting them on the same table is not advisable. We must understand the meaning of
the quantitative evaluations from the methods and their purposes.
3.2.4 Discussion on Global Risk
Among the globally discussed risks in the contemporary societies, those counted as
significant, with the magnitudes of effect and possibilities of occurrence, are
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“extreme weather events”, “natural disasters”, “large-scale involuntary migration”,
“terrorist attacks”, “cyberattacks” and “failure of climate-change mitigation and
adaptation” (World Economic Forum 2017). If we look at specific regions, the
possibilities of occurrence drop; however, for the entire world, the odds are high,
and they will affect the entire world. These risks were identified as combined
wisdom by specialists and experts and although, not quantitative, we can acknowl-
edge them as our primary global risks.
For each of these risks, quantitative risk evaluation is in progress for purpose,
e.g. commodities are available in insurance and investment industries. Concerns on
extreme weather events and natural disasters led the United Nations to form frame-
works, agreements and organizations for them, and these topics are now discussion
items among the world countries. Risk evaluations are discussed there based on
legitimate data to set target standards for each country.
As technology advances, people, capital and information travel beyond borders of
countries raising potential risks within our societies. We now need to form cooper-
ative systems to take measures against them. For our cooperative efforts of risk
recognition and risk mitigation, the common language of “risk-related mathematics”
is playing a big role.
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Chapter 4
Modern Societies and Establishment
of Scholarship
Toshihiro Kawaguchi and Tadahiro Motoyoshi
Abstract The previous chapter discussed characteristics of contemporary societies
in problems related to safety. Histories of birth of societies and cities and their
maturing are deeply related to histories of birth and development of scholarship and
science. This chapter overviews how scholarship and science were born, how they
branched out and specialized, and then how they unified and formed interdisciplin-
ary studies beyond boundaries of specialized fields. It also explains histories of
various academic fields related to societal safety sciences.
Keywords Industrial revolution · Safety engineering · Scholarship · Scientific
revolution
4.1 Human Societies and the Start of Scholarship
4.1.1 Origin of Scholarship
Oxford Advanced Learner’s Dictionary defines the scholarship to mean “the serious
study of an academic subject and the knowledge and methods involved.” Subjects
that we study at universities, philosophy, psychology, law, economics, sociology,
science, engineering, and medicine are all scholarships systematized based on
knowledge and theories. Here we will first review the origin of scholarships.
Human, since ancient times before civilization, empirically found regularities in
the nature deeply related to their lives, i.e., movements of the sun and stars, transition
of seasons, and change of weather. We then acquired knowledge about these natural
phenomena and applied them to farming of crops and livestock. The ancient
Mesopotamian civilization, said to had started around 3500 BC, had a number of
city states. Priests and leaders that ruled the city states defined letters, numbering
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systems, weights and other measures, the calendar, and so on and acquired various
knowledge about mathematics and astronomy. The ancient Egyptian civilization,
said to had started around 3000 BC, carried the knowledge from Mesopotamia and
established the basics of mathematics and astronomy.
During the time of Mesopotamian and Egyptian civilizations, people built canals
and irrigation facilities for improving their farming work, and also huge structures
like pyramids as city states formed. These works added knowledge about land
survey and astronomy lifting people’s understanding of the nature to much higher
levels. People at the time, however, believed gods made nature’s moves that gave
people benefits and, however, at times would pose threats to the people. In other
words, people were dominated by the nature leaving their destinies in the gods’
hands. The understanding of nature at this time was merely an accumulation of
empirical knowledge that was necessary for autocracy that led people’s livings.
Thus, there probably was no attempt to explain nature systematically in a scholarship
manner.
When poleis were established in ancient Greece around 800 BC, efforts to
establish a systematic explanation of the accumulated empirical knowledge about
the nature with unified principles started. This move is understood as the origin of
scholarship that attempted to explain the world by systematically understanding the
nature with laws and theories within a civilization that explained all phenomena as
god’s act.
Thales (~625 BC–~547 BC) is said to be the first philosopher that put scholarship
into practice. Thales and other natural scholars of Ionia searched for “arche (princi-
ple)” that formed the origin of nature and all things. Thales believed water was the
arche constructing everything in the world and preached that everything was a
transformation of water. Ancient Greek philosophy started by Thales was carried
over to Plato’s (427 BC – 347 BC) idealism (theory of “ideas”), and the basis of
scholarship was established. Idealism asserts that reality is constructed upon idea and
individual reality that we sense is merely provisional images. Plato attempted to
understand the world of reality in a top-down manner and theoretically systematized
it with ideas.
The concepts of natural scholars starting from Thales were summarized by Plato’s
student Aristotle (384 BC – 322 BC). Aristotle was critical against the concept of
placing formless ideas in the center and started to preach the concepts of “eidos
(form)” and “hulê (matter).” Eidos are existing substances that are observable in the
real world and hulê material or ingredients that form substances. For example, for a
wooden table, its eidos is the shape of the table and hulê is wood. Describing
substances under observation with distinction between eidos and hulê is the basics
of scientific observation. Aristotle built the basic scientific theory and methodology
of describing the results of observing substances, storing the results, organizing and
systematizing them. He further divided scholarship into specialized fields depending
on the substance. These fields were physics, astronomy, meteorology, politics,
ethics, and so on, and Aristotle systematized each field. Understanding nature in
this manner largely contributed to raising people’s interest into scholarship. And
categorizing the nature, setting the divided nature substances as objects for fields,
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and understanding the world in a bottom-up manner are the first of scientific
thinking, and his work is said to be the origin of the variety of scholarships.
4.1.2 Decline of Scholarship in the West and Its Development
in the Arabic Regions
The number of scholarships originating from Aristotle of ancient Greek continued to
develop into the first century AD. Then, however, scholarship in Europe declined
until the Middle Ages. Techniques in civil engineering and practical solutions for
supplying water and building roads advanced; however, scholarships as science did
not record much progresses.
Among the causes of the decline of scholarships in European societies during this
period, one was that development of physics in Greek came from the desire to
“understand the structure of the world.” Europe back then was dominated by the
Christian churches which taught that God was the only being that clarified the truth.
Scientific scholarships that tried to explain various phenomena based on theories
conflicted with Christian theology, thus, were frowned upon and declined.
Modern European historians look back at the time after ancient Greek to the
Middle Ages as the “dark ages” of the world’s scientific development. Recent
researches, however, revealed that Islamic civilization advanced in Arabic countries
during the ninth to the fifteenth centuries (Jacquart 2005). During the era in Arabia,
references by Hippocrates (460 BC–375 BC), Plato, Aristotle, and so on were
translated into Arabic leading to development of Arabic science in astrology,
mathematics, and medicine. During the time of Abbasid Caliphate (750–1258), an
intellectual center “House of Wisdom (Bayt al-Ḥikma)” built in the capitol Baghdad
gathered scholars of all fields and all ethnic groups of Turkish, Iranian, and Jewish. It
is not an exaggeration to say that Arabic science was ahead of European science
from the eighth to the eleventh century (Haskins 1927). The Arabs took over the
Christianity-dominated Europeans to lead the world of scholarships.
4.1.3 Birth of Universities and the Twelfth-Century
Renaissance
In the twelfth century in Europe, movements started to reevaluate the heritages of
ancient Greek civilization and revive them. The ancient Greek scholarships not
passed on within Europe were transferred to Arabia to go under further development
and were reimported back to Europe and translated from Arabic to Latin. The
restoration of scholarships in Europe then that started by accepting Arabic sciences
is called the twenty-first-century Renaissance (Haskins 1927).
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During that time, a number of universities were born in the cities of Europe
(Table 4.1) where translations of Arabic science into Latin took place. Universities at
that time had the task of studying the vast amount of knowledge from the ancient
Greek sciences and spread them throughout Europe (Haskins 1927). During this
time, books on medicine by Hippocrates and publications by Aristotle were trans-
lated into Latin to merge into systematic teachings with those of Christianity.
Philosophy based on Aristotle’s work was called “scholastic philosophy” and turned
into major scholarships at universities in Europe. The rise of Greek scientific
rationality, however, led to heated discussions with Christian beliefs. Aristotle’s
descriptions of the world conflicted with the teachings of Christianity and European
scholars argued over where the truths were (Haskins 1927).
After the twelfth century was over, the Faculty of Arts at the University of Paris
took the central role in promoting “Latin Averroism” that supported teachings by the
Arabic philosopher Averroes (Haskins 1927). Averroism taught a double-truth
theory that despite the discrepancies, both Aristotle’s philosophical truth and truth
of the Christian teaching were both acceptable. The churches and orthodox theolo-
gians strongly opposed Averroism and often condemned it heretical. In 1277, the
bishop of Paris, Étienne Tempier (? – 1279), researched the debates at the University
of Paris and declared that anyone in support of the 219 Averroism propositions will
be condemned and kicked out. In Europe, where visions of the world that casted
doubt on Christianity were unacceptable and while accepting Aristotelianism, its
cosmology and theory of motion were not accepted.
4.2 Birth of Modern Science
4.2.1 Pioneers of Modern Science
In the European societies back then, people believed in Ptolemaic geocentric cos-
mology that placed the earth at the center of the universe. Nicolaus Copernicus
Table 4.1 Primary
universities and their years
established
Year established Name (Country)
1088 Università di Bologna (Italy)
1150 Université de Paris (France)
1167 University of Oxford (England)
1173 Università degli Studi di Salerno (Italy)
1204 Università a Vicenza (Italy)
1208 Universitat de València (Spain)
1209 University of Cambridge (England)
1215 Università di Arezzo (Italy)
1220 Université d’Orléans (France)
1222 Università degli Studi di Padova (Italy)
Data source: Haskins (1923) and latest data
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(1473–1543) discovered that his theory that set the sun at the center of the universe
explained planetary motions rationally and beautifully. This Copernican theory was
often quoted in scientific discoveries that conflicted with the Christian belief.
Copernicus, however, had a Christian church title and is said not to have explained
Copernican theory in a way that opposed Christian teachings (Butterfield 1957).
Astronomer Tycho Brahe (1546–1601) kept accurate records of celestial obser-
vations. Johannes Kepler (1571–1630) discovered that planets circled around the sun
in elliptical orbits with the sun being one of the foci and that the line segment
connecting a planet and the sun swept regions with constant areas during a set time
period. In his publication Astronomia nova (New Astronomy), he wrote about what
are known today as Kepler’s first and second laws of planetary motion. At about the
same time, Galileo Galilei (1564–1642) discovered the “law of falling bodies” that
the time for a body to fall freely was independent of its mass and was proportional to
the square of the elapsed time.
In the seventeenth century, scientific approaches to the huge amount of data,
collected through celestial observations and physical experiments, started to look for
essential relations in natural phenomena trying to construct unified theories and
axioms. René Descartes (1596–1650) discovered the law of inertia that a body in
motion continued to move, unless there was resistance, without applying force to it
and opened the world of objective mechanical theories governed by mechanical
forces. Kepler, Galilei, and Descartes are said to be the scientists that built the basics
of modern science.
Both Kepler and Galilei, however, believed that God was a great mathematician
and the nature God created was written in mathematical words. Their pursuit of
nature was in line with their beliefs in Christianity, and they were trying to
understand God’s will. Science today has a variety of aspects including human
ruling of parts of nature, experiments, discovery of laws, mathematical physics, and
mechanical views of the world. Each of these elements had profound relationships
with Christian beliefs in Europe when it was born at the dawn of modern science
(Haskins 1927).
Isaac Newton (1642–1727) from England gathered the results of Copernicus’s
“Copernican theory,” Kepler’s “laws of planetary motions,” and Descartes’s “law of
inertia” and synthesized them into a theoretical system to form the basics of modern
science. Newton, in his 1687 publication of Philosophiæ Naturalis Principia
Mathematica (Mathematical Principles of Natural Philosophy), mathematically
proved planetary motions and explained the “law of universal gravitation,” “law of
inertia,” and other results. His work proved that bodies and celestial motions are
mathematically explained in a unified framework. By the end of the seventeenth
century, a highly generic system of theories was established instead of a collection of
fragments of knowledge. An English historian Herbert Butterfield calls this era of
revolutionary changes in natural science that gave birth to modern science, “the
seventeenth century scientific revolution (Butterfield 1957).”
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4.2.2 Birth of Academic Societies and Specialized Fields
Among the contributors to modern sciences, some had teaching jobs at universities.
Galilei taught mathematics and astronomy at University of Pisa and University of
Padova. Newton held the position of Lucasian Professor of Mathematics at the
University of Cambridge. In the seventeenth century, the scientists established
new communities, academic societies outside of universities. The wealthy class in
control of politics, economy, and culture in cities competed with churches at the time
and sponsored their formation and operations. “Accademia dei Lincei (Academy of
the Lynx-Eyed)” founded in 1603 in Rome for the pursuit of nature is said to be one
of the oldest of such societies (Furukawa 2000). In Firenze (Florence), Italy, the
House of Medici sponsored the “Accademia del Cimento (Academy of Experi-
ment),” and many scholars conducted a variety of experiments as the academy
name suggests. In 1662, the King of England, Scotland, and Ireland, Charles II
(1630–1685), gave Royal Charter to the Royal Society of London, started in 1660,
that functioned as the hub for scholars dedicated to new scholarships for studying the
nature. In 1665, the society started periodic publication of Philosophical Trans-
actions so the members could publish their research results. It was the beginning of
the system of academic journals for scholars to publish their accomplishments in
scientific researches.
The establishment of Royal Society of London was largely affected by Francis
Bacon’s (1561–1626) scientific ideology that science ruled the nature. Bacon,
known for his quote “For also knowledge itself is power,” believed that nature
given to human by God could also be ruled with the power of knowledge. The Royal
Society of London was established as a community for researchers of the nature that
strived to understand many natural phenomena through observations and experi-
ments. In 1666, “Académie des sciences (Academy of Sciences)” was established in
Paris which was nationally supported, instead of by churches or private patrons, to
carry out scientific researches under the support by the nation (Ornstein 1928).
The spirit of modern sciences established by Bacon, Descartes, Newton, and so
on inspired French philosophers in the eighteenth century, and they believed the
scientific revolution would not only advance natural research topics, but it would
also affect the entire human activities (Butterfield 1957). Illuminati at the time tried
to change Christian recognition of nature and social recognition by the general
public with modern sciences based on rationality.
In the nineteenth century, natural sciences advanced internally at an enormous
speed. Physics, chemistry, biology, and geology especially shaped up their own
independent scholarship fields (Butterfield 1957). In France, in fact, a number of
independent academies started their activities: Académie Nationale de Pharmacie
(French National Academy of Pharmacy) in 1803, Société de Géographie (Geo-
graphical Society) and Société d’Histoire Naturelle de Paris (Paris Natural History
Society) in 1821, Société géologique de France (France Society of Geology) in
1830, and in 1843, Société de Chirurgie de Paris (Society of Surgery). They were the
start of specialized associations formed by scientists in the study area where they
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could cooperate in pursuing studies in the applicable fields, a style still carried on
today. In Germany and France, modern universities for advanced education were
also established. In the twentieth century, many academic fields taught today at
universities founded the basics of their scholarship systems, and today, universities
that carry out researches and education in each field exist over the world outside of
Europe as well.
4.3 Advancement of Scholarship and Specialization
In general, scholarships are categorized into “natural sciences,” “social sciences,”
and “humanities” (Table 4.2). Natural sciences encompass a group of scholarships
that study laws of natural phenomena. Categorization in Japan often takes the form
of “rikei (scientific)” and “bunkei (social sciences and humanities).” Scholarships in
rikei correspond to natural sciences and those of bunkei to social sciences and
humanities. Social sciences study phenomena in human societies and humanities
study culture that human has created.
The idea of categorizing scholarships into natural sciences, social sciences, and
humanities is relatively new. Natural phenomena like motions of the sun and stars,
flow of water in rivers attracted the interest of scientists in old days. Scholarships
started from pursuing truth in rules and matters that surrounded people, and in
ancient Greece, it was called “philosophy.” How the human hearts worked and the
language that people used also caught the attention of scholars as time passed by. It
was natural that we also started looking at monetary economy, law, and administra-
tion as study subjects with the development of human societies.
During the dawn of scholarship, each scholar took interest in a variety of subjects
and pursued the truth. As knowledge accumulated and scholarship made progress,
the scholars turned their interest into more profound realities. The subjects that each
scholar studied gradually narrowed down into specific areas, and scholarships
headed into diversified specific areas. Table 4.2 shows the general scholarship
areas. Engineering today are further divided into, mechanical engineering, civil
engineering, electrical engineering, chemical engineering, and so on. Further, the
scholarship of mechanical engineering is split into a number of specialized areas of
fluid dynamics, thermodynamics, strength of materials, and so on. Fluid dynamics
alone can also go under finer divisions. Scholarships today have gone through
Table 4.2 Categorization of scholarships
Scientific
category Primary scholarship fields
Natural sciences Physics, chemistry, biology, astronomy, medicine, engineering, . . .
Social sciences Economics, operation research, law, sociology, administration, education,
. . .
Humanities Psychology, history, linguistics, religion, literature, philosophy, . . .
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division after division with the advancement of what to study and research, and the
trend will probably continue that way in the future.
As scholarship advanced, “specialists” that study specific areas in detail
increased. A single specialized area, however, can only apply principles and law
to a narrow range, and specialists have hard time applying their skills or creating new
concepts. This led to new ways that are catching the attention of training human
resources that have one detail specialty but also basic knowledge over a wide area.
Tom Kelley and Jonathan Littman call this type of person “T-shaped” to distinguish
them from “I-shaped” people that thoroughly study single areas (Kelley and Littman
2000). Those with wide basic knowledge over a wide area with two or more
specialized subjects are called “Π(Pi)-shaped” people. Here, “I,” “T,” and “Π” are
not the first characters of English words, but they are selected for their shapes
representing the concepts. You can understand that the length of the horizontal
bars represents the wide knowledge and vertical bars the number of specialties.
Whether “T-shaped” or “Π-shaped,” the width of the basic knowledge was
thought to stay within a certain range. Leaders of corporations, local or central
governments, however, have to understand to a certain extent of all areas, e.g.,
economics, law, and physics, to give directions when needed. Solutions for detailed
problems can be left to specialists in the areas; thus, the knowledge in each
scholarship area does not have to reach so deep. Leaders are required to have
knowledge over a wide area in the real sense that is not framed within the system
of scholarships in Table 4.2, that is, the qualification for a “generalist.” The
advancement of scholarship led to specialization in each specific scholarship area;
however, the society today needs generalists having knowledge over a wide range of
specific areas and being able to give proper directions to real specialists in each area.
4.4 Births of Safety Engineering, Disaster Science, and Risk
Analysis
This section overviews how specific fields related to societal safety sciences, i.e.,
safety engineering, disaster science, risk analysis, and so on were born. As we
explained in Sect. 4.2.2, the medieval Europe saw huge advancements in science
called “scientific revolution.” In England, “industrial revolution” started to take
shape in the mid-eighteenth century. The industrial revolution gave leaping steps
forward for scientific technologies and, however, also caused accidents at levels
never expected before. James Watt’s (1736–1819) steam engine is often quoted as a
symbol of industrial revolution. The steam engine is a machine that converts thermal
energy of steam into mechanical power. The steam engine allowed machines to
produce huge forces and transfer ships and railway cars at high speed. The strong
machine and fast-moving transporters caused disastrous accidents when human body
contacted them in wrong ways. As the number of accidents rose, people turned
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conscious about safety and the concept of industrial safety was born. Then it was
followed by the scholarship of safety engineering that sought ways of preventing
accidents and disasters. Not only to design and produce safe machines, researches on
the psychology of safety and laws to keep the societies safe are developed as well.
Human already knew about dangerous natural phenomena of earthquakes,
typhoons, flooding, and lightning and planned to protect safety of their way of living
before social disasters entered their lives with the advancement of scientific tech-
nologies. Back then, however, without the knowledge of how natural phenomena
took place, human had to protect themselves with empirical methods. In fact, plate
tectonic theory was developed only in the late 1960s. Observation balloons went up
in the sky in the 1930s; however, we had to wait till 1960 to hear about weather
satellites. Thus, it took “disaster science” a long time to make its way into the system
of scholarships. Engineering technologies and social scientific studies can now
protect human lives and societies to a certain extent.
Risk analysis is also a relatively new field of study. Today’s societies with highly
advanced scientific technologies started to see complex phenomena involving
health, environment, ecosystem, economics, and all other fields beyond whether
matters were dangerous or safe. As the concept of risk with uncertainty is ever more
important, the “Society for Risk Analysis”was established in the USA. The societies
today are subject to a variety of risks, and it is called “Risk Society” (Beck 1986).
When we recognize events of traffic accidents, NPP accidents, natural disasters of
typhoons and earthquakes, safety of food, and financial crises from the viewpoint of
risk, our societies must now deal with them in an intelligent manner.
The advancement of scientific technologies made our lives rich; however on the
other hand, we are faced with a variety of risks and safety concerns of large-scale
disasters, concerns about resources, energy, and the environment that come with
corporate activities, traffic accidents, and terrorism attacks. For us to build safe and
secure societies is one of the most important problems to solve, and for that goal, we
need to pursue research, take practical actions, and educate human resources.
Problems with safety and security, however, are often hard to solve with a single
force in a traditional field of specialized area. In search of solutions for safety and
security issues of today’s society, we have to build a new area of scholarship that
gathers wisdom from a number of specialties.
Today, scientific technologies are deeply related to our society, but some scien-
tific problems cannot be solved within the realm of science alone. We can pose
questions to science in such situations; however, science alone cannot provide
answers to them. The state is generally called a trans-scientific situation (Weinberg
1974). Issues related to safety and security often are trans-scientific. Solving a trans-
scientific problem involves not just scientists, but citizens, as a stakeholder, have to
take part in making decisions. Problems with safety and security directly relate to life
and property; thus, we cannot leave them to decisions by others, and we cannot stay
indifferent. We have to face the need to educate human resources with good
knowledge in societal safety issues to solve the variety of safety and security
problems in today’s societies.
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Part II
Events That Threaten Human
and Its Societies
Chapter 5
Human, Nature, and Artificial Products
Mamoru Ozawa
Abstract Nature and societies that surround us are full of hazards. Depending on
their intensities and surroundings, they develop into incidents. What artificial facil-
ities are around, what actions people involved take, and states of societies or nature
can further turn them into accidents or disasters. Risk management is ever more
important for controlling such development and minimizing damages. This chapter
overviews how hazards develop into accidents and damages and discusses several
topics in risk management.
Keywords Hazard · Heinrich’s law · Incident · Risk evaluation · Risk space
5.1 Environment That Surrounds Human and Societies
We, humans, since our first existence on the earth, have formed societies under
certain sets of rules in the natural environment. The industrial revolution at the end of
the eighteenth century triggered development of large-scale factory production
systems, as well as power generation systems, systems for electricity generation
and distribution, and so on. Once the transportation networks formed with steam-
powered ships and railways, the human societies turned into somethings fundamen-
tally different from what they used to be. The spread of factory production systems
caused problems with health management and safety measures for factory workers,
and in the mid-nineteenth century, England passed the Factory Act. Also as marine
transportation turned active, people came up with ship inspection systems and
marine insurance systems in case of marine accidents. Further for power generation
systems, as people aimed at developing higher efficiency boilers, many of the efforts
resulted in explosion accidents leading to boiler inspection systems by third parties.
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As the industries advanced, transportation and logistics turned large-scaled, and
today people and freight travel the world. Growth of computers and network
technologies has now made high-speed transfer of large amounts of information
across countries giving us great conveniences. Faster transportation and logistics,
however, were factors that caused worldwide spread of food safety problems like
mad cow disease (bovine spongiform encephalopathy, BSE) or pandemics. The
quick information communication technologies have led to frequent problems of
personal information leakage and harmful rumors.
The radius of the earth is about 6500 km, and the earth crust where we live in or
on is only about 30 km thick. The theory of plate tectonics says the earth surface is
covered by ten or so plates, and the mantle flowing underneath them moves in
various directions. Japan, at the boundary of the Eurasian and other plates, is often
shaken by major earthquakes caused by sinking of the plates.
Mountains cover about 70% of Japanese land, and since the ancient time, people
lived and produced along rivers or near the oceans. Advancements of societies and
economics caused people to concentrate in cities, where they cut and flattened
mountains, filled lowlands, and built housings. As more people concentrated to
cities, agricultural regions in the mountains are now facing depopulation and eco-
nomic gaps with urban regions. We are living in an environment as a result of
intertwinement of natural, societal, and historical factors.
5.2 Hazards in Natural and Social Environments
We will next explain about hazards in the natural and social environments with some
examples. Large-scale inter-plate earthquakes or direct earthquakes cause large
damages to the infrastructures, railways, and road networks. When tsunami waves
follow them, like in the case of the Great East Japan earthquake, they cause large
casualties as well as major damages to power plants and port facilities in coastal
areas. An earthquake is a phenomenon of a rock bed shifting caused by relative
motion between plates and fault activities; thus, force on the rock bed is the hazard in
case of an earthquake. Concentrated heavy rainstorms directly cause sediment
disasters, frequently taking place in recent years. If we, however, review the mech-
anisms of sediment disasters, housing development and forest damages weaken the
water retention capacities of soil and the imbalance among inter-ground friction, and
viscosity and gravity on ground are factors leading to sediment disasters as well. The
hazard for sediment disasters is lower friction caused by rainfall.
In large cities, electricity grid wiring and gas and water piping are congested, and
in addition, information, logistics, and transportation networks are overcrowded at
high speed. These situations lead to small incidents triggering large catastrophes
with huge damages. The 1977 passenger plane collision in Tenerife, Spain, and the
1985 airplane crash near Mt. Osutaka in Japan both ended up with over 500 casual-
ties. Major NPP accidents include the 1986 Chernobyl plant explosion in former
Soviet Union and the 1979 Three Mile Island (TMI) accident in the USA. In Japan in
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March 2011, multiple cores melted down at Fukushima Daiichi NPP. With these
accidents, using high-density energy is the hazard hidden in today’s social
environment.
5.3 Development of Hazards into Accidents and Disasters
Hazards expose themselves as incidents, depending on their intensities and environ-
mental conditions around them. Incidents turn into accidents or disasters with
casualties or property damages depending on the facilities around them, how people
reacted to them, or social systems or natural environment that surrounds them.
In April of 2005, West Japan Railway had a derailing accident on the
Fukuchiyama Line that caused 107 casualties. When the train passed through a
curve, rotational moment due to the centrifugal force being a function of running
speed exceeded rotational moment from gravity, and these physical factors led to
derailing and overturn of the passenger cars. People that live along railway tracks
and passengers are exposed to dangerous situations with railway cars or tracks that
are not fully maintained, troubled train drivers, improper automatic train stops or
fail-safe equipment, lack of frictional force between the tracks and wheels caused by
rain, and many other factors that lead to incidents. Especially, when the cars are
packed during the commute time, and when the train is speeding, like in the case of
Fukuchiyama Line accident, the incident develops into an overturning accident with
a huge number of casualties.
Infrastructures and industrial products consist of a large number of parts and
elements, sensors, computers, and software that control them. If we count a very
large-scale integrated circuits that compose the computer, we understand that our
societies today are built on an extremely huge number of elements that construct
hierarchical systems. For such complex systems, predicting processes or scenarios
that cause hazards to turn into incidents and finally into accidents is extremely
difficult. Even Space Shuttle Challenger, with sufficient safety measures, exploded
immediately after its launch when the simple part O-ring failed. For this accident, the
operation made the mistake in business decision of prioritizing schedule despite
warning from engineers who had recognized the trouble with the O-ring. Organiza-
tional management and human factors place large effects on accidents and natural
disasters when hazards turn into incidents and eventually into accidents or disasters.
5.4 Risks for Evaluating Accidents and Disasters
As ISO defines (ISO/IEC 2014), the combination of damage level and frequency
determines the risk magnitude. Setting the frequency Fi of incident i, and the level of
damage Di,, the next equation evaluates risk Ri;
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Ri ¼ FiDi ð5:1Þ
This equation is an example of evaluating risk, and some evaluations define risk
with the magnitude of damage alone and others with the probability of occurrence.
Chapter 1 discussed deterministic risk assessment and probabilistic risk assess-
ment. Deterministic risk assessment evaluates risk with whether the safety meets the
standards determined by evaluation guideline and tolerance based on scientific
evaluations, technical discussions, or past experiences. Many of general safety
standards, like those of nitrogen oxides (NOx) and particulate matter (PM) in
automobil exhaust gas, and aseismic standards are based on deterministic risk
assessment.
On the other hand, the study known as Rasmussen Report “Reactor Safety Study
– An Assessment of Accident Risks in U.S. Commercial Nuclear Power Plants”
(U.S.NRC 1975; Lee & McCormick 2011) established the probabilistic risk assess-
ment (PRA) methodology. The report evaluated risks with the magnitudes of effect
and annual occurrence frequencies. In general, upon event that causes an accident,
there is some time delay for the effects to propagate to related parts and elements,
and the delay can cause the event to develop into another event. Rasmussen Report
was a breakthrough at the time in that it developed a model that simulated dynamic
system response to take this time delay into account. PRA is applied not only for risk
assessment of NPPs but also for aerospace industries.
Risk assessment quantifies the smallest danger as risk, but at the same time, it
tolerates certain levels of risk (Slovic et al. 2000); however, clarifying which risk to
tolerate under what conditions is difficult. For example, WHO states the guideline
for water quality requires that the probability of waterborne diseases is below the set
standards, specialists to make judgment, and administration and majority of the
public to accept the quality (Hunter and Fewtrell 2001). The requirement of being
accepted by the public is a judgment standard along human psychology and is not
based on scientific roots. What universally applies to risk evaluation is statistic
numbers, like probability of occurrence.
H. J. Otway and R. C. Erdmann reported (Otway and Erdmann 1970) that if the
death count is less than 106 per year, people do not take big interest in the risk
thinking they will not get caught by it. When the count, however, reaches 104 ~ 105
a year, they turn active in reducing the hazard and will accept inconvenience to a
certain extent to avoid the risk. Further at about 103 a year, they no longer accept the
risk and take immediate actions. There is, perhaps, no clear reason why people accept
the death rate of 106 a year, i.e., one out of a million a year. É. Borel, however, in his
1943 book, (Borel 1943) wrote that the chance of 106 (i.e., a little less than 3 out of
2.8 million, the population of Paris back then) is something that people would accept.
The current world population is about seven billion, and for this size population to
match Borel’s victim count, the probability has to drop to 109 ~ 1010 a year. This
example means simple probability calculations do not reach judgments and the
population size matters. The count of 1 out of 1 million is just a statistical number,
and the situation surrounding each case is not taken into account. We tend not to pay
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much attention to accidents in remote locations; however, if it involves a neighbor or a
family member, we suddenly turn intolerant. Whether we tolerate a risk or not is not
just a matter of probability, but it also heavily involves time and spatial distance.
Further detail can be found in, for example, P. Slovic’s book (Slovic 2000).
5.5 Problems That Are Common to Accidents and Disasters
Each event of accident or disaster is an unusual event with different situations in the
event itself, its cause, and surroundings. If we, however, neglect the special circum-
stances with them and relate the level of damage with the chance of occurrence, the
probability distribution shows that large-scale accidents and disasters have small
odds of happening, whereas small and minor events break out frequently. A typical
example is “Heinrich’s law” by H. W. Heinrich (Heinrich 1931) about industrial
accidents in places like factories. It stated that among 330 incidents of the same type,
300 nearly escaped actual damages, but 29 cases involved minor damage, and 1 case
had a major damage. Heinrich also pointed out that behind the 300 cases without
injury, there were thousands of unsafe actions and situations.
Heinrich’s basic idea was that we cannot change the structure leading to accidents
and disasters; however, by reducing unsafe actions, situations could lead to less
disasters without injury and at the same time decrease the numbers of accidents with
minor injury and those with major consequences. We often refer to the 300 cases
without injury “close call” events. Heinrich’s law is applied to other fields like
medicine or railway, and it is a basic concept for today’s accident prevention
measures.
The second characteristic about disasters is that accidents and disasters develop
over time; however, they do not keep spreading forever. Automobile or airplane
accidents happen in split seconds; however, an event at a nuclear plant takes hours to
develop into an accident. Epidemics, at the beginning, start with a small number of
patients, and the number of affected grows because of contact with the infected;
however, over time, the infected will either cure or die, and the number of infected
does not keep growing. In case of natural disasters as well, earthquakes are phe-
nomena that happen over short periods, and in some cases, aftershocks can take long
time to subside. Tsunami and heavy rain, on the other hand, have some time
allowance until the most severe situation arrives; thus, guided evacuation at the
right time can reduce the number of casualties. The time scale of accidents and
disasters are important factors to think about in planning disaster management.
Thirdly, accidents and disasters are not self-contained. That is, those that avoided
direct hits of accidents or disasters still, sometimes, suffer from related damages. The
Great East Japan earthquake had a total count of 18,458 of dead and missing, among
which, as many as 3331 were related deaths due to evacuation-related health matters
like stress. We need to plan against related deaths when we plan countermeasures
against accidents and disasters.
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We can put accidents and disasters in large categories depending on whether their
occurrences are detectible beforehand or not; whether the events are controllable or
not; whether their effects are within a short time period or they last over a long
period, if the damages are local or over a wide area; or whether their damages can
easily be removed or not. Among these factors, Fig. 5.1 picked out two and plotted
different type accidents on the 2D plane, the risk space. Figure 5.1 took controlla-
bility for its horizontal axis and detectability for the vertical. The axes are free to pick
depending on the discussion topic. The plots in Fig. 5.1 carry some arbitrariness in
them. One may want to apply data from questionnaires to the general public or
specialists or otherwise use risk numbers from rigorous risk assessment. In general,
events in the first quadrant with difficulties in detection and control have high risk.
Earthquakes, tsunami, and heavy rain are out of control, and their prior detections are
difficult so they lie in the first quadrant. The target events are not only those in the
first quadrant, but central theme for risk management is to understand characteristics
of various hazards and find effective countermeasures to prevent them from growing
into incidents to accidents, disasters, and major disasters and to minimize the
damages.
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Chapter 6
Natural Disasters
Koji Ichii, Yoshinari Hayashi, Tomofumi Koyama,
and Tomoyuki Takahashi
Abstract Natural disasters are damages to human lives or social activities caused by
dangerous natural phenomena. This chapter quickly reviews the history of natural
disasters, specifically for earthquakes and volcanic disasters, ground and sediment
disasters, and water disasters, and discusses the mechanisms of how they break out
and the typical damages they cause. Then the chapter explains predictions and
countermeasures for disaster management.
Keywords Earthquake · Global environment · Ground disaster · Sediment disaster ·
Tsunami · Typhoon · Volcanic eruption
6.1 History of Natural Disasters in the Japanese Islands
6.1.1 Disaster Environments of Japan
Natural disasters break out when natural phenomena of earthquakes, volcanic
eruptions, typhoons, heavy rain, or snow avalanches release large energy within
short time periods to affect human living environments. Whether a natural disaster
takes place or not depends on global environment, geographic conditions, sinking,
lifting, and rising of tectonic plates and relative positions among oceans and land.
The global environment is constantly changing; however, the time it takes to make
visible changes is much longer than the average life span of human. This means that
within a timescale of several tens of thousands of years, typhoons and earthquakes
repeat at roughly the same locations.
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The islands of Japan, when compared to other regions of the earth, are surrounded
by an environment where natural phenomena can easily cause disasters. The Pacific
plate and Philippine Sea plate sinking under the ocean near Japan cause mega-thrust
earthquakes. Tectonic plates that dive under Japan islands push the continental plates
to cause inland crustal earthquakes at active faults. The sinking plates also produce
magma underground and trigger volcanic eruptions.
Japan also sees a heavy average precipitation and the rain concentrates in the
rainy season and typhoon seasons easily causing water disasters like flooding and
storm surge. Furthermore, the Japan Sea between the Eurasian continent and Japan
islands supplies plenty of moisture to the seasonal wind from the continent dropping
heavy snow along the Japan seasides of the islands. The accumulated snow can
cause snow avalanches and even landslides in early spring with rises of underground
water levels.
6.1.2 Natural Disasters Up to the Mid-eighteenth Century
(End of Edo Era)
With the geological conditions, we must say Japan cannot avoid outbreaks of
earthquakes, volcanic eruptions, typhoons, and so on. These natural disasters have
repeatedly attacked the islands since human started inhabitation on them. The
ancient history books of Japan like Nihon Shoki (the oldest chronicles of Japan,
Aston 1896) even noted such events. History books tend to record earthquake and
tsunami damages over wide areas. Kyoto, which used to be the center of government
administration and culture for a long time, has a large number of disaster records in
its archives. “Nankai (south sea) trough earthquakes” break out in locations rela-
tively close to Kyoto, and a number of disaster records have accumulated over the
years.
The oldest Nankai trough earthquake on record is the 684 “Hakuho earthquake.”
Nihon Shoki recorded damages that buildings collapsed over a wide area, tsunami
waves washed away many boats, rice patches in the land of Tosa (now Kochi
prefecture) went underwater with land subsidence after the earthquake, and hot
springs in the land of Iyo (now Ehime prefecture) stopped coming up. These are
typical damages with Nankai earthquakes with epicenters off the shore of Shikoku.
Records show that earthquakes in Heian and Edo eras caused similar damages to the
area. If we follow the timeline, we find that the earthquakes repeated in the same area
every 100–200 years. The concept of plate tectonics in the 1960s clarified the
mechanism of plate subduction causing large earthquakes to repeat in cycles. The
entire world knows about Nankai trough earthquakes as a typical example.
Volcanic eruptions typically leave large amounts of volcanic ashes and lava on
the ground surface. Affected areas often suffer over long times for removing the
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debris and from frequent soil disasters caused by them. Well-known volcanic
eruptions are the 1707 Mount Fuji and the 1783 Mount Asama. When volcanos
near the coast erupt, the sector collapse can cause tsunami. History books record
major large-scale tsunami disasters at Oshima-Oshima in Hokkaido in 1741 and the
1792 Unzen Mayuyama collapse causing tsunami in the Ariake Sea.
Since the old days, people have made major civil engineering works to actively
control water disasters. Singen-zutsumi (Kasumi Bank) in Kamanashi River in
Yamanashi prefecture and project of shifting the Tone River flow to the east have
traces of their major work still left today. Civil engineering works to manage water
damages have the purpose of “flood control.” Forcing rivers to reconfigure often
have positive effects of promoting traffic, enhancing agricultural productivity, or
building military barriers in addition to preventing disasters.
6.1.3 Natural Disasters in the Mid-eighteenth Century (Meiji
Era) and After
In the Meiji era, the government prepared disaster measures under a single national
standard and also collected statistical data about disasters and started to form
regulations about them. Since then, major earthquake disasters that caused 1000 or
more fatalities occurred 13 times in the islands of Japan. Especially the 1891 Nobi
earthquake, the 1923 Great Kanto earthquake, the 1995 Great Hanshin-Awaji
earthquake, and the 2011 Great East Japan earthquake greatly affected earthquake
measures after them.
Nobi earthquake was the first major disaster for modern Japan. The number of
victims totaled 7273, and a large number of brick buildings and bridges built with
imported Western technologies collapsed. This earthquake moved the government to
establish the “Imperial Earthquake Investigation Committee” in 1892 to systemati-
cally study the mechanism of earthquakes and research ways of preventing earth-
quake disasters.
The Great Kanto earthquake was the worst earthquake disaster in Japan that killed
over 105 thousand people. Severe fire damages took place in the cities of Tokyo and
Yokohama, and the sum of fire-caused fatalities amounted to 90 thousand for the
2 cities. Cities during this time had wooden houses packed together with extremely
high population densities. The disaster made people and the government realize the
importance of city planning to keep some open space and wide roads, and schools
next to public parks started to form with the reconstruction plans.
The Great Hanshin-Awaji earthquake was a major earthquake about 50 years
after the 1948 Fukui earthquake. This earthquake marked a large number of building
collapses, and over 80% of the deaths and missing immediately after the quake were
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caused by crush or suffocation. Water supply, electricity, and public transportation
were cut off revealing the extreme vulnerability of urban areas against earthquakes.
The Great East Japan earthquake was triggered by the largest earthquake withMw9.0
near the islands of Japan on record. The mega-thrust earthquake at the plate boundary
caused extremely huge tsunami waves. After this earthquake disaster, earthquake
measures on the table now generally assume earthquakes larger than those on records.
Since the Meiji era, the number of major volcanic eruptions is relatively small.
The biggest was the 1888 Mount Bandai (Fukushima prefecture) mountain collapse
that took lives from 477 people. One in recent years that we probably remember is
the 2014 Ontakesan eruption with death toll of 63. During the 1986 Izu-Oshima
eruption, the 2000 Mount Usu eruption, and the 2000 Miyake island eruption, the
administration successfully evacuated the residents temporarily. Volcanic eruptions
often come with early symptoms. The 2000 Mount Usu eruption caught much
attention as a successful example of predicting volcanic eruptions.
During the time immediately after World War II, many weather-related and water
disasters took place. The 1945 Makurazaki typhoon and the 1947 Kathleen typhoon
attacked only 2 years apart, and each caused over 1000 dead and missing. The 1959 Ise
Bay typhoon caused storm surges that attacked the zero-elevation area in Nobi Plain.
This typhoon caused 5098 deaths and led to the regulation, “Disaster Countermeasures
Basic Act.” The 1982 Nagasaki heavy rain, the 2000 Tokai heavy rain, and the 2011
Kii peninsula flooding followed. In recent years, the out-of-control land usage with
urban area development magnified the damages, and economic damages spread to
even wider areas with the destruction of supply chain; we started to see new facets of
disasters that measure beyond damage to human bodies (Cabinet Office 2014).
6.1.4 Changes in Disasters Caused by Changes in Social
Environment
Areas inhabited by people are rapidly growing with the growth in population
(Christian et al. 2013). Japan, from the latter half of the Edo era to the early
twenty-first century, saw rapid growth of population, and people kept moving onto
landfills along the coast or carved out land where no one used to live. Also, with the
development of globalization, supply chains in businesses are spread over large
areas in and out of the country. Today, a fire in a single factory can cause effects that
propagate throughout the entire world. Devastating natural phenomena like earth-
quakes catch our attention in terms of natural disasters; however, we also have to
recognize that changes in people and societies are expanding the damages into other
aspects that surround us.
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6.2 Earthquakes and Volcanic Eruptions
6.2.1 Mechanisms of Earthquakes and Volcanic Eruptions
An earthquake is a phenomenon of underground bedrocks releasing a large amount
of energy stored within them when they break in a short time period. Shifting of
underground “faults” causes destruction of bedrocks, and the vibration from this
shift transfers in the form of waves traveling over the surrounding ground shaking
everything on the surface and underneath (Bolt 2005).
For an earthquake to break out, the bedrock has to be subject to continuous force,
and it has to be sturdy enough to store the energy. Places that meet these two
conditions are limited on the earth. Primary forces that deform the bedrocks are
relative motions among the ten and some more tectonic plates that cover the earth
(plate tectonics). Most earthquakes, therefore, break out near plate boundaries. Areas
where oceanic plates dive under continental plates are susceptible to great earth-
quakes. Ground formations by molten rocks or magma are called volcanos, and the
phenomena of magma bursting out to the ground surface, directly or indirectly, are
called eruptions. Underground magma is subject to buoyancy caused by differences
in its density with the surrounding rocks. Magma contains large amount of volatile
material, primarily water, which separates out when the pressure drops to lower the
magma density and generates the lifting force. If the magma contacts underground
water near the ground surface, the water suddenly evaporates and causes steam
explosion. Both great earthquakes and volcanic eruptions break out near band areas
where tectonic plates sink. The reasons are sinking plates taking water deep down
underground and the water lowering the rock’s melting points to boost the genera-
tion of magma.
6.2.2 Earthquake Disasters and Their Transition
An earthquake shakes the ground, and artificial structures built on the ground surface
and underground may suffer damage. The law of inertia tries to keep objects on
ground surface where they stand, even when an earthquake moves the ground, and
the objects receive force in the direction opposite from the ground movement. This
force is inertia. If structures have insufficient strength to withstand inertia, they
collapse and suffer damages. Inertia applies to underground structures, just like
structures on ground surface. In addition, differences between movements of the
ground and structures generate direct forces on the structures that can cause dam-
ages. Damages due to earthquake-caused ground movement include destruction of
structures built directly above faults and those caused by earthquake-induced
tsunami.
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Intensities of the ground shaking are not uniform. The shaking tends to magnify
on soft ground and apply large inertia on the structures. The ground properties also
affect the cycle of the shaking. When the ground vibration property (natural fre-
quency of ground) and that of the structure (natural frequency of structure) built on it
coincide, resonance causes the shaking of the structure to magnify, and large inertia
forces apply to the structures. The strength of structures is not uniform either. Even
when stories of a building look all the same from the ground surface to high floors,
the lower floors have to bear weights of the floors above them and have bigger
columns and more reinforcement bars in them. When a strong tremor attacks a
structure, the structure suffers damages first in its weakest point. For example, if a
building has pilotis or columns to secure parking space on the ground floor, the
relatively weakest ground floor suffers crashing damages.
We learned through lessons from the past major earthquakes that structures must
have sufficient strengths so they do not suffer damages even in case of large inertia.
The size of such inertia to assume during the design stage changes with time, and
strengths of structures vary depending on when they were built. Their strengths also
go down over time with degradation of the structures. In other words, sizes and
strengths against inertia differ depending on location and structures, and large
damages occur on structures with relatively insufficient strengths. This tendency
applies not just to buildings like houses but also to bridges, subways, pipelines, oil
tanks, and all other varieties of structures. Furthermore, secondary damages or their
chain reactions can take pace, for example, with subway damage caused subsidence
on the ground surface affecting nearby structures.
6.2.3 Predicting and Countering Earthquake Damages
Unfortunately, our current technologies cannot predict the sizes, locations, or timing
of future earthquakes. Thus, we have to discuss countermeasures against estimated
earthquakes that can cause large damages to the society once they break out. This
process starts by estimating the ground shaking (reference earthquake motion) upon
an estimated earthquake, projecting the damages to existing structures (evaluation of
seismic capacity), and installing necessary strength (seismic retrofit). On the other
hand, for structures to build in the future, designers design them to keep the level of
damages within tolerance (aseismic design) in case of estimated earthquakes.
Mechanisms of earthquake occurrence shall be considered in the determination of
the estimated earthquakes. Locations where bedrocks receive large forces must have
caused a number of earthquakes in the past. If they continue to receive large forces,
many earthquakes will occur in the future as well. Strengths of bedrocks also depend
on sizes (magnitudes) of earthquakes; thus, magnitudes of past earthquake contribute
to making estimations of sizes of future earthquakes.
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In general, the shaking intensity reduces with distances to structures (attenuation).
Therefore, assuming earthquake magnitudes allows estimating the ground shaking
intensity with the distances from the structures of concern to the location of
earthquake (location of the fault) and the properties of the ground where they are
built (soil classification). The transmission of earthquake waves in the ground,
however, is quite complex, and in recent years, more scientists estimate ground
shaking at structural locations using sophisticated computational methods.
Once the ground shaking estimations are available, the magnitudes of inertia on
the structure are found and comparing them to the structural strengths lead to
estimating damages from earthquakes and their levels. If the analysis leads to
intolerable damages, countermeasures are taken to enhance structural strengths by
adding reinforcement, changing sectional configuration, or applying different
materials.
6.2.4 Volcanic Eruptions and Their Transition
Phenomena that cause damages from volcanic eruptions include drop of volcanic
rocks, deposition of volcanic ash, pyroclastic flow, lava flow, outburst of volcanic
gas, and so on. Debris bursting out from volcanos are at high temperature and flow
down from the volcano body toward lowland with large energy. When these “flows”
reach areas where people live, they cause volcanic eruption damages. Different
viscosity of magma causes different scenes of damages. Volcanos with less viscous
smooth magma often squirt out lava flows. Those with high viscous magma tend to
have explosive eruption with large amounts of volcanic ashes and cause pyroclastic
flows. The caldera of Mount Aso in Kyushu is the sign of the huge eruption with
debris scattered over distances of several hundreds of kilometers.
At times, the same volcano can show different types of eruptions. For example,
the 864 Jyogan eruption of Mount Fuji caused lava flows, whereas the Hoei eruption
in 1707 burst out volcanic ashes and pumices from a crater that opened on the
volcano side. Debris accumulated around a volcano are unstable and can cause the
volcano body to collapse upon earthquakes or small eruptions. The 1888 Mount
Bandai eruption and the 1980 eruption of Saint Helens in the USA are such
examples. The 1985 eruption of Nevado del Ruiz in Columbia suddenly melted
volcano-top glaciers all at once and caused huge lahars that took 23 thousand lives.
Large-scale volcanic eruptions, in addition to the direct damages described above,
are known to cause global climate changes. Volcanic gas and ashes from large
eruptions reach the stratosphere to block solar energy from reaching the earth
surface. This lowers the average temperature over the entire globe and causes poor
crop harvest and food shortage. Eruptions of Laki in Iceland in 1783, Tambora in
Indonesia in 1815, and Mount Pinatubo in the Philippines in 1991 are typical
examples of such damages.
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6.2.5 Predicting and Countering Volcanic Eruptions
Before volcanos erupt, the rise of magma toward the earth surface often causes
abnormal phenomena. Administration has established organizations for disaster
prevention by evacuating people beforehand by detecting signs of eruptions through
constant monitoring of bedrock movement, electromagnetic changes, abnormal heat
generation, volcanic gas, and so on.
The Japan Meteorological Agency constantly monitors 50 volcanos among the
110 active ones throughout the country. The Cabinet Office of the Government of
Japan has established “Volcano Disaster Management Councils” for 38 of the 50.
Each council consists of prefectural and local government officials, meteorological
observatory personnel, the Sabo (Soil Erosion Control) Department, and volcanol-
ogists to discuss evacuation at times of no threats to prepare against eruption. These
volcanos have eruption alert levels to announce eruption warning and forecasts in
coordination with local evacuation plans.
At the time of the 2000 Mount Usu eruption, the work of Professor Hiromu
Okada of Hokkaido University (at the time) known as the “home doctor of Mount
Usu” succeeded in predicting the eruption and evacuating the residents in the area
(Okada 2007). At the time of the 2014 Ontakesan eruption, however, the size of
precursors was small, and the prediction failed leaving 63 dead or missing. It was the
worst volcano disaster in Japan after World War II.
6.3 Ground and Sediment Disasters
6.3.1 Types of Ground Disasters and Mechanisms of Their
Occurrences
There are two types of ground disasters: those that break out on plains and landfills
and others that take place in hills and mountainous areas. The former type includes
subsidence due to consolidation of clay ground, wide area subsidence caused by
extraction of groundwater, and liquefaction of sandy ground. Landslides caused by
earthquakes and heavy rainfall are of the latter type. Although different in nature
from these types, the new concerns of underground disposal or storage of industrial
waste including radioactive nuclear waste are, in a broad sense, also ground
disasters.
Soil that make up the ground has the structural skeleton formed by solid grain
particles contacting one another and pore filled with air or water or in cases with oil.
Ground disasters break out when pore water that fills pore inside the grain particle
formed structural skeleton changes within the ground. Structures built on clay
ground change the load inside the ground, and pore water is squeezed out over a
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long time period causing ground subsidence. When pores filled with water reduce
their volumes due to pumping out of the groundwater, ground subsidence also takes
place. Liquefaction, on the other hand, is caused when the earthquake force takes
away resistance in loosely packed sandy ground filled with water and turns the
ground soil into a liquid-like state. The earthquake shakes the ground giving rise to
the pore water pressure, and the soil particles lose their contacts with one another
disintegrating the particle-formed structure, and the particles start to flow in the form
of muddy water.
On slopes, earthquakes and heavy rain trigger sediment disasters. The next
section discusses types of sediment disasters and how they happen. The groundwater
flow that fill pore raises concerns about dispersion and diffusion of contamination
from underground waste.
6.3.2 Types of Sediment Disasters and Mechanisms of Their
Occurrences
Sediment disasters is a collective term for debris flow, landslides, hillside collapses,
and so on that are caused by the movement of earth and soil. Debris flow is a flow of
mud with high content of rocks and stones, and it is called a mudslide when the flow
mainly consists of finer mud, sand, and pebbles. Debris flows can be caused by
hillside collapses induced by heavy rainfall or riverbeds with stones and soil
suddenly lifted by increased river flows that push them all downstream. Although
theory about physics of debris flows have been clarified, predicting when, where,
and how big they will be is difficult. Landslides and hillside collapses are phenom-
ena of big chunks of soil and rocks sliding down with gravity. Landslides, in general,
are mild slopes moving slowly, however, over wide areas. In many cases, grounds
that slipped in the past often start sliding again. Special land configurations called
landslide formations can form on ground surfaces. Hillside collapses, like cliff
collapses, are relatively smaller, and they are concentrated collapses of steep slopes
on mountainsides caused by heavy rainfall or earthquakes. Hillside collapses break
out during the rainfall or within a relatively short time from the end of rain; however,
landslides often continue for long times even after the end of rain. Understanding
them takes not just knowing infiltration of rainwater but also long-term flow of
groundwater.
Soil and rocks on slopes receive strong sliding forces from gravity trying to
push them down the slopes induced temporarily by earthquakes or added weight
with rainwater infiltration. On the other hand, vertical movement from earth-
quakes can lower the vertical stress, and rainwater infiltration can raise the pore
water pressure to lower the effective force on the structural skeleton of soil
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particles. These phenomena lower the frictional resistance at the “slip plane”
between the stable layer of slopes and chunks of soil and rocks. When the sliding
force overcomes frictional resistance at the slip plane, a landslide or a hillside
collapse breaks out.
The huge landslide at Xiaolin Village in Kaohsiung Taiwan in August 2009
triggered attention to deep-seated landslides. Differently from shallow landslides of
slope surfaces with weathered depositions, deep-seated landslides are major col-
lapses that take bedrocks at deep underground with them. Shallow landslides occur
with heavy rainfalls in short time periods, and in contrast, deep-seated landslides
break out when the accumulated rainfall reaches 400–500 mm over long time.
During the September 2011 Kii Peninsula heavy rain, deep-seated landslides took
place over a wide area in Nara and Wakayama prefectures, Japan, and caused serious
damages.
6.3.3 Ground and Sediment Disasters
Main damages caused by ground and sediment disasters are the following. Subsi-
dence causes structure to tilt, generates steps on the ground, and increases the risk of
flooding. Liquefaction causes structures to sink or tilt and can cause underground
structures to come up to the ground surface. Levees can sink or their bodies can shift
to the side. Landslides can cause loss of lives or properties and can destroy houses.
In recent years, people are more concerned about compound disasters like
earthquake, liquefaction, and tsunami all occurring at the same time, or heavy rain
causing landslides and flooding. During the March 2011 Great East Japan earth-
quake in Japan, the earthquake caused liquefaction, and coastal structures like
seawalls or river levees lost their functions when the tsunami hit the area to mark
huge damages. The September 2011 heavy rain in Kii Peninsula caused huge
landslides that blocked rivers and formed natural dams. There was high risk of
these natural dams collapsing that would have caused major outburst floods in the
downstream areas.
6.3.4 Preparations for Preventing Ground and Sediment
Disasters, Measurement, and Monitoring
Measures for ground and sediment disaster prevention include both hardware and
software. Hardware measures against debris flows include embedding soil retaining
structures to stop collapse of unstable slopes and prevent lumps of earth from
moving, or building soil-blocking dams in the downstream of rivers to stop debris
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flows or to lessen their energies. Software measures, on the other hand, include
enforcing regulations that restrict housing development in areas where sediment
disasters are likely (e.g., Act on Promotion of Sediment Disaster Countermeasures
for Sediment Disaster Prone Areas 2000); informing residents with sediment disaster
hazard maps about areas with risk of debris flows, landsliding, and hillside collapses;
or issuing ground and sediment disaster warnings so residents can brace or make
early evacuations. Hardware preparations so far have made large contributions in
reducing ground and sediment disasters. In recent years, however, reduction in
investment to public projects caused by the shrinking economy is causing adminis-
trations to shift their efforts into software. Of course, software alone cannot prevent
these disasters. Especially the battle against extreme weather conditions, said to be
caused by global warming, requires more efficient and effective measures by
combining hardware and software measures in a balanced way. For liquefaction, a
number of construction methods have been proposed and implemented including
dispersing increased pore water pressure, lowering underground water level, or
stiffening the ground.
Measurements and monitoring of ground and soil movements like debris flows,
landslides, and hillside collapses are extremely important in predicting disaster they
cause and in making early warnings and evacuations. Methods in practice include
monitoring displacement and deformation of moving soil and measuring physical
quantities about groundwater like water content in hillsides or pore water pressure. A
large number of methods for such measurements and monitoring have been pro-
posed; however, what and where to make measurements and monitor for the best
results have not been clarified. We need to continue making measurements and
collect monitoring data and analyze the data to set control standards and to reach
solutions for these threats by the nature.
6.4 Hydrosphere Disasters
6.4.1 Mechanisms
Water-caused disasters like tsunami, storm surge, or flooding are called hydrosphere
disasters. They are all natural phenomena that involve huge quantities of water with
great energy; however, the mechanisms of their occurrences vary. Tsunami is a
phenomenon that propagates a rise or subsidence of sea surface with gravity working
as the restoring force. A landslide or a volcanic eruption can cause tsunami, but
about 90% of them are caused by earthquakes. When a tropical cyclone like typhoon
grows, the low pressure sucks up the ocean surface, and the violent wind blowing
toward the coast pushes the seawater to cause storm surge. Flooding is the
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phenomenon of heavy rain from a typhoon or a front gathering to rivers and their
sudden rises in water level pouring out into the cities.
A lump of water quickly moves in the horizontal direction than in the vertical, and
all hydrosphere disasters are explained as waves with long wavelengths compared to
the depth (in case of a flooding, the flood area is wider compared to the inundation).
When the wavelength is 25 times or more of the water depth, the wave is called a
long wave, and the governing equations (equations that describe the governing




















































where η is the water level; M and N are the discharge fluxes in x and y directions,
respectively (which express the strengths of flows in the horizontal direction); D is
the total water depth (sum of water depth and water level; inundation depth in case of
flooding); g is the acceleration of gravity; and n is Manning’s roughness coefficient
(for the magnitude of friction at the bottom).
The first term of Eq. (6.1) is the rate of water level change with respect to time,
and the second and third terms are the rates of discharge flux changes with respect to
space. Equation (6.1) is the continuity equation derived from the law of mass
conservation, and it expresses that spatial change of flow causes the water level to
go up or down. The first terms in Eqs. (6.2) and (6.3) are the rate of flow flux change
with respect to time, the second and third terms are the rate of discharge change with
respect to space along the flow components, the fourth terms are the change of
pressure with respect to space, and the fifth terms are the sizes of bottom friction.
Equations (6.2) and (6.3) are the equations of motion in the horizontal directions
derived from the law of conservation of momentum, explaining that the flow varies
with spatial differences in flow or pressure and it decays with larger friction at the
bottom.
Calculating Eqs. (6.1) through (6.3) with the computer allows simulating hydro-
sphere disasters. In fact, they are the equations that the central and local governments
use in estimating damages and producing hazard maps. These three equations with
multiplications and divisions of variables are based on the theory of nonlinear long
waves and apply generally to deep ocean and to land. Tsunami warnings, however,
only need predictions of waves that reach the coastlines, and nonlinear terms for
shallow sea and on ground are neglected.
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6.4.2 Scenes of Damages
Tsunami damages take different forms depending on where they take place. In
general, tsunamis that were generated near the coast like the tsunami caused by the
2011 Off the Pacific Coast of Tohoku earthquake (Tohoku tsunami) are called near-
field tsunamis, and those that reached long distances where the earthquakes were
hardly sensed, like in the case of 1960 Chilean tsunami, are called far-field tsunamis.
The two types are distinguished in disaster mitigation. Near-field tsunamis attack the
coastal area within several minutes to several hours to cause large human damages.
Far-filed tsunamis that travel across the Pacific Ocean attack a wide area with long-
wavelength waves to cause large damages to the fishery industry. The coastal
topography also affects tsunami damages. A ria coast has complex jagged interface
between land and water, and although tsunami waves may amplify locally, the steep
land in the back often limits the inundation to the coast. For flat land, tsunami waves
may amplify a little because of the simple coastline; however, the wide flat land lets
the waves reach far inland. For example, Tohoku tsunami inundated a wider area in
Fukushima prefecture and destroyed more buildings than in Iwate prefecture with
higher waves. Rivers have less resistance and friction to damp the tsunamis, and they
can run up to upstream regions and cause damages to residents that are usually not
worried about tsunamis.
Storm surges cause different magnitudes of damages depending on the typhoon
routes and geography. Strong winds blow counterclockwise in the perimeter of
typhoons, and the right side of the moving typhoon suffers from the circling wind
and forward movement. Typhoons near Japan move from southwest to northeast
generally. Thus, bays that face the south have openings that winds can attack and
suffer big storm surge. This effect caused huge inundation damages to, for example,
Tokyo bay at the time of the 1949 Kitty typhoon, Ise Bay during the 1959 Ise Bay
typhoon, and Osaka Bay with the 1961 second Muroto typhoon. Global warming
weakens the upward flow of air that causes typhoons, and predictions say that their
number will drop. Warm vapor that is the energy source of typhoons, however,
increases, and there is the risk that once they are born, they may be larger and
stronger.
Global warming caused larger and stronger typhoons that will increase the rainfall
with higher risks of flooding. When towns are flooded by river, flows going over the
banks or destroyed levees are called fluvial flooding, whereas, flooding caused
directly by rainwater and insufficient pumping or draining are called pluvial
flooding. The primary cause of fluvial flooding is upstream rainfall. Thus, even
when there is small rainfall in towns, flooding can take place and persist for an
extended time. Inundation depths suddenly rise with fluvial flooding; thus, quick
evacuation is important. Not evacuating the area or attempting to after the flooding
started can cause human damages. In recent years, there is more pluvial flooding in
urban areas. The inundation depths growing gradually with pluvial flooding cause
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less human damages; however, flooding over a wide urban area can cause large
economic damages.
6.4.3 Damage Mitigation
Countermeasures against hydrosphere disasters start with assuming the external
force and estimating the damages they cause. Based on these basic data, hardware
and software countermeasures are implemented. Many of the countermeasures are
common to all forms of hydrosphere disasters. Tohoku tsunami influenced the
countermeasures against storm surge and flooding, so in the following, we will
discuss mainly about countermeasures against tsunami.
Hardware preparations of building structures like seawater walls, river levees, and
water gates aim at preventing water from entering residential areas. In designing
structures, the designer needs to define the external force, and before Tohoku
tsunami, it was the largest in history. The idea was reasonable that huge external
force applies in cycles; however, the precondition was that human knows the biggest
in history. Tohoku tsunami, however, showed us the fact that our limited records of
history do not teach us what the largest in history was. The fact that we had a
misunderstanding of knowing the biggest in history was a factor in causing huge
damages beyond our forecast. With this lesson from Tohoku tsunami, we since then
have set two levels of tsunami expectations: “level 1 tsunami” height with tsunamis
that frequently occur from our data and maximum “level 2 tsunami” height with
physical possibility even beyond our experience. Hardware preparations against
level 1 tsunami aim at protecting resident’s lives and properties, and for level
2 tsunami, the preparations also involve software to protect people’s lives.
Damage estimation before Tohoku tsunami was about inundation damages, i.e.,
about the behavior of water. Tohoku tsunami, however, opened our eyes to all sorts
of tsunami damages including building destruction, floating objects, disaster debris,
and geographical changes with sand transportation. Evaluations are starting about
these phenomena that accompany inundation damages.
Software preparations target properly informing the residents about risks that
come with disasters and encouraging them to take proper action upon their break-
outs. Evacuation is especially important in case of hydrosphere disasters, and a
number of hardware preparations are also in process, like double levees (raised
roads) that proved effective at the time of Tohoku tsunami, coastal protection forests,
evacuation buildings and lifesaving hills for temporary evacuation, and strong
seawater walls. At the time of Tohoku tsunami, the tsunami warning, indispensable
for starting evacuation, underestimated the size and was a factor in causing expanded
damages. Since Tohoku tsunami, therefore, enhanced monitoring and new numerical
models are in the process of being in place.
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Chapter 7
Social Disasters and Damages
Takahiro Nakamura, Emiko Kanoshima, Tomofumi Koyama,
Hiroshi Nishimura, and Mamoru Ozawa
Abstract This chapter discusses actual social disasters and damages they caused.
The first section starts with some societal problems we face today. They are
accidents due to aging infrastructures and difficulties in preventing them, nature
and trends in accidents involving airplanes which are one of the most advanced
industrial products today, characteristics of automobile accidents with the most
serious social disasters in modern society in terms of the number of deaths and
injured, and drug toxicity and safety in medical care. The following Sect. 7.2
analyzes human error, which is the most important factor in conducting analysis
and investigation of accidents. Lastly, the third section closes the chapter with an
overview of the history of major social disasters and their countermeasures.
Keywords Aging infrastructures · Automobile accidents · Drug toxicity · Human
error · Maintenance · Safety-I · Safety-II · Transportation war
7.1 Social Disasters and Damages
7.1.1 Accidents with Infrastructures
Infrastructures are basic systems and services for countries, industries, or organiza-
tions to function effectively. For example, roads, railways, electrical grids, commu-
nication networks, ports, dams, water supply and sewage, schools, hospitals, parks,
and public housing are systems of facilities that form bases for industries and social
livings. In Japan, the ceiling-slab collapse accident took place in December 2012 in
Sasago Tunnel on Chuo Expressway and caused nine fatalities. This accident
triggered large concerns for people over aging of social infrastructures like tunnels,
bridges, water supply, and sewage.
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Infrastructures are said to last, in general, 50 years; thus social infrastructures
built during the high economic growth period in the 1960s have now served
functions for over 50 years, and their maintenance, repair, and renewal are urgent
matters. The 2014 “White Paper on Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism”
reports that by 20 years later in 2033, social infrastructures that have surpassed
50 years of existence will make about 67% of road bridges, about 50% of tunnels,
about 24% of sewage drainage, and about 58% of harbor piers. Maintenance
management and renewal cost was about 3.6 trillion yen (about 34 billion US
dollars) in 2013 and is estimated to grow to 4.6–5.5 trillion yen (43–52 billion US
dollars) in 2033 (MLIT 2014).
The USA, under the New Deal in the 1930s, had its infrastructures built earlier
than Japan, and already their aging was a serious problem in the 1980s. Pat Choate
and Susan Walter in their 1981 book America in Ruins warned about accidents that
the aged infrastructures would cause.
In Japan, local public organizations control most of the social infrastructures. For
example, among the about 730,000 bridges in the nation, about 520,000, which is
over 70%, are on municipal roads, and in 2025, 44% of them will be in service for
over 50 years (MLIT 2015). There are about 4000 roadway collapses caused by
sewage line failures annually. This amounts to about 1.0 roadway collapse a year for
every 100 km of sewage pipe (NILIM 2012). Local public organizations, thus, have
the important role of maintaining, managing, and renewing social infrastructures;
however, their organizations are short of what are sufficient, and they are in need for
people resources and skills. Budgets for such maintenance, management, and
renewal are also short. Since the Sasago Tunnel accident, managing organizations
have the liable responsibilities, and “lack of personnel” or “lack of budget” cannot
make reasons for not performing maintenance and management. Local public
organizations have the urgent need to secure and educate technicians for mainte-
nance and management of social infrastructures.
Social infrastructures are important factors in national resilience for disaster
prevention and its mitigation. Making necessary preparations is an urgent matter
so they can remain safe and serve their functions at times of disasters. For mainte-
nance, management, and renewal of social infrastructures to meet local needs and
demands of the time, efficient and effective asset management of the facilities is in
need. The management should be based on mid- to long-term total and strategic
maintenance plans to, for example, make preventive maintenance based on time
degradation forecast. Under the circumstances of lack of budget and workforce, we
need to promote development and application of new technologies that can effec-
tively maintain and manage infrastructures, so we can cope with aging social
infrastructures.
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7.1.2 Accidents with Industrial Products
Industrial products include a wide variety with different sizes and uses. Gas water
heaters and air conditioners for home use; machining tools like lathes for factories;
transportation machines like automobiles, railway coaches, ships, and airplanes
assembled in factories; large facilities like nuclear reactors, boilers, and turbines
for power generation; and chemical plants for petroleum products are all industrial
products. This section explains the transition in accidents about industrial products.
It takes airplane accidents as the primary example because the industry has out-
standing advancement in the technologies involved over the past 50 years and
reliable statistical data about their accidents.
Figure 7.1 shows the number of commercial flights and their accidents over the
past 55 years. As Fig. 7.1a shows, the number of flights was small in the 1960s, but
with economic growth and lowered airfare, it grew roughly linearly over the years till
now. The number of accidents also grew at a high pace in the 1970s but then leveled
off at a rate of 10–25 a year. On the other hand, as Fig. 7.1b shows, the number of
accidents per one million flights exceeded 50 per year around 1960; however, it
rapidly went down to about 5 a year in 1970 or so, and since then it is maintaining a
slow but gradual decline.
Through a large number of accidents they experienced, airplane manufacturers
and airline companies overcame a large number of problems and advanced their
manufacturing technologies and flight control systems. The introduction of com-
puters especially made large contributions to enhancing the reliability. Even so,
aging equipment and the problem of human factors persist, and the accident count
does not drop to zero. This trend of accidents is not unique to airplanes and is
common to all accidents involving industrial products.
7.1.3 Automobile Accidents
During the postwar period of high economy growth, automobiles spread widely in
Japan, and the number of owners increased rapidly. On the other hand, building
infrastructures like sidewalks and traffic lights lagged behind as well as regulations
for traffic control, and deadly automobile accidents reached 16,765 in the single year
of 1970 (First Traffic War). The victims back then were pedestrians, especially
infants and children.
In 1970, Basic Law on Traffic Safety Measures was enacted to promote well-
planned and overall safety measures for land, oceanic, and aero transportation. When
the law went in effect, the administration took on building infrastructures like
sidewalks, pedestrian bridges, and guardrails. Promotion of traffic safety education
and campaigns reduced the number of automobile accidents and the number of
victims injured or killed.
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Later, the number of automobiles kept growing, and the shortage of budget for
adding more traffic-control policemen or building more traffic infrastructures of safety
facilities caused the number of deaths due to automobile accidents to turn around and
start growing again in 1980. Especially from 1988 to 1995, the number of deaths
constantly exceeded 10,000 a year (Second Traffic War). During this period, the
Fig. 7.1 History of airplane accidents, based on data from Airbus (2015) and Boeing (2014). (a)
Number of accidents, fatal accidents, and number of flights. (b) Number of accidents per one
million flights
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number of accidents by young drivers increased rapidly, and another distinct point
was that the rate of those killed while in the car at the time of accident was high.
In 1996, the number of annual deaths with automobile accidents went below
10,000 and started to decrease. The number of accidents and injured, however,
increased until 2004 with growing quantity of automobile traffic. Although the
number of accidents increased, the development and spread of safety technologies
at the time of impact, airbags and antilock braking systems, turned the vehicles safer,
and regulations like mandatory seatbelts in the front seats (1992) and mandatory
child seats (2000) contributed to reducing the number of deaths. Further the tighter
penalty against driving under the influence, criminal charges against reckless driving
leading to death or injury (2001), and continued efforts in improving automobile
safety technology led to drop in all numbers of accidents, injured, and deaths.
As our society rapidly turned to an aged society, however, more than half of the
automobile-caused deaths has been with elderlies at 65 or older since about 2010. As
our society will grow even older in the coming years, the trend in automobile
accidents will be affected, and further measures for accident prevention will be
necessary.
By the way, automobiles turned into practical tools in the early twentieth century.
Since then, the societies have been dealing with the social problems of driving
manners and noise, in additions to accidents. The measures cover a wide range of
improving vehicle performance including safety, constructing and developing tech-
nologies for infrastructures about road traffic systems, regulation and enforcement of
traffic rules, and training and education of drivers and others involved with
transportation.
In recent years, advancement of various sensors and camera technology as well as
automobile safety technologies like damage-reducing braking systems was devel-
oped, and by coordinating them with information and communication systems like
intelligent transportation systems (ITS), “automatic driving” that does not rely on the
driver’s operations is turning into reality. Nevertheless, a number of problems still
remain like the fact that a set of certain conditions need to be met for driving
assistance systems to work or who is liable in case of an accident while driving
with automated assistance.
7.1.4 Drug Toxicity and Safety in Medical Care
Throughout the history of mankind, drugs have been in use for curing diseases since
the ancient times. Especially since the twentieth century, advancements in chemistry
and medicine led to mass production of drugs as industrial products. Drugs have
saved a large number of human lives but, at the same time, have caused drug toxicity.
The phrase “drug toxicity,” in general, has a broad meaning of “damage caused
by drugs”; however, in the medical and pharmaceutical fields, the phrase is specif-
ically used for the narrow meaning of “damages caused by harmful side effects of
pharmaceuticals”; however, not all damages caused by harmful side effects of
7 Social Disasters and Damages 77
pharmaceuticals are called drug toxicity. Special administration of pharmaceuticals
has strong relations to this practice.
Pharmaceuticals, in principle, provide healing effects, but at the same time, their
applications cause inconvenient side effects to human bodies. The extremely com-
plex nature of human body enjoys the expected effect (primary function), however,
with a number of side effects in general. Some side effects may benefit human body;
however, some are harmful. A drug is a product to use carefully with knowledge of
the target effect and accompanying side effects, especially harmful side effects, and
apply just the right amount at the right time. Fault in drug administration is, thus, not
drug toxicity but it is a medical accident. On the other hand, negligence in identi-
fying harmful side effects of pharmaceutical and hiding or falsifying them to cause
delay in response or unnecessary expansion and severity are called drug toxicity.
Figure 7.2 shows major drug toxicities in Japan in the past.
Fig. 7.2 Major drug toxicities in Japan [ durations (victims count)]. (Original source:
Medwatcher Japan meeting handouts. Source: Mainichi Newspaper, morning edition, Aug.
20, 2017)
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Quality of drugs directly relates to safety of life; thus, in modern pharmaceutical
industry, good laboratory practice (GLP), good manufacturing practice (GMP), and
good clinical practice (GCP) are in place to establish high-quality safety evaluation
systems that are unequaled with any other industrial product. Safety evaluation of
pharmaceutical, however, takes specialized knowledge; thus, pharmaceutical com-
panies often directly or indirectly take part in research activities that can easily lead
to problems of conflict of interest with medical facilities, organizations for medical
research, or academic institutes. The industry has a problem of being under the threat
that social anxiety or distrust could spread with rumors that expert judgments are
distorted and unfair evaluations are made.
The 2012 Diovan scandal in Japan was a typical example of such social problems.
This scandal involved a pharmaceutical company employee taking part in a clinical
research of his company’s new drug Diovan and publishing forged data with the
doctor in a paper. The result was a blockbuster (a code word in the pharmaceutical
industry for a drug that led to sales of 100 billion JPY or more) among its
competitors, and the profit was enormous.
In the medical field, new problems continue to arise including but not limited to
drug toxicity, like safety concerns with fair drug treating. Further, with the June 2014
amendment of Medical Care Act, the system of medical accident investigation just
started on October 1, 2015. Countermeasures for these problems are equally impor-
tant to the safety and security of the citizens in addition to the problems we have had
over the years.
7.2 Human Errors and Accidents
7.2.1 Hazardous Human Errors
Even under the circumstances when the given information is insufficient, conditions
are unknown, or unexperienced people can flexibly carry out problem-solving based
on experience and knowledge. When a performance has to continue, however, and
for an extended period of time, people cannot continue the precise work no matter
how serious they are. On the other hand, machines can repeat the same work
precisely even if the work may be complex and hard as long as the expected
performance is within the design and specification of the machine. When, however,
information to perform the task is insufficient, or it is out of the design specification,
a machine cannot carry out the work. Its work also has to be stopped in case of
unexpected events.
Human can flexibly react to a variety of situations and can carry out redundant
actions as well. In short, human has the characteristics of flexibility, redundancy, and
variety. If we look for flexible judgment by machines in response to the situations,
the ranges that they can handle have technical limitations, and they cannot meet the
needs. The recent advancement of artificial intelligence (AI), however, is gradually
giving machines flexibility, redundancy, and variety that human has.
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Humans have demanded reliability, accuracy, and repeatability to machines and
have realized them with scientific technology. Given the right specifications, we can
design and assemble the machine, and by giving them proper maintenance, machines
can continuously carry out the given precise performance with high reliability. There
are some exceptions to human work, like cases of craftsmanship that far outperforms
machines. Human ability, however, has limits both qualitatively and quantitatively,
and if we ask them to perform accurate work continually, there will mostly be some
level of variation.
Ever since the industrial revolution, humans developed a wide variety of tech-
nologies to cover the characteristics they lacked. The development of technologies
has made our lives comfortable and effective. As long as men and machines
compensated each other, there were no big concerns. The social demand for effi-
ciency and productivity these days, however, is so high, and as people started to see
AI with human-like characteristics, the demand against human for reliability, accu-
racy, and repeatability rose up to the level of machines or even more.
The advancement of scientific technology is also pointing at development and
improvement of methodologies for human problem-solving and education and
training for enhancing problem-solving skills. The human nature, however, has not
made much of a difference since the birth of humankind. Therefore, when the
difficulty with performance requirement is over the limitations of human, or when
the abilities of the performer are insufficient or inadequate, the odds for incidents or
accidents to take place go up. The concept of human error comes with inadequate
action by human from inabilities or inadequate responses that leave the given task
incomplete.
7.2.2 Human Errors and Accidents
We all acknowledge that “anyone makes mistakes.” In fact, anyone can be “careless”
and have “mind slips” at times, and as long we are human, we can never do away
with them.
The advancement and complexity of scientific technologies now demand humans
to perform well above their abilities, and there have been quite a number of cases
where minor mistakes developed into unprecedented major accidents or troubles.
Mistakes that humans make can qualitatively and quantitatively affect the society,
and as they have caught our attention, the phrase “human error” now applies to such
acts. At the same time, the idea that “we can prevent accidents and troubles if we
eliminate human error” is gradually gaining grounds.
Since some time before, many companies post signs that read “Safety First.”
Recently another sign “Eliminate Human Errors” often makes their ways next to
them. Efforts to eliminate human errors have continuously been in practice since the
1980s, and much resource has been put into them. So far, however, there have been
no case of successful human error elimination, and as we will discuss next, we will
not succeed in the future, either.
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Posting signs that say “Eliminate Human Errors” has the thinking behind that
human errors are causes of incidents and accidents and that their elimination can
prevent accidents. If, however, human “carelessness” or “slip of mind” is what a
human error is, we can never eliminate them. The reason is because these phenom-
ena are part of our specification as living organisms and they cannot change unless
we change the specification for human. If we take the standpoint that human errors
cause accidents, once we find a human error with one involved with an accident,
investigation has identified the cause, and it stops right there. Since this cause cannot
be eliminated, so is the accident.
As we clarified that “human error elimination” cannot prevent accidents, mea-
sures for accident prevention are shifting toward taking human error as a result,
identifying the real cause in the background, and discussing accident prevention
measures against it. The idea that human errors cause accidents, however, spread
first, and many organizations still spend large efforts under the target of “human
error elimination.”
7.2.3 Human Errors and Accident Prevention
We all acknowledge that “anyone makes mistakes.” In fact, anyone can be “careless”
and have “mind slips” at times, and as long we are human, we can never do away
with them.
Shinnosuke Usui, a researcher in Safety Ethology, stated “the same action would,
depending on the range of system tolerance, result in a human error at times, but not
at other times” (Usui 1995). He further claims that the phrase human error means
“When the action taken is compared with the standards required for the external
circumstances and situations and if it falls outside of tolerable range, it is named”
human error and that “It does not mean some special action of an abnormal nature”
(Usui 2000). An aero- and astro-medical scientist Isao Kuroda defined human error
as “Human action against expectation that unintendedly resulted in something
different from the target goal” (Kuroda 2001). Both views take human error as
results, and we can summarize human error to mean “unintended different results,”
“results outside of tolerable range,” or “unexpected results.”
Based on these ideas, we have to first analyze “what was the person’s intension or
goal of action at the time,” “what was the tolerable range of action under the external
circumstances or situations at the time,” and “how big was the gap between the
expected results and results of the action taken,” and then we can determine what the
human error was. Further, the countermeasure to make changes depends on which
action is taken as human error which also depends on the point of time and level of
concern throughout the series of actions.
Sidney Dekker stated that solving the problem of human error first takes under-
standing how the taken action systematically related to the external circumstances
and expected results, and then it is important to understand, in the actor’s shoes, the
local rationality inside the human judgments and actions (Dekker 2002). We need to
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think about local rationality when we want to understand human error, in finding the
cause of an accident, and in attempting to prevent the accident. Further, with the
understanding of human nature, we need to continually make efforts in gaining skills
for judging the contents of the required problems, skills for judging if the posed
difficulty is fair, and ability to accurately detect errors with the understanding of
error patterns and enhance the overall system protection, expansion, and
improvement.
7.3 History of Major Social Disasters and Their
Countermeasures
7.3.1 History of Social Disasters and Accidents
Human exchanges material with the nature. The process involves (1) make actions to
gain resources from the nature, (2) apply work to the gained resources to produce
artificial objects, (3) consume resources and artificial objects to live, and (4) after
completely consumed, return what is left of the resources and artificial objects by
disposing them to the nature. This sequence of processes acquires resources and
artificial objects needed to maintain life as “goods” and consume them. The
sequence, however, often produces some unwanted “bads.” Social disasters in the
broad sense are, in a sense, “bads” produced in the process sequence of material
exchange. For example, industrial bads are produced in processes (1) and (2),
product and equipment accidents and accidents of infrastructures are bads in process
(3), and environmental destructions are bads that can surface in all processes
(1) through (4).
Industrial disasters affect the modern world in two forms: one contains the bads in
the production zone, and the other spreads the bads to the surrounding regions and
the whole society. The following descriptions review the history of their breakouts.
Like for the case of accidents in mines, factories, or construction zones, when the
damage is contained within the industrial zone, bodily damages are handled as
industrial accidents. The history of coal and other mines tells us that major to
minor accidents of explosions, fires, collapses, and flooding repeated. The postwar
worst coal mine accident in Japan was the 1963 Mitsui Miike mine explosion that
killed 458 and injured 555. This accident caused carbon monoxide poisoning to
839 and the majority suffered aftereffects. A number of large accidents followed
this one.
Fires and explosions at factories made their marks also, like the 1892 Osaka
Spinning Mill factory fire (85 deaths) and the 1905 Tokyo Artillery Arsenal factory
explosion (26 deaths). After those, however, there have not been such factory
accidents with many fatalities other than the exception of the 1970 Mitsubishi
Heavy Industry Nagasaki Shipyard turbine explosion accident (a 50-ton turbine
rotor broke apart killing 4 and leaving 64 injured). Industrial accidents in the
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manufacturing industry are mainly during the daily work, and the number of
accidents has been declining since the peak around 1960. In recent years, however,
the industry has to be cautious about accident that surfaced with some time delay. In
some fields, a variety of chemical substances is present, and exposure to them
without the knowledge of their danger can cause serious damages later. The problem
of bile duct cancer with printing factory workers surfaced recently, and in the past
were the problems of benzene poisoning and cancer-causing polyvinyl chloride.
Health effects from asbestos have been known for quite some time; however, they
have caught the general attention only recently.
Industrial disasters that affect the surrounding area and the society are caused
either by accidents or in some cases the regular daily operation. A typical example of
the former is the 1984 pesticide leakage from Union Carbide’s plant in Bhopal,
India. The toxic gas leaked out over a 5-mile area from the factory leaving 2000 dead
and 300,000 injured the following day. The death toll continued to increase later in
the devastated area, and health problems are still persistent as of today. Examples of
the latter in Japan, on the other hand, are air or water pollution from smoke or
wastewater disposal from factories. In the Meiji era (1868–1912), Ashio Copper
Mine poisoning broke out, and smoke pollution from Hitachi Mining Company
caused sickness. They were followed by itai-itai disease (cadmium poisoning),
Minamata disease (organic mercury poisoning), Yokkaichi asthma (air pollution
from petrochemical factory chimneys), and so on. Pollution in Japan was by then
well known to the world as the negative side of economic growth.
Accidents and disasters caused by products have been growing in their magnitude
of effects. The most prominent problem is automobile accidents. WHO announced
the number of deaths caused by automobile accidents in 2013 was about 1,250,000
worldwide. The number of accumulated deaths caused by automobile accidents in
Japan has reached 600,000, and the injured figure is close to 50 million. Railways
and airplanes, much safer than automobiles, have also experienced their share of
accidents. Once they take place, these accidents often turn into major disasters.
Relatively recent ones are the 1998 Intercontinental Express (ICE) derailment
(101 dead), the 2005 Japan Railway (JR) Fukuchiyama Line accident (107 dead),
and so on. For airplane accidents, we have the 1977 collision of 2 Jumbo jets in
Tenerife, Spain (583 dead), the 1985 Japan Airline crash (520 dead), and so
on. Accidents involving ships and busses also result in large death tolls, like with
the 2014 Sewol ferry disaster with victims including high school students on their
school excursion (304 dead or missing) and the 2016 ski bus accident in Karuizawa
(15 dead) that still have traces in our memories.
Accidents with facilities and infrastructures are also social disasters that break out
while using artificial objects. They include accidents with escalators, elevators, and
revolving doors, or accidents due to structural flaws in buildings. The 1995
Sampoong Department Store collapse in Seoul and the 2017 high-rise fire in
London are such examples. Accidents with NPP are also facility disasters. As we
saw with the 1986 Chernobyl NPP accident and the 2011 Fukushima Daiichi NPP
accident, these accidents affect not just the area around it but also the entire world,
and they require long-term actions against them. The ultimate disposition of
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radioactive waste takes tens of thousands of years, and no one can guarantee if the
mankind has such capabilities (Beck 2002).
7.3.2 Overview at Major Measures Against Social Disaster
J. K. Mitchell categorizes accidents into “routine” ones and “surprising” ones. Spe-
cialists have already studied routine disasters, and principles and practices developed
over the years can handle them. Surprising disasters, on the other hand, have huge
effects over time and space, and without prior experience, even the specialists cannot
predict them, and we need to study each one of them (Mitchell 1996).
Even for routine disasters that are easy to manage, their handling did not develop
easily. People first thought that routine disasters were caused by technical problems.
Their management then took improved technology and social handling. If we look at
their history, however, we find that managers, reluctant to spend the cost on safety
measures, often exposed workers to dangers.
Next, it was human error that caught the attention. Technical measures advanced
and mechanical failures turned rare; however, with the magnitude of energy that
humans control, minor mistakes caused huge disasters. The managing side had the
idea that if they emphasized human error, they could avoid the cost of improving
facilities and the work environment. Later studies of human factor, however, clar-
ified that taking an error as the result, rather than the cause, and working counter-
measures would better improve the safety. This finding led to implementing a
countermeasure for each factor that could lead to an error, as we discussed in the
former section.
Recently, organizational safety management has caught the attention. The 1986
space shuttle “Challenger” explosion and the Chernobyl NPP accident taught us that,
in addition to human factor, we must also review the organization to eliminate
accidents. James Reason explained that an active failure that pierces the weak points
of multiple layers of defense leads to an accident with his Swiss cheese model
(Reason 1997). He further named such accidents “organizational accidents” caused
by organizational factors of people and technology and argued that organizational
culture and management are responsible for their prevention.
As we saw above, we attribute causes of social disasters to technology, human
factor, and organizations and their culture. By removing factors that lead to risk from
each one of them, we have improved the technology, enhanced social regulation,
implemented ways to prevent human error, and developed measures for safety
management. As a result, the rate of accidents per operational quantity has drasti-
cally dropped. Erik Hollnagel, however, wrote that we would have to face and
manage accidents that we cannot identify what their causes are. He argues that our
measures so far are “Safety-I” and we will, in the future, need “Safety-II,” that is,
active safety management (Hollnagel 2014).
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A typical example of applying the concept of Safety-II is the problem with
Boeing 787. This model started commercial operations in 2011; however, due to
its repeated damage and burn problems with batteries, it suspended operation in
January of 2013. A thorough investigation has failed to identify the cause, still today;
however, safety measures in case of batteries burning have been implemented, and
the operation restarted in May of the same year. Some voice their anxiety that the
decision does not follow the conventional Safety-I concept and the risk factor is not
removed.
Ulrich Beck described in his Risk Society that an “industrial society at a stage
where generation of wealth has turned into generation of risk” (Beck 1986). In the
modern society, where what we thought were goods have turned into bads without us
recognizing the change, we need to add Safety-II-type countermeasures that actively
assure safety by identifying symptoms that can lead to failures and accidents through
daily monitoring and managing of people or IoT like the way our computer software
is continually revised.
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Chapter 8
Environmental Risks
Toshio Takatorige, Yukio Hirose, and Shingo Nagamatsu
Abstract Production and consumption pose a number of burdens on our ecological
systems. The risk of causing damage to human health by environmental contamina-
tion is called, in general, environmental risk. Climate changes and infection to new
pandemic influenza are believed also to be caused by the global human activities
affecting global environment and ecological systems; thus, they often make part of
environmental risks in the broad sense. This chapter explains each of these risks and
unveils our unique methods in counter them.
Keywords Chemical substance · Climate change · Environmental risk · Global
warming · Infection · Pandemic
8.1 Change in Biological System and Risk of Infection
Infections spread with the presence of (1) source (e.g., virus), (2) path of infection,
and (3) susceptible host (organisms with weak immunity). History tells us that
climate changes and changes in biological systems also place large effects on spread
of infections.
8.1.1 Accidents with Infrastructures
Changes in nature and ecosystems have posed a number of threats to humankind. A
typical example was the plague infection in medieval Europe. Global warming in
recent years is causing concerns of a tropical epidemic dengue fever in Japan. This
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section will introduce the relation between changes in nature and ecosystems and
risks of infection spreading through discussions on plague and dengue fever.
8.1.1.1 Spread of Plague in Medieval Europe
Plague had a history of repeated attacks in Europe. The spread in the fourteenth
century, especially, killed one third of the population according to the records.
Plague is an infection caused by Yersinia pestis. Yersinia pestis infects rats and
rodents, and then when fleas that feed on their blood bite people, the infection is
passed on. Pets like cats and dogs and livestock like pigs and sheep can carry
Yersinia pestis as well. The devastating spread of plague in medieval Europe is
explained by rodents like black rats and squirrels living in the plains of central Asia
invaded into Europe for some reason. Up until the medieval, the Alps and its north
were woods covered with trees. People cut down the trees and turned the land into
farmland and fields to grow grass to feed livestock like pigs. The big changes in the
natural and ecological systems chased out the foxes, wolves, owls, and harks out of
the woods. The rodents then entered the human living environments and multiplied
their numbers explosively feeding on the food residue from people. Medieval
Europe had a large climate change as well causing poor crops in the cold seasons
and people’s nutrition worsened. Increase in people’s moving among regions was
also a factor in the ravage of plague. Today, plague is an infection controllable with
antibiotics. It still, however, spreads locally in some countries, and about 2000
patients are reported each year.
8.1.1.2 Dengue Fever Front Moving North with Warming
and Increased Risk of Infection
Dengue fever is an infection caused by dengue virus carried by mosquitos, and it is a
disease local to the tropics and subtropics regions, especially Southeast Asia, South
Asia, Central and South America, and the Caribbean islands. The infection has
recently been reported in Africa, Australia, China, and Taiwan. The estimate is
about 100 million worldwide infections annually, and about 250,000 are affected
with symptoms. Mosquitos cannot live through the winter in Japan with high
latitude, and dengue fever is not a resident local here. Sporadic cases in Japan,
however, are increasing where the patients had been infected overseas and showed
symptoms after their return (imported case). The number of patients reported
annually, excluding January to March, has been 9 in 1999, 18 in 2000, and 200 in
2010. In 2014, the number of patients and infected exceeded 150 cases among those
that visited Yoyogi park in Tokyo. Global warming has pushed the habitat of Asian
tiger mosquitos up north close to Aomori Prefecture, and the virus may turn into a
resident one. We need to keep our eyes on this risk.
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8.1.2 Changes in Lifestyle and Risks of Infection
Well-known infections that change risks with the change of lifestyle include cholera,
tuberculosis (TB), and AIDS.
8.1.2.1 Worldwide Spread of Cholera in the Nineteenth Century
Cholera is a disease caused by oral intake of water or food contaminated with Vibrio
cholerae. Its symptoms are caused when Vibrio cholera reaches the lower part of the
small intestine and produces toxin. There were seven cases of cholera pandemic in
the nineteenth century. The first through the sixth pandemic originated from Bengal,
India, and spread throughout the world. Economic and military activities by
European countries in India and other southern Asian countries had strong influence
on the spread of the disease in Europe. In the nineteenth century, the invention of
steamboats gave a big boost to the capacity of transportation over the ocean. The
opening of Suez Canal shortened the travel time between India and Europe, and it
also contributed to more people and things traveling between the two places. At the
same time, building infrastructures for health and hygiene had not caught up with the
abrupt increase of population in cities like London or Paris, and the conditions were
ready for the sudden spread. Cities of advanced countries like England started public
control of water supply and sewage, i.e., measures for public hygiene of drinking
water, food, and waste, and succeeded in terminating the spread. Other regions with
insufficient hygienic environments still suffer from the spread. The 2015 WHO
estimation counted 1.3 to four million cholera patients a year and 21 to 143 thousand
annual deaths due to it.
8.1.2.2 Once a National Disease for Japan, Tuberculosis
Tuberculosis is an infection caused by tubercle bacillus. Tubercle bacilli are passed
to human only from human. It was the number 1 cause of death in Japan during the
1900s to the 1920s when it spread throughout the country due to poor lifestyles and
nutrition. The lack of systems to protect factory workers caused the nationwide
spread of the disease. Under the Japanese government’s promotion of the textile
industry producing cotton yarns and cloth and the silk industry, a large number of
young female workers lived in dormitories built adjacent to the spinning mill
factories. They were far away from home and worked in day and night shifts with
bad labor conditions. Poor nutrition and living environment caused sickness to some
of the female workers who were laid off. They spread the tuberculosis they had
caught after they returned to their home country, and the disease spread in cities and
countryside all over the nation.
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The government countered by setting the Factory Act to protect the factory
workers and building health centers around the nation. After World War II, the
government set the Labor Standards Act and the Industrial Safety and Health Act to
further protect workers. The health centers organized themselves to function as
central establishments for tuberculosis management and patient control. As a result,
the number of tuberculosis patients has dropped in Japan who is now close to a low
TB burden country. The world, however, still carries 2–3 billion tubercle bacilli
patients, and in the year 2015, there were about 10.4 million new patients and about
1.4 million deaths; it is still a disease with high concerns. Recently immigrants and
refugees from high tuberculosis burden countries into advanced countries with low
burden increased the number of infections in advanced countries, and the situation is
calling for precaution and countermeasures. In fact, major cities of New York, San
Francisco, and London faced the comeback of the patient counts in the 1980s and
have enhanced their countermeasures. In Japan, among the patients in their twenties,
over 60% are now foreign nationals (MHLW 2016). If the number of foreign labor
continues to increase, the country has to be concerned of the comeback, like
European and American countries, and it has to keep tight control on tuberculosis.
8.1.2.3 HIV/AIDS Continues to Spread
In the 1980s, acquired immune deficiency syndrome, known as AIDS, entered human
society, and the change of human lifestyles caused the disease to quickly spread
throughout the world. When a person infected with human immunodeficiency virus
(HIV) develops symptoms, the person is considered an AIDS patient. Early in Japan,
AIDS started as drug toxicity where victims had blood transfusion of blood products
contaminated with HIV. Recently, is it more of a sexually transmitted disease (STD)
where the majority of carriers and patients are male homosexuals. AIDS is now not
deadly with the birth of a drug to inhibit the growth of its virus; however, it is still an
incurable infection. Since 2007, a number of new HIV infection reports have been
over 1000 a year, and the reports of new AIDS patients have been over 400 annually
since 2006 in Japan. This means the number of patients is steadily growing in Japan. In
the world every year, about 2.1 million are newly infected and about 1.1 million die.
The number of patients is over 30 million with about 17 million receiving treatment.
AIDS is the biggest infection WHO is fighting now (WHO 2015).
8.1.3 Risks of Pandemic with Infection to New Influenza
and Alike
In May 1980, WHO announced that a type of viral infection, smallpox, was
eradicated, and it appeared that human won the battle with viral infections. Imme-
diately after that, however, pathogen unknown before like HIV, Escherichia coli
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(E. coli) that causes colon bleeding O157, and norovirus suddenly surfaced in our
world. In 2003, severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) started in southern China
and quickly spread around the whole world. A new influenza H1N1 type started in
Mexico and spread to the United States and to the world. The world is alert against a
revisit of the Spanish flu-like pandemic a hundred years ago from 1918 to 1919. It is
estimated that this pandemic infected about half a billion people and killed over
50 million. Today, the most feared new influenza is the H5N1 type. The new flu
epidemic in 2009 was luckily not H5N1 type. Wild birds and domestic poultry
usually do not have symptoms even when influenza viruses infect them. Especially
when highly pathogenic avian influenza H5N1 outbreaks, there is a high possibility
that it transforms to a new type influenza virus that infects people. For this reason,
culling of all birds in the poultry farm takes place to eliminate the viruses.
WHO revised the International Health Regulation in 2005 (WHO 2008) and
required all member states to enhance their preparedness against influenza pan-
demics. The requirement calls for international cooperation so an outbreak of a
new type influenza will not turn into a pandemic. Japan in 1998 set the Act on
Infectious Diseases (the official title is “Act on Prevention of Infectious Diseases and
Medical Care for Patients Suffering Infectious Diseases”) and, in addition in 2012,
established the “Act on Special Measures Concerning Novel Influenza Infection,
etc.,” and the legal system is in place to counter occurrences of influenza. The law
states that once a state of emergency against novel influenza is declared, the prime
minister takes the role of the response headquarter chief and requests people of Japan
to refrain from going out, box office entertainment, and corporations to limit public
transportation. The central and local governments have set their action plans and
guidelines to protect the lives and health of the people of Japan and minimize the
effects on our lives and economy in case a novel type influenza or alike breaks out.
8.2 Risks of Climate Changes and Their Countermeasures
8.2.1 Risk of Climate Changes
The modern society with mass production, consumption, and disposal places an
excessive burden to the global environment and is causing serious environmental
concerns of global warming, ozone layer depletion, loss of tropical rainforests, and
deforestation. This section especially discusses climate changes like global warming,
among these problems.
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) was established in 1988 to
evaluate climate changes, and the panel has been rigorously discussing what impact
they pose on our lifestyles and societies. In its Fourth Assessment Report in 2009,
IPCC projected that the average global temperature would rise by 1.1~6.4 C
(Kelvin, K). The report also claimed that, although there was some uncertainty,
there was no doubt that the trend of warming will persist through our future and our
societies needed to adapt to the climate changes. In the Fifth Assessment Report in
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2014, Working Group II reported the following eight risks that the climate changes
would pose on our lives based on the up-to-date scientific findings (IPCC 2014).
First was the risk of storm surge damage along the coastline caused by sea level
rise. When warming melts glaciers and raises the sea surface temperature to cause
thermal expansion of seawater, the sea level rises. This rise immediately impacts
high risk of inundation along coastlines. In fact, it is estimated that if the sea level
rises by 1 m around Japan, the number of people living in sub-zero areas of average
tide levels will double from two million to 4.2 million. Many lowlands are protected
by levees; however, sea level rises will raise the latent risk of storm surge and
tsunami attacks. The rise of the sea level is said to affect the ecosystem as well. When
the sea level rises, seawater invades further upstream the rivers and expands the
brackish water areas. Fish and shellfish change their habitat with the change of water
environment, and there is the risk that fishermen’s livings will be affected.
Secondly, heavy rainfall would cause the risk of flooding damage in metropolitan
areas. Higher temperature increases the amount of water vapor in the air. Global
warming will increase the strength and frequency of heavy rain. The number of
tropical cyclones will remain at the same level or decrease; however, the number of
strong tropical cyclones is increasing, and the forecast for water damage risk is
higher with warming.
Thirdly, extreme weather conditions would place the risk on infrastructures that
may stop functioning. Heavy rain and earth disasters are local weather phenomena.
However, if lifelines like electricity, water supply, or information networks are
damaged, their stop of functions will lead to influence to socioeconomical systems
over wide areas.
Fourthly, heatwaves could cause health damage to the weak living in urban areas.
The synergistic effect of climate change over the entire globe and heat island
phenomena elevate the possibility of extremely hot regions in urban areas. Extreme
heat especially burdens low-income families, elderlies, and outdoor workers and
increases their risk of death or damages from heatstroke.
Fifthly, temperature rise and droughts would pose risk on safe guarantee of food
supply. Higher temperature and unstable rainfall can cause drop in agricultural
production due to usual crops not adapting to the weather changes. If the price of
food products goes up over the world, it will impact low-income families in their
good quality food supply.
Sixthly, insufficient water supply and climate change would put the living of
farmers at risk. Depletion of irrigation water and irregular weather conditions can
lower the crop yield, and farmers and herders with minimum capital may have to
face serious drops in their income. Natural disasters like flooding may further take
away their minimum means of production like farmland, machines, and livestock,
and they may suffer great damages.
Seventhly, the rise of seawater temperature could destroy the ecosystems along
the coastlines. Coral reefs near tropic and subtropic coasts not only provide living
space for a variety of creatures, but they also provide the function of purifying the
seawater. Higher seawater temperature causes coral bleaching and in some cases
death. The seawater temperature rise can cause a great amount of influence on the
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ecosystems near the coastlines. Oceanic creatures along the coastline are important
economic resources in terms of food supply. Once the oceanic ecosystems are
destroyed, there will be large damages to the fishermen living on the coasts.
Eighthly, climate changes would pose the risk of losing functions provided by the
forests on land and underwater ecosystems in rivers and ponds. Forests not only
provide living space for a number of animals, but they also supply oxygen and nuts.
If global warming causes shifts in the forests, animals living in them will also change
their habitats, and the resulting animal damages in neighboring farmlands will result
in economic loss of resources for the farmers.
8.2.2 International Actions Toward Climate Change Risks
In response to the risk of environmental changes at the global level, the 21st United
Nations Climate Change Conference (COP 21) was held in Paris, France, in 2015.
During this conference, 196 countries and regions formally agreed to the interna-
tional framework about actions against global warming to start in 2020 (Paris
Agreement) (United Nations 2015). The Paris Agreement specified a target for the
international society to keep the average global temperature rise to less than 2.0 K by
means of taking advantage of mechanisms of the markets. It was a large forward step
with all member countries, including developing countries as well as advanced
countries, reaching an agreement. Even if the agreement is followed, we have to
accept a temperature rise of about 2.0 K and thus need to take further counteractions
against various climate change risks.
8.3 Environmental Risks and Their Countermeasures
8.3.1 Environmental Risks of Chemical Substances
The modern society is experiencing mass production and mass consumption that
human never experienced throughout its history. The primary hazards of environ-
mental risks are chemical substances intentionally produced as industrial products
and chemical substances that the processes of manufacturing and disposal produced
as unintended by-products. PCB and benzene are examples of the former and
organic mercury, dioxin, and sulfur oxide of the latter. When these chemical sub-
stances are discharged into the air, water, or ground during production, consumption,
or disposal, they contaminate the environment.
Hazardous chemical substances pose threats to our health, e.g., they can cause
cancer even with minute amount in the environment if we continue to introduce them
into our bodies for long periods. Minamata disease, itai-itai disease, and Yokkaichi
asthma in Japan are examples of serious harms to local residents exposed to large
quantities of hazardous chemical substances.
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8.3.2 Higher Concerns over Environmental Risks
and Changes in Countermeasures
What lifted people’s concerns over environmental risks were the four major pollu-
tions that caused serious health damages to people. Large petroleum complexes built
during the post-war high economic growth period disposed hazardous chemical
substances generated during production directly to the air, water, and ground without
treatment and residents in the areas suffered damages to their health. The health
damages caused by environmental pollution, lawsuits by the victims and their
supporters, public movements, and people’s higher concerns over pollution pushed
for the establishment of Basic Law for Environmental Pollution Control in 1967. It
was followed by Air Pollution Control Act, Water Pollution Control Law, and Waste
Management and Public Cleansing Law, one after another, to promote prevention of
environmental contamination.
These laws for pollution prevention set standards for factory discharges and local
environment concentration of mercury, cadmium, sulfur dioxide, and other pollut-
ants. Enforcing these countermeasures against pollution contributed to improving
serious air pollution and water contamination, and people’s concerns spread to other
chemical substances. In her 1962 book “Silent Spring,” Rachel Carson (1962)
pointed out that the ecosystem of wild birds was suffering damages caused by
pesticides like DDT. The book made it to a worldwide bestseller. In 1974, Sawako
Ariyoshi’s “Fukugo Osen” (Complex Pollution),” a newspaper series alerted the
society about environmental contamination caused by multiple chemical substances.
These works were followed by further publications and media coverage about the
environment and people started to fear for contamination of the living environment
and health damages caused by chemical substances in daily products.
The concerns spread to living conditions including water contamination in Lake
Biwa in Japan due to living drainage containing synthetic detergent and dioxin
production from burning plastics. Once the consumers understood that their own
activities of consumption and disposal could contaminate the environment and cause
health hazards, they started to turn their lifestyles to save the environment.
Serious health damages started to take place all over the world including the toxic
gas leakage from a pesticide factory in Bhopal, India, in 1984. Triggered by these
accidents, the United States and Netherlands acknowledged the people’s rights to
know the use and discharge of chemical substances and built the rules to make such
lists available. Japan, in 1999, set the system Pollutant Release and Transfer Register
(PRTR) for which companies producing or using hazardous chemical substances
have to report the amount released to the environment to the administration.
The above history led the whole society to recognize the importance of knowing
which chemical substance contains what amount of risk and the need for effective
control for avoiding such risks. As a result, at the end of the twentieth century,
methods for risk management were searched and developed against a number of
chemical substances.
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8.3.3 Managing Environmental Risks
We will next discuss effective management of environmental risks from chemical
substances. In 1997, the US Presidential/Congressional Commission on Risk
Assessment and Risk Management proposed a six-stage framework for risk man-
agement. The six stages involve defining the problem and putting it in context,
analyzing the risks associated with the problem in context, examining options for
addressing the risks, making decisions about which options to implement, taking
actions to implement the decisions, and conducting an evaluation of the actions.
Other countries often reference these processes in evaluating new environmental risk
management methods. As methods and procedures of evaluating risks of chemical
substances caught the attention, research advanced in finding a common scale for
evaluating environmental risks of which chemical substances affect human health to
what extents. Once the environmental risk of each chemical substance is evaluated,
we can then identify risk management of which chemical substance to prioritize and
to reduce the risk to what level.
The magnitude of environmental risk from a chemical substance depends on the
severity of health damage when exposed to the substance (e.g., exposure to
benzene can cause leukemia in which case the worst scenario is death) and the
amount of intake of the substance from the environment (e.g., the lifetime intake of
benzene). In general, environmental risk evaluation proceeds in checking the
hazards associated with the chemical substance, analyzing the relation of volume
to reaction, measuring the amount of exposure, and assessing the risk, that is, first
confirming the harm to health by the chemical substance and then evaluating how
high the level of harm is to the health with the amount of intake, next the process of
estimation to what level people take the substance from the environment, and last,
judgment what level of health damages to expect at what level of exposure.
We now explain the four-step environmental risk evaluation in Uchiyama’s paper
(Uchiyama 1996) with benzene. Benzene is produced from synthetic resin and other
materials at the rate of about four million tons a year. Epidemiological studies of
leukemia with workers in factories that use benzene as glue and animal experiments
have confirmed that benzene is a carcinogenic hazardous material. The unit risk of
benzene in terms of developing leukemia is the measure of the level increase in the
risk of leukemia with lifetime intake of 1 microgram per 1 cubic meters. The
volume-reaction relation, according to an overseas epidemiological study, estimates
the unit risk of benzene at 3–7 for every 1 million persons. Measuring the benzene
concentration in the air gives an estimate of exposure to benzene. If we calculate the
environmental risk of benzene in Japan from its unit risk, concentration in the air,
population, and average life, we can estimate the leukemia outbreak risk at several
tens of people a year.
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8.3.4 Problems in Environmental Risk Management
of Chemical Substances
We have gradually been gaining study results of environmental risk evaluations for
chemical substances hazardous to our health like benzene and dioxin. There are,
however, about 100,000 chemical substances in use over the world and about 50,000
in Japan alone. Each year, the industries develop hundreds of new chemical sub-
stances, and environmental risks of most chemical substances have not been clarified
at this time.
Chemical substances with scientific evaluation of their chemical risks are only a
part of them all. The Act on the Evaluation of Chemical Substances and Regulation
of Their Manufacture, etc. sets the rules of risk evaluation before introducing
products into the market if they contain chemical substances that may cause health
hazards. Chemical substances with large risk evaluation have their production
banned or their use limited by this law. The fact, however, is chemical substances
subject to such restrictions make only a small part with those with clear health
damages by past pollution or confirmed health damages to workers in the production
fields.
For most chemical substances, even without clear damages caused, their sizes of
risks are not clarified. Currently, chemical substances suspected to pose large health
hazards include persistent organic pollutants like dioxin, polychlorinated biphenyl
(PCB), and dichlorodiphenyltrichloroethane (DDT). These substances hardly dete-
riorate in the natural environment; thus, they are persistent, and once discharged in
the environment, they travel and diffuse to a wide area over the globe. Further, they
accumulate when living organs take them into their bodies and thus are highly
hazardous to ecological systems. Countries of the world have agreed to cooperate
in regulating their production, like with Stockholm Convention; however, tackling
the problem of their risk management at the global level is one that we just started.
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Chapter 9
War, Crimes, and Terrorism
Shingo Nagamatsu
Abstract Unlike accidents or natural disasters, war, crimes, and terrorism are all
incidents caused by people’s specific intentions. Nevertheless, these events, just like
accidents and natural disasters, are greatly influenced by development of scientific
technology and social structures of political disagreement and economic disparities.
This chapter overviews structures and what are special about war, crimes, and
terrorism.
Keywords Disparity · Ideology · Nation · Religion · Social isolation · Violence
9.1 War, Crimes, Terrorism, and Societal Safety Sciences
Nobody argues with the fact that war, crimes, and terrorism are threats to people’s
lives and properties. These problems, however, have fundamentally different nature
in contrast to accidents and natural disasters we have discussed in this book so far.
Accidents and natural disasters, in general, have differences in whether they are
caused by men or nature; however, they are both unintended. War, crimes, and
terrorism, on the other hand, always come with an individual, group, or government
that intentionally starts them. In other words, accidents and natural disasters are
unintentional and unfavorable results of societal activities by humans, and in con-
trast, war, crimes, and terrorism are actions started by human for specific intentions
or purposes. For this reason, measures for protecting the societies from war, crimes,
and terrorism center around how to manage these executors or their motivations. We
will discuss four approaches below:
The first approach is to eliminate motivations to start war, crimes, or terrorism.
For example, one of the fundamental reasons to start terrorism or war is economic,
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religious, or ideological conflict among countries or groups involved. If we can
resolve such conflicts peacefully, we can avoid the breakout of war and terrorism.
Crime rates, also, are known to have high correlations with economic poverty and
disparity in the societies. Thus, if we develop the economy to remove the disparity,
we should be able to reduce crimes. For these approaches to make actual effects, they
will take long times and enormous efforts.
Then comes the second approach as an important method to control executors of
war, crimes, and terrorism. This approach removes or constrains individuals or
organizations with high probabilities of planning war, crimes, or terrorisms. The
2003 US military attack against Iraq and the bombing of Syria and Afghanistan upon
declaring Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant was a terror organization are typical
examples of such approaches. For domestic crimes, police captures the suspect under
the law. Actions against organized crimes and terror attacks include police investi-
gation against illegal actions before the incidents.
The third approach manages results of war, crimes, and terrorism. This approach
saves victims of military or terrorist attacks, controls the spread of damages, and
provides care for the victims.
The fourth approach controls motivations for war, crimes, and terrorism. Arrang-
ing international rules and cooperation among international societies have continued
in their efforts to raise the political price to pay for making military actions. From
now on, it seems that we need approaches to socially encompass individuals that
seem to turn radical and make terrorist acts and approaches to maintain environments
with physical structures in cities that make it hard for crimes to take place.
Among these approaches, the third and the fourth not only reduce damages from
war, terrorism, or crimes, but they can also contribute to mitigating damages from
accidents or natural disasters. We will discuss the fourth approach, with similarities
with countermeasures against accidents and natural disasters, in some detail.
First, we need to check the definition of war, terrorism, and crimes. Terrorism
has large influence over interests of the international societies; thus, it has so many
definitions that one can probably write a book on its definitions. There are,
however, three points that are agreed among most studies: (1) the act has political
or religious intention, (2) it targets civilians, and (3) it is a violent act. This chapter
defines that terrorism meets all of these three conditions. A violent act targeting a
citizen is a crime if it does not have a political or religious intention. We will not
discuss nonviolent acts like a scam. As Fig. 9.1 shows, if a violent act with a
political intention is not targeting civilians, it is a war which is an execution of the
right of belligerency by a nation. The fact, however, is that some terrorist acts are
backed by some countries blurring the borderline of war and terrorism; however,
this book will not discuss this matter. Our explanation here gives a common
understanding that war, crimes, and terrorism are all violent acts that individuals
or groups of people make.
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9.2 War, Its Damages and Causes
First, we will review the amount of risk a war poses on our lives and properties. In
the human history since the fifteenth century, the number of deaths due to war is not
necessarily increasing, and Pinker explained that the number of wars is decreasing
(Pinker 2013). Nevertheless, with the two world wars we experienced, the number of
deaths with one war is increasing since the twentieth century. The history of Japan
shows 3.2 million victims during World War II. The number is bigger by digits
compared to the First Sino-Japanese War or the Russo-Japanese War. If we count the
victims over the entire world, World War I resulted in 8.53 million deaths and World
War II, 50 million, that is, the number of victims per each war abruptly increased.
We need to look at two factors to explain the sudden increase of victims with
recent wars (Kihata 2004). The first factor is the change in how wars are fought. Up
to the eighteenth century, knights and mercenaries fought wars, and the wars were
between two kings. Once the countries adopted the draft systems to hire professional
soldiers, wars involved the people of the countries. The two world wars in the
twentieth century were typical examples, and they were battles among the full forces
of the countries involved. A nation entering a full force war pours many of the
economic resources into the war, and large portions of the citizens are entangled into
the actions.
The second factor is the change in technologies of weapons. The advancement in
scientific technology greatly increased the ability to kill with new weapons. Espe-
cially, nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons are so deadly as they have the
power for human distinction. Recognizing the magnitude of devastation, a war can
make now the world largely changed its concept about war. When war was a conflict
Fig. 9.1 Definition of war, terrorism, and crime, based on definition of terrorism from Ganor
(2002) and Southers (2013)
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between kings, it was just another method of solving the difference. The
international society, however, recognized war as a “crime against peace” after
experiencing World War I. The United Nations, established after World War II,
enhanced the concept of group security assurance. The members, in general, view
sanctions by the international society are necessary against military actions that
threat the peace.
The new concept gradually reduced direct damages by war on the global basis;
however, small military conflicts still take place frequently. On the other hand, the
coordinated simultaneous September 11 attacks in 2001 was not a militant conflict
between two countries but a new form of war between a small radical group and
international peace, and this conflict is still present on our earth.
9.3 Damages from Crimes
9.3.1 World Comparison of Crimes
Murder is a typical outbreak of violent actions. Different countries have different
definitions, e.g., in the United States, intentional killing is murder or voluntary
manslaughter, and if the killing was unintended, involuntary manslaughter. Com-
paring damages from murder among different countries is, therefore, not necessarily
an easy task.
The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) reported that the
worldwide murder victims in 2004 were 490,000. This evaluates to 7.6 for each
100,000 people. This number exceeds 20 in South America, Central America,
Caribbean countries, and South Africa and, in contrast, is less than 5 in Europe,
Oceanian countries, and East Asian countries (Malby 2010). Note that numbers
announced by the jurisdiction are often quite different from numbers by health
authorities. Hirschi wrote that people tend to take delinquent actions when the four
elements of bond, “attachment,” “commitment,” “involvement,” and “belief” are
weak (Hirschi 1969).
In a recent field of study, environmental criminology explains crimes with the
environment that surrounds the society. A theory in the study field, “Routine
Activity Theory” explained a crime breaks out when the three conditions of “poten-
tial offender,” “suitable target,” and “absence of capable guardians” are met. In other
words, absence of capable guardians, like police, is one factor for a crime to take
place; however, the presences of an individual with the tendency to commit a crime
and an individual that is an easy target are equally important factors (Cohen and
Felson 1979).
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9.3.2 Trend of Crimes in Japan
Japan is known as a fairly safe country in the world. In the old days, however, the
situation was not so. Figure 9.2 shows the history of number of crimes per popula-
tion of 100,000 and their clearance rates. After World War II, the number of crimes
went up for a few years to reach a peak in the second half of 1950. The number of
murder cases was 3.49 per population of 100,000 in 1952, a value similar to the 2008
values of 3.5 in Taiwan and 3.2 in Nepal.
As Japan entered its years of high economic growth, the number of crimes
dropped; however, with the structural recession from financial crises in 1997, the
number quickly went up and reached another peak in 2002. After this peak, however,
the number dropped rapidly. Vicious and violent crimes showed similar changes.
The clearance rates, i.e., the ratios of cleared cases vs. identified crimes, have
shown the opposite trends. If the police force is constant, the number of clearances
should also be the same; thus a rise in the number of cases would drop the clearance
rate. Nevertheless, the clearance rate for vicious crimes of murder, armed robbery,
arson, rape, and so kept higher clearance rates over general crimes. This means more
efforts are put in clearing vicious crimes.
Okada pointed out the following three reasons as major factors in the drop of
clearance rate. First, people in the society have less bonds now, and the force to deter
minor crimes is dropping, and small problems that were not taken as crimes before
are now reported to the police to raise the number of identified crimes. Second, new
types of crimes like stalking, domestic violence, and cybercrimes complicate and
diversify criminal investigation, and stricter procedures for the investigation exhaust
the available resources. Third, uncharged offenses are more difficult to identify
(Okada 2006).
Fig. 9.2 History of number of identified crimes and their clearance rate, based on annual issues of
criminal statistics (National Police Academy)
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9.4 Terrorism
9.4.1 Trend of Terrorism
Terrorism has a long history, and Global Terrorism Database (GTD) records inter-
national terrorist attacks since 1970. Figure 9.3, based on this database, shows the
number of terrorism incidents and deaths over the world. This figure shows us two
distinct features about terrorism. The first is the fact that the number of terrorist
attacks has increased since the globalization in the 1980s. Second, after the 2001
coordinated simultaneous September 11 attacks, the number of victims has also
increased in the war on terror. Especially in recent years, about 40,000 are killed by
terror attacks annually.
Many people think that Japan does not have terror actions; however, that is not
the case from a global viewpoint. The Japanese Red Army aiming at a global
revolution based on communism, for example, made a terror attack of hijacking an
airplane in 1970, and the seven executors defected to North Korea. This army is also
responsible for the 1972 Lod Airport massacre in Israel where they opened random
fires and exploded grenades in the airport lobby killing 32 people. These actions by
the Japanese Red Army were the first of international terrorist attacks and are
positioned as the start of indiscriminate terror attacks (Kim 2016).
Political or religious demands should be made peacefully through political
movements, speech activities, or public campaigns. At least the European and
American countries, troubled by terrorist actions, grant such rights to everyone.
Also, it is an undeniable fact that even if they may have similar beliefs with the
terrorists, the overwhelming majority of people and groups prefer peaceful activities.
An American terrorism researcher Richardson pointed out the following four fun-
damental reasons for terrorists to choose violent actions (Richardson 2006).
Fig. 9.3 Numbers of terrorism actions and victims, based on the data of “Global Terrorism
Database”
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(1) Terrorists are always minorities. People that sense they are ousted from the
social structure turn to terrorism when they have the urge to make changes. (2) Emer-
gence of a leader that explains justice to people that feel they are treated unfairly
leads to terrorism. (3) Philosophies that urge people to righteousness through
violence and religious or unreligious ideologies move the people toward terror
actions. (4) Existence of an environment that justifies the terrorist claims.
Globalization of the societies made it possible for the minorities in each country
to communicate across the borders. When their networks share ideologies of social
reformation or revolution, and when the ideologies bind with ideas that justify
violence, they turn into radical terrorists. One of such terrorist groups that quickly
demonstrated its violence was “Aum Supreme Truth” in Japan, well known world-
wide. The cult was socially alienated from the residents near its center of activity. It
also fielded a large number of candidates for the House of Representatives election in
1990, however, was badly defeated. The experience gave the cult members perse-
cution complex, and the group took on developing biological weapons as its last
resort of self-defense and deterrence. The cult looked hopeless in the court case
about relocating its Matsumoto branch, and in 1994 it carried out the Matsumoto
Sarin attack where they spread deadly poison sarin gas toward the official residential
apartment where Nagano municipal court Matsumoto branch personnel lived. The
attack killed eight people. When the cult learned the police was going to start a
nationwide investigation, it sprayed sarin in Kasumigaseki station in Tokyo. This
was the March 1995 Tokyo Metro sarin attack that killed 12 people. Some members
of the cult, to the surprise of people, had high academic records. Aum Supreme Truth
had teachings that lured the intelligent with high academic accomplishments, and the
leader Shoko Asahara had some charisma. Members with ample scientific knowl-
edge made it possible to develop chemical weapons and build well-thought thorough
plans for the terror attacks, trends that we see in many recent terrorist attacks.
9.4.2 Changes with Terrorism
For many advanced countries, terror attacks were mostly carried out by foreign
groups. An Islamic extremist group al-Qaeda planned the 2001 coordinated simul-
taneous September 11 attacks to the United States that shook the whole world. The
17 perpetrators had entered the United States with visas although some were staying
illegally with expired ones. Given these facts, the US terrorism control concentrated
its efforts into stopping the terrorists from entering the county. One of its main
concerns is to protect the nation from threats of terrorists as demonstrated with the
establishment of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS).
During the past 10 years, however, the form of terrorism changed, and the above
type of terrorism prevention is losing grounds. The first change is who turns into
terrorists; people with the country’s citizenship, who received education in the
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country and are working on the grounds, are turning into terrorists. They are the
so-called homegrown terrorists. The second change is the frequent emergence of
terrorists called lone wolves that single-handedly plan terror attacks based on
information from the Internet and without organizational connections with terrorist
groups. The third change is the terror targets that used to be large political events or
significant facilities. Recently concerts, events, local assemblies, and restaurants
with less security are turning into targets of attacks. They are called soft targets.
The December 2015 San Bernardino attack was a typical example of such
changes. The target was a training and banquet event for employees of San
Bernardino County Department of Public Health. Of the about 80 employees
there, 14 died from random shooting. Syed Rizwan Farook, one of the perpetrators,
was an employee at the department. His parents were immigrants from Pakistan but
Farook, born in the United States, had American citizenship. The other perpetrator,
Farook’s wife Tashfeen Malik, was born in Pakistan, met Farook through the
Internet, married Farook, and immigrated to the United States in 2014. The married
couple had no criminal records and were not on the Terrorist Screening Database.
This type of terror attack is a big threat to local communities. The communities
have to face the threat that a neighbor may 1 day turn to them as a terrorist. Bracing
against these terror attacks will take, whether one likes it or not, local community
involvement.
Federal, state, and county police forces will have to work with the communities as
well. In this case, securing and explaining police authority is also a concern. For
example, in September 2015, a 14-year-old high school student in the State of Texas,
who was a Muslim, was arrested for the suspicion of being a terrorist and taken into
custody. The student had put together a clock from loose parts and brought it to
school. The clock resembled a bomb, and the school called in local police who
arrested the student. Later the student was released without charges. An influential
blogger learned about the incident through news and opened a form for people to
send messages. President Obama, at the time, invited the student to Astronomy
Night at White House. The student’s family filed some suits but were all dismissed.
This case is an indication that it is not just terrorism but also acts of terror attack
prevention that can cause serious confrontation in local communities.
9.4.3 Measures for Terrorism Prevention: Case of the United
Kingdom
The problem of homegrown terrorists is not just for the United States. The Canadian
daily newspaper The Telegram reported that the number of foreigners that moved to
Syria and Iraq to become Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) soldiers was
about 27,000–31,000 during the years 2011–2016. Among them, about 6000 were
born in European and American countries (Kirk 2016). As of July 2017, ISIL has
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significantly lost its power, so the number of young people that head toward Syria
must have greatly dropped; however, the trend of training terrorists across borders
will probably continue.
The United Kingdom has started a program Channel, since 2012, to prevent its
people from being drawn into terrorism. Channel is a program to identify individuals
with risks of turning radical, evaluate the risk with a checklist, and provide support to
prevent the individuals from entering terror actions. At the frontline of this program
are about 70,000 local teachers, public health workers, and doctors who have gone
through proper training to identify individuals with the potential of turning radical. A
program like Channel, seen from its outline, is a different approach from allowing
public authorities, like the police, to interfere with local communities. It rather places
terrorism prevention along the line of local medicine, local community service, and
social education to accomplish a safe community. The approach seems even in line
with local disaster prevention. Some evaluate the method highly saying it has
dramatically reduced the number of young people moving out to Syria; however,
some others not so highly saying the drop is simply a result of ISIL losing its power,
and the program itself is not so effective. Some point out that the Channel method
merely identifies individuals with risks of turning radical following a manual and
that it is far apart from ideal social connotation. In either case, without doubts, the
method is symptomatic and has no solution of dealing with the fundamental factor
leading to terrorism, that is, minorities bearing negative feelings toward the society
where they are isolated and discriminated. How to accept minorities in the society
and encompassing them within appears to be public service issues; however, they are
equally important in terrorism prevention. Earlier, we discussed that weaker human
relations in the communities are causing increase in crimes, and the same applies to
the background of terrorism.
9.4.4 Current State of Terrorism Prevention in Japan
and Problems
As we discussed above, Japan has its own share of terrorism concerns. A 2013
al-Qaeda linked terror attack in Algeria, took hostages, and killed 40 including
10 Japanese. It was the reality that overseas terrorism can target Japanese.
Al-Qaeda and ISIL have repeatedly announced Japan as a target for terror attacks,
and people in some international terrorist organizations have been in and out of the
country. With the summer Olympics coming up in 2020 in Tokyo, the threat of
terrorism is going up every year in Japan.
Under these circumstances, prevention of organized crimes like terrorism must
take international cooperation. The United Nations Convention against Transna-
tional Organized Crime (TOC treaty) turned effective in 2003. This agreement
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clarifies that it is a crime to take part in international criminal organizations or money
laundering of profits through criminal actions.
TOC treaty obligates its signees to identify and punish “agreeing to perform a
serious crime” or “participating in organizational criminal group activities” as a
crime separate from attempted or committed crimes. For this reason, Japan had not
signed the treaty for a long time. In 2017, the Second Abe Cabinet submitted a
proposal for amending the Act on Punishment of Organized Crimes to add “Crime
for preparing terror attacks and alike.” The proposal gave authority to the adminis-
tration to punish preparations at early stages before actually committing a variety of
crimes and was met with strong oppositions from minor parties and the people of
Japan saying that the amendment could lead to administration going out of control.
The majority party, however, forced the proposal through and enacted the bill and
then later ratified the TOC treaty. Ratification of the treaty is commended for
enhancing the country’s prevention of terrorism; however, it also opened fundamen-
tal problems of how far we can allow the government power to expand and how we
can stop the power if it goes out of control.
The more we enhance terrorism prevention, information from grassroots investi-
gation turns more important, and there will be demands for more involvement of
local communities. We are now faced with a mound of problems like if the power
ends up splitting local communities, whether it will disturb human rights of people
with different ideologies and foreigners, or how to avoid people excessively spying
on each other. They are also problems that societal safety sciences have to look into.
References
Cohen, L. E., & Felson, M. (1979). Social Chane and Crime rate trend: A routine activity approach.
American Sociological Review, 44(4), 588–608.
Ganor, B. (2002). Defining terrorism: Is one Man’s terrorist another Man’s freedom fighter? Police
Practice and Research – An International Journal, 3(4), 287–304.
Global Terrorism Database. https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/. Accessed 28 June 2018.
Hirschi, T. (1969). Causes of delinquency. Berkeley: University of California Press.
Kihata, Y. (Ed.). (2004). 20-Seiki no Senso toha Nandeattaka [what were the wars in the twentieth
century]. Tokyo: Otsuki-shoten (in Japanese).
Kim, H. (2016). Musabetu-Tero: Kokusai Shakai ha dou Taisho sureba iika [Indiscriminate terror
attacks: How the international societies should prepare]. Tokyo: Iwanami (in Japanese).
Kirk, A. (2016, March 24). Iraq and Syria: How many foreign fighters are fighting for ISIL? The
Telegraph.
Malby, S. (2010). Chapter 1 – Homicide. In: S. Harrendorf, M. Heiskanen, & S. Malby (Eds.),
International statistics on crime and criminal justice, Publication series no. 64 (pp. 7–19).
Helsinki: HEUNI.
National Police Academy. Crime in Japan, published annually.
Okada, K. (2006). Nippon no Hanzai Gensho [Crime phenomena in Japan, mainly on criminal cases
since the Mid-1950s]. Reference No. 666, National Diet Library of Japan (in Japanese).
108 S. Nagamatsu
Pinker, S. (2013). The decline of war and conceptions of human nature. International Studies
Review Harvard University, 15(3), 400–405.
Richardson, L. (2006). What terrorists want: Understanding the enemy, containing the threat.
New York: Random House.
Southers, E. (2013). Homegrown violent extremism (1st ed.). Scotch Plains: Anderson Publishing.
Open Access This chapter is licensed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-
NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-
nc-nd/4.0/), which permits any noncommercial use, sharing, distribution and reproduction in any
medium or format, as long as you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source,
provide a link to the Creative Commons license and indicate if you modified the licensed material.
You do not have permission under this license to share adapted material derived from this chapter or
parts of it.
The images or other third party material in this chapter are included in the chapter’s Creative
Commons license, unless indicated otherwise in a credit line to the material. If material is not
included in the chapter’s Creative Commons license and your intended use is not permitted by
statutory regulation or exceeds the permitted use, you will need to obtain permission directly from
the copyright holder.
9 War, Crimes, and Terrorism 109
Part III
Risk Analysis and Management
Chapter 10
Methods in Risk Analysis
Eiki Yamakawa and Toshihiro Kawaguchi
Abstract To protect our lives and properties from disasters and accidents, we need
to identify sources of risks, acknowledge weaknesses in our societies and ourselves,
and be readily prepared in both hardware and software. We frequently express the
odds of events taking place with probabilistic numbers; thus, we must have at least
the minimum knowledge in mathematical statistics. This chapter first introduces
quantitative evaluations of probabilities of events to cause damages to us and the
magnitudes of the damages. We will then learn how to analyze and estimate risks
using the evaluations. The chapter closes with decision-making methods in finding
the best measures that minimize the risks.
Keywords Confidence interval · Linear model · Mathematical programming ·
Random variables · Relative risk
10.1 Evaluation and Probabilities of Risks
When natural disasters, like flooding or earthquakes, or accidents caused by
physical or chemical phenomena take place, their formation of outbreak greatly
differs with environmental factors and chances. For evaluating uncertain events
like disasters or accidents, we generally apply the function called measure that
maps the set of results of interest to a nonnegative real number to express its
“magnitude.”When we express the set for the entire results that can take place with
Ω, and its subsets with E1, E2, the function μ that satisfies the following conditions
is called the fuzzy measure.
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μ ∅ð Þ ¼ 0 ð10:1Þ
μ Ωð Þ ¼ 1 ð10:2Þ
E1  E2 ) μ E1ð Þ  μ E2ð Þ: ð10:3Þ
The first two conditions show that when we set the size of the set of all possible
results to 1, fuzzy measure is a function that expresses the ratio of the results of
interest occupy. The third condition is called monotonicity, and it shows that the
evaluation goes up when more results are included.
The characteristics of measures depend on how measures of unions of sets are
defined. When parameter λ is a real number larger than 1, a fuzzy measure that
satisfies the next condition is called λ-fuzzy measure.
E1 \ E2 ¼ ∅ ) μ E1 [ E2ð Þ ¼ μ E1ð Þ þ μ E2ð Þ þ λμ E1ð Þμ E2ð Þ: ð10:4Þ
Probabilities that we are most familiar with are nothing but λ-fuzzy measures with
λ ¼ 0. Probabilities have complete additivity expressed with the following equation:
E1 \ E2 ¼ ∅ ) μ E1 [ E2ð Þ ¼ μ E1ð Þ þ μ E2ð Þ: ð10:5Þ
Complete additivity is a basic property to derive many characteristics about
probability and is important for easily analyzing and estimating risks; however, it
often conflicts with human psychology that wants to avoid uncertainty. The λ-fuzzy
measure is a measure that generalizes complete additivity required to probability. In
fact, when the parameter λ takes a positive number, the measure shows the property
called super-additivity with the expression:
E1 \ E2 ¼ ∅ ) μ E1 [ E2ð Þ > μ E1ð Þ þ μ E2ð Þ, ð10:6Þ
and the property is sub-additive when the parameter λ takes a negative value
expressed:
E1 \ E2 ¼ ∅ ) μ E1 [ E2ð Þ < μ E1ð Þ þ μ E2ð Þ: ð10:7Þ
In classic probability theory, when a trial results in N equally probable cases, and
the number of events of interest is r, the occurrence probability of the events is
defined r/N. For example, rolling a cubic die and recording the result have six
possible outcomes. With a proper die, all results have equal chances; thus, the
possibility of getting 1 is 1/6. The occurrence probability of an event equals the
relative frequency of the event occurrence with an infinite number of independent
trials. Natural phenomena, however, like flood or earthquake often break out with
some events in combination, and their occurrence usually depends on past records;
thus, we need to proceed carefully in applying probabilistic models to their risks.
114 E. Yamakawa and T. Kawaguchi
We can easily calculate the probability of accidents of a person that flies on an
airplane everyday by applying the method of “probability of the complement of an
event” that we learn in high school. Setting the probability of encountering an
accident with a single flight to p, and the number of flights to n, the probability of
not being involved in an accident with a single flight is 1  p. The probability, thus,
of not encountering an accident at all with n flights is (1  p)n. Subtracting this
probability from the entire probability of 1, we find the probability of being involved
with at least one accident is 1  (1  p)n. The frequency today of airplane accidents
is about 0.3 times for each million flights; thus, if a person flies on an airplane





that is about 0.87%.
A variable that changes its values probabilistically is called a random variable,
and a random variable that changes its chances with time is called a stochastic
process. When the set of values that a random variable can take, like in the case of
amount of rainfall or earthquake magnitude, forms a section of continuous real
values. In this case, the distribution function that defines the probability that the
value is less than a threshold or its derivative, the probabilistic density function,
gives an idea of what the probability distribution is like. The sum of many mutually
independent random variables forms a normal distribution. Normal distributions are
often used to model probabilistic random phenomena like measurement errors. The
probabilistic density function for a normal distribution is bilaterally symmetric
around the average value. A random variable with normal distribution is most likely
to take a value near the average, and the probability drops as the value shifts away
from the average.
On the other hand, for stochastic processes with increasing occurrence probability
with time, like for the case of machine failure, the random variable that expresses the
machine life or time to failure follows the Weibull distribution. If the distribution
function or the probabilistic density function is known, we can find the confidence
interval about characteristic values of the average or variance without having to
observe the phenomena for an infinite number of times.
Odds is a measure that we often use in comparing the likelihood of events. We
can calculate the odds by dividing the number of cases that the event of interest is
taking place by the number of cases it is not. If the occurrence probability of event is
known, the odds for the event is the occurrence probability divided by the proba-
bility the event does not occur. For example, assume there are ten test procedures for
a certain illness and A was positive with five tests, whereas B had eight positive
results. A’s odds is 5/(10–5) ¼ 1 and B’s odds 8/(10–8) ¼ 4. B’s odds is 4 times that
of A and the possibility of B having the illness is 4 times that of A. In general, the
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odds of an event of interest divided by that of a reference event is called the odds
ratio. As we will discuss in the next section, the odds ratio is often used in
statistically estimating the magnitude of risk for an event.
In quantitatively evaluating risk, we also need to decide how to calculate the
magnitude of damage. When calculating casualty deduction for income tax filing,
the following equation rationally determines the property damage from a disaster
based on current value:
damage amount½  ¼ acquisition cost½   depreciation from acquisition to damage½ ð Þ
 damage ratio½ :
On the other hand, damage to facilities and buildings is often calculated with
damage amount½  ¼ replacement cost½   damage ratio½ ,
because the cost for reconstruction has to enter the equation. In case of a major
disaster that caused damage to transportation systems, the indirect cost of opportu-
nity loss for being unable to use the systems sometimes enters the calculation in
addition to the direct cost of reconstruction.
Among objects lost with tsunami or fires, there are things like “photo album of
memories” that are difficult to give monetary evaluation, i.e., things that cause big
psychological pain when lost. In case it is difficult to directly calculate the absolute
value of a property, comparing the relative value to evaluations of other properties
can lead to absolute values. As we can easily verify, when there are n pieces of
property, 1, . . ., n, with values w1,. . .,wn, the n  n matrix with (i, j)-th entry wi/wj
has the maximum eigenvalue n, and the corresponding eigenvector is (w1, . . .,wn)
T.
Then for each pair of (i, j) from the set i, j 2 {1, . . ., n},i 6¼ j, having the owner
answer how many times property i is worth property j and set the answer to aij. The
diagonal components of the matrix are 1, and the eigenvector corresponding to the
maximum eigenvalue of this matrix is a multiple of vector (w1, . . .,wn)
T of absolute
values of properties 1, . . ., n.
10.2 Analysis and Forecast Models of Risks
We can estimate occurrence probability of an independent event by counting the
number of occurrences of the event of interest during a large number of trials. In fact,
if the event of interest took place X times while repeating the trial N times, with a
large enough N and X/N at a reasonable value, the occurrence probability p of the
event of interest is within the following range with a 95% confidence level:
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X
N
 1:96s  p  X
N
þ 1:96s: ð10:9Þ
In this equation, s is standard error expressed with the following equation:
s ¼
ffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffi











In case an event of interest took place 38 times out of 380 independent trials, the
95% confidence interval for the occurrence probability is evaluated at 0.07–0.13.
From the definition of standard error, quadrupling the number of trials N will halve
the confidence interval for the occurrence probability p.
When the occurrence probability is extremely small, like in the case of disasters
or accidents, the number of occurrences of the event of interest during a large
number of repeated trials is of interest. In general, during n independent trials of
an event with occurrence probability p, binominal distribution gives the probability
of the event of interest to occur k times:
Bn,p kð Þ ¼ nCnkpk 1 pð Þnk ¼
n!
k! n kð Þ! p
k 1 pð Þnk: ð10:11Þ
For example, if we set the probability p of getting 1 with one throw of die at
p¼ 1/6, we expect to get 1 once with six throws of the die. The probability of getting
1 exactly once, however, is only B6,1/6(1)’ 0.402, twice B6,1/6(2)’ 0.201, and never
B6,1/6(0) ’ 0.335.
On the other hand, when n is sufficiently large and p is sufficiently small, the
Poisson distribution approximates the probability of the event of interest occurring
k times at




The parameter λ is the expectation for the number of times the event of interest
takes place and is calculated by λ ¼ np. The constant e is Napier’s constant, and it
approximately equals 2.72. For example, with a machine that produces 1 defective
product for every 500 pieces, the probability of finding at least 1 defective product in
1000 pieces produced by this machine is:
1 P1000=500 0ð Þ ¼ 1 1e2 ’ 0:865: ð10:13Þ
In general, there are multiple factors that cause a damage, and we often find
different risk sizes for these factors. If you have two groups, one with factor A and
the other without, continuous observation of the two counting the number of cases
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with damaging result B can lead to statistical evaluation of how factor A affects the
occurrence of result B. With observation results shown in Table 10.1, the risk of
result B occurring with factor A is a/l, whereas that without factor A is c/(n  l );





a cþ dð Þ
c aþ bð Þ ð10:14Þ
times the risk without factor A. The value q, in general, is called relative risk or risk
ratio.
When the time to see whether result B takes place or not takes too long, there are
cases that the risk ratio can be estimated by comparing the number of objects with
and without factor A for objects with and without result B. With the observation
results in Table 10.1, the odds of factor A in the group with result B is a/c, and that








When the probability of occurrence of result B is extremely low, i.e.,
when a 	 b, c 	 d, the odds ratio r is a good approximation of risk ratio q.
When Table 10.1 is not the observation results of the entire investigation objects,




 e1:96s  r  ad
bc
 e1:96s ð10:16Þ















For example, if a ¼ b ¼ c ¼ d ¼ 460, e1.96s ’ 1.2 and accurate estimation of the
odds ratio will require a fairly large sample size.
Table 10.1 Cross table of
causal correlation
Result B
TotalOccurred Did not occur
Factor A With a b l
Without c d nl
Total m nm n
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When the factors that cause damaging results include quantitative data, we can
analyze the risk with generalized linear model. Generalized linear model estimates
the occurrence probability p of result B based on observations x1,. . .,xn for factors
A1,. . .,An, with the following equation:
p ¼ 1
1þ ez , z ¼ a1x1 þ 
 
 
 þ anxn þ h: ð10:18Þ
The calculation of determining the coefficients a1,. . .,an and constant h from
observations of factors A1,. . .,Anwith result B occurrence and those without result B
occurrence is called logistic regression analysis. For generalized linear models, the
odds p/(1  p) of result B is ez; thus, when factor Ai increases by 1 unit, the risk of
occurrence of result B is ez times in terms of odds ratio.
10.3 Decision-Making for Risk Minimization
Mathematical programming is one of the methodologies applied in rationally solving
decision-making problems that we encounter in various fields of natural sciences and
social sciences. Mathematical programming formulates the decision-making prob-
lem into a mathematical optimization problem to maximize or minimize the value of
the objective function with variables subject to some constraints. Thus, by setting the
policies for disaster management and accident prevention to decision variables, the
physical and social conditions that govern the policies to constraints, and the sizes of
possible risks under the policies to the objective function, we can solve the decision-
making problem within the framework of mathematical programming.
When the objective function is linear and the constraints are a system of linear
equations or inequalities, the optimization problem is called linear programming and
is expressed in the following manner:
minimize : cTx
subject to : Ax ¼ b, x  0:
For this set of formulae, x is the vector of decision variables, A is the parameter
matrix, and b and c are parameter vectors. Setting the sizes of risks with accidents or
disasters is difficult, and parameters A, b, and c have uncertainties. Especially when
parameters A and b have uncertainties, both sides of the equation Ax ¼ b are
uncertain; thus, it takes clarifying the constraints that require the two sides are
equal for solving the linear programming problem. We then turn the problem into
a “Chance Constraining Problem” that looks for the decision variables x that
minimize the objective function cTx under the constraints that the probability of
the equation Ax ¼ b or its fuzzy measure is not less than a certain threshold or the
“recourse problem” that adds the magnitude of the residual error Ax  b to the
objective function instead of equation Ax ¼ b.
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If the range of parameters A and b are known, the method to find decision
variables x that minimize the objective function cTx while the equation is satisfied
whatever values A and b take is another effective approach (“robust optimization”).
In assessing the effectiveness of risk management, “worst case analysis” is also well
practiced that identifies the case that maximizes the objective function cTx among
optimized results of linear programming problems for all possible combinations of
parameters A and b. Worst case analysis takes solving the two-level mathematical
programming problem that have the original linear programming problem in its
lower level.
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Chapter 11
Risk Management
Yoshinari Hayashi and Katsuyuki Kamei
Abstract Risk management consists of a series of actions to list out all possible
risks, evaluate their influences, and reduce or avoid the losses. We hear the term “risk
management” in a number of fields including finance, corporate management, safety
of machine systems, accident prevention, and natural disasters. The fields, however,
have different concepts and understanding of its controllability associated with the
term. In most fields, risk is pure risk that can only produce negative effects, but in
some cases, evaluating speculative risk with both negative and positive effects is
important.
Keywords Pure risk · Risk assessment · Risk treatment · Speculative risk
11.1 What Is Risk Management?
11.1.1 Nature of Risk Management
Frequently quoted in other chapters, the 2009 international standards of risk man-
agement, ISO 31000:2009 “Risk Management – Principles and Guideline,” defines
risk as “the effect of uncertainty on objectives” and risk management as “coordinated
activities to direct and control an organization with regard to risk” (ISO 2009). The
concept of risk has more than one tracks of development. The first is a financial
approach centered around business administration and insurance, and the second is
safety engineering oriented. Further, there are the third and fourth approaches that
are oriented along science of disaster management and along law. The concept of
risk management is spreading among, not only corporations, but a number of fields
including nation, administration, local societies, educational institutes, medical
institutes, homes, and individuals.
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J. H. Fayol of France first pointed out the importance of risk management in
business administration. He pointed to “security function” as a corporate activity and
defined it as “protection of resources and employees” in his 1916 paper Adminis-
tration Industrielle et Générale (Fayol 1916). Since this paper, risk management has
meant management, know-how, systems, and countermeasures to overcome risk.
On the other hand, in the USA, insurance management-type risk management
turned into the standard in the 1950s. The 1956 Gallagher paper “Risk Management:
New Phase of Cost Control” is from that time. The paper pointed out “how much
cost to spend on safety and risk management” (Gallagher 1956), an angle still in
practice today. Then in the 1970s to the 1980s, American insurance management-
type risk management theories made their ways into Japan.
In the 1960s, safety engineering fields in Japan started to take on risk manage-
ment-type methods (Hollnagel 2014). The main reason was, at the time, machine
systems quickly turned complex and they needed ways to analyze risks. For actual
engineering systems, engineers developed analysis methods, for example, fault tree
analysis, that estimates the probability of functional failure based on causal events
and reliability data, and event tree analysis that analyzes event progress of systems.
After the outbreak of the TMI accident in the USA in 1979, methods of risk
management have shown further development since the first half of the 1980s.
Analyses of the TMI accident showed that human factors and human error pose
serious effects on system safety. Thus, risk assessment and accident analysis started
to involve people and organizations, in addition to technical and engineering aspects
of machine systems, into the overall system evaluation.
Recent machine systems have complex functions intertwined with one another
and, at the same time, feature distributed functions over wide areas on the Internet.
The advancement of technologies in mechanical and information communication
pushed for more researches in developing risk management methods, and risk
management now plays a central role in resilience engineering.
Risk management originally started and developed in fields of man-made disas-
ters; thus, its history in dealing with natural disasters is relatively new. It is difficult
for human to control natural phenomena that cause natural disasters. Also, earth-
quakes and volcano eruptions have low frequencies of occurrence; thus, their
mechanisms, needed for evaluating external force magnitudes, were not well clari-
fied even in the 1980s. For this reason, in disaster prevention to prepare against
natural disasters, it was common to set the standards to the maximum in the past
records. This method only works to prevent the same disaster again and is not along
the line of risk management. Risk management against natural disasters spread in
Japan after the 1995 Great Hanshin-Awaji Earthquake (Okada 2004).
In case of earthquake disasters, for example, performing risk management takes
damage estimation with the following procedure:
1. Establish source model for the earthquake to analyze.
2. Estimate the strength of ground motion or seismic intensity at each point of
interest.
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3. Estimate the magnitude of damage caused by different strengths of ground
motion.
4. Collect damage estimates at locations of interest and show them on a map.
The development of geoscience theories since the 1970s and the accumulation of
measurement data allowed us to reach a reasonable source model of earthquakes in
item (1). Rapid advancement of theories and simulation technology of earthquake
wave propagation have also made estimating spatial distribution of earthquake
motion intensities in (2) based on source models in (1). A number of practical
empirical equations have been proposed to relate the damage rate of buildings
with earthquake movement intensities. Therefore, multiplying damage rate esti-
mated to the number of buildings or the number of people living in specific areas
gives us the magnitude of damage needed for (3). Collecting the results of (3) leads
to (4) that are in fact published in the forms of hazard maps or damage estimation.
Local organizations and corporation have started to prepare against disasters in risk
management styles based on damage estimates from (4).
Today, what risk management means have a great variety depending on who is
carrying them out against which risk and differences in the concept of management.
In the field of corporate risk management, the framework of enterprise risk manage-
ment (ERM) announced in 2004 by the Committee of Sponsoring Organizations of
the Treadway Commission (COSO) and revised in 2016 is widely accepted (COSO
2004, 2017).
11.1.2 Concept of Risk
Risk, in the past, had been defined as “combination of the consequences of an event
and the associated likelihood of occurrence” (ISO/IEC Guide 73:2002) or “combi-
nation of the probability of occurrence of harm and the severity of that harm”
(ISO/IEC Guide 51:1999). ISO 31000:2009 and ISO Guide 73:2009 in 2009
added to these definitions “the effect of uncertainty on objectives.” In the back-
ground of change in the definition of risk is the modern concept of risk management
to deal not only with risks that cause negative effects, but also with risks with
positive effect when decisions to take the risks are made.
Traditional risk management theory divides risk into pure risk and speculative
risk. As Table 11.1 shows, the former is “loss only risk” like damages from natural
disasters or accidents by chance. The latter, on the other hand, is loss or gain with a
risk that may result in loss with changes in corporate activities or operational
environment but can also lead to profit by preventing the generation of loss, i.e.,
the risk in case of “risk taking.” Table 11.1 summarizes these risks.
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11.1.3 Elements of Risk
The theory of risk management mainly discusses safety management and insurance
management. It takes risk as possibility of accident occurrence and covers such
elements like (1) hazard, circumstances and conditions that affect accident occur-
rence; (2) exposure, people and objects that are exposed to risk; (3) risk, possibility
of accident occurrence; (5) crisis, nearing of accident breakout and persistence of
accident consequences; and (6) loss.
As we discussed in Chap. 1, the term “hazard” means latent source (generation
source or characteristics) of harm. The term hazard, however, has different nuances
depending on the field. Young and Tippins explained hazard as “probability of
generating loss or environment and conditions that elevate the degree of loss.”
They also explain its synonym risk factor to mean “it is a synonym of hazard but
it also includes investment risk with possibly positive outcome in addition to
negative outcome” (Young and Tippins 2000). In applying risk management, we
need to clarify which of these elements we place in the center of our work.
11.1.4 Process of Risk Management
ISO 31000 stands out in clarifying the term definitions and showing risk manage-
ment processes that are applicable to all types of organizations. Processes of risk
management takes the form of (a) communication and consultation and
(b) monitoring and review interacting with each other at each stage of (1) establishing
the context, (2) risk assessment, or (3) risk treatment.
Table 11.1 Pure risk and speculative risk
Pure risk: objectives of risk
treatment
Loss-only risk
Risks that only produce negative effects (loss)
Operational risk
Accident, disaster, liability
Objectives related to protection, prevention, and insurance
Speculative risk: objectives
of risk taking
Loss or gain risk
Possibility of negative effect (loss) and positive effect (gain)
Business risk, strategic risk
Uncertainty with success or failure of new business, capital
investment, new product development, funding, M&A, and so on
Objectives of decisions about business chances and operational
strategies
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11.1.5 Establishing the Context
ISO 31000 places “context establishment” at the first stage of risk management
process. In establishing the context, the process defines external and internal factors
to consider for managing risks and sets the applicable range and risk criteria along
the risk management guideline. For the best risk management, an organization first
has to recognize its context. That is to understand (1) the situations and environment
where the organization stands, (2) resources the organization owns, and (3) its
mission and strategies to carry out.
11.2 Risk Assessment
11.2.1 Risk Assessment
The second stage of risk management, according to ISO 31000, is “risk assessment.”
Risk assessment analyzes the frequency of risk outbreaks and levels of influence. At
the same time, based on risk criteria, it evaluates whether to accept or avoid risks and
what the significant risks are and prioritizes responses to risks. Risk criteria here are
cost requirement for risk responses, upper limits of resources for risk exposures,
possible benefits for accepting risks, regulatory constraints and requirements, impact
on the environment, and expectations by the stakeholders. Risk assessment uses
matrices and risk maps showing relations of risk frequencies and effects.
11.2.2 Risk Identification
ISO 31000 defines that the first stage of risk assessment is risk identification to find
and recognize risks. Risk identification takes risk-sensitive minds to clarify the
following points:
1. List out exposures, that is, to check what human and physical resources the
organization has
2. Clarify what accidents may take place, i.e., human risks, physical risks, liability
risks, and risks in cost
3. Find what forms of losses are expected like human loss, physical loss,
non-recoverable receivable, loss of profit, or liability for damage compensation
A number of methods are available for identifying risks: (a) field investigation,
(b) interview, (c) discussion sessions, (d) checklist, (e) questionnaire, and
(f) flowchart.
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11.2.3 Risk Analysis and Evaluation
ISO 31000 states the second stage of risk assessment is risk analysis. The third stage
that follows is risk evaluation to estimate the effect of risk. In these stages, we have
to assess probabilities of accident occurrences or their frequencies and the sizes of
losses in case the accidents take place, i.e., the magnitude or influence of accidents.
For each specific risk, the stages analyze and evaluate the probability or frequency of
the risk developing into a real accident and what influence it makes as a result.
On the other hand, risk maps visualize the risks based on the results of identifi-
cation and evaluation. For a risk map, a visualization for anyone to recognize the
risks is important.
ISO defines risk analysis as a “process to comprehend the nature of risk and to
determine the level of risk” and risk evaluation as a “process of comparing the results
of risk analysis with risk criteria to determine whether the risk and/or its magnitude is
acceptable or tolerable.” Control self-assessment (CSA) is a method for risk analysis
and evaluation.
11.3 Risk Treatment
The phrase “risk treatment” means deciding the response to risk or selecting the
method of risk handling. It is a decision-making process for an organization to select
the best risk handling method based on set criteria and necessary cost estimates.
Risk treatment decides how to handle the risks identified and evaluated with risk
assessment. ISO 31000:2009 defines risk treatment as a process of modifying risks
with possibly the following:
– Avoiding the risk by deciding not to start or continue with the activity that gives
rise to the risk
– Taking or increasing risk in order to pursue an opportunity
– Removing the risk source
– Changing the likelihood
– Changing the consequences
– Sharing the risk with another party or parties (including contracts and risk
financing)
– Retaining the risk by informed decision
Risk treatment has two pillars of risk control, to prevent accidents or to take
disaster responses and risk finance to prepare funds or applying insurance. There are
four methods of risk treatment: (1) avoidance, (2) removal/reduction, (3) redirection/
transfer/sharing, and (4) retention/acceptance. Actions to treat a risk that broke out
without avoiding it involve reducing it to the extent possible. Then further efforts of
transferring the residual risk to others or sharing it takes place. Parts of the risk that
escaped redirecting, transferring, or sharing are kept within.
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Two ways of risk retention exist: one is passive retention as a result of being
unaware of it and the other is active retention with full understanding of the risk.
Active risk retention is further separated into one with a priori preparation and one
with no preparation, i.e., postponed response. There is advantage in active risk
retention with thorough understanding of the risk over passive risk that we recognize
for the first time after the exposure to it. ISO 31000 also recommends retaining risks
after making decisions to do so based on information.
11.4 Executing Risk Management
11.4.1 Communication: Sharing Understanding about Risk
Treatment
Figure 11.1 shows risk communication for corporate operation. The components in
the figure show that companies need to share common understanding of (1) what
risks the company holds and (2) how to treat such risks among (a) structures within
the company and (b) outside stakeholders. Corporate disclosure of risk information
means listing problems to handle, operational risks, financial standing, business
performance, cash flow analysis, and corporate governance and, so in the financial
report, describing “Rules and other systems for managing risks of loss” in the
corporate governance report and explaining such matters in the shareholder’s
meetings.
11.4.2 Coordination: Organizational Structure of Risk
Management
ISO 31000 defines risk management as “coordinated activities to direct and control
an organization with regards to risk.” Coordination in this definition means to
Fig. 11.1 Risk communication for corporations
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organize conditions about risk treatment within the organization and to derive the
best solution for interests of the stakeholders. Corporations these days commonly
establish risk management committees for coordinating risk management. Risks that
are unique to departments of production, sales, information processing, and so on are
handled within the departments. Risk management committees take on risks that
affect multiple departments or the whole companies. Today, risk treatment targets
“risk optimization” by minimizing the loss and maximizing the profit. In actual
societies, “risk zero” situations with no risk are impossible. Because there are risks
that threaten us, we make efforts to overcome them with risk management. The
efforts lead to raising corporate values.
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Chapter 12
Risk Communication and Disaster
Information
Seiji Kondo, Yukio Hirose, and Hideyuki Shiroshita
Abstract This chapter explains who needs to communicate about disaster risks and
how. It also discusses what the critical information are especially in response to
disasters and further how to educate people in preparation against disasters.
Keywords Bidirectional communication · Disaster education · Disaster
information · Reconstruction information · Risk communication
12.1 Risk Communication
12.1.1 What Is Risk Communication?
A literal interpretation of the phrase “risk communication” is to let people know
information about risks. We sense risk when we face situations that can cause
hazardous damage. The risk communication about exposure to radiation from the
Fukushima Daiichi NPP accident (Hatamura et al. 2015; IAEA 2015), therefore, was
aiming at communicating the possibilities of damage to health from radiation
exposure.
What information about risk to inform people is a highly sensitive issue. For
example, International Commission on Radiological Protection (ICRP) gave the
information about the level of health risk from radiation exposure caused by
Fukushima-1 NPP accident saying every additional 100 mSv radiation exposure
throughout the lifetime adds 0.5% to the possibility of cancer-caused death. It is hard
to believe that the people properly received and understood such expert information
in numbers (ICRP 2007, 2011).
The risk psychologist Slovic (1987) claimed that ordinary people, instead of
judging the size of risk by numeric information with probability values, evaluate
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risk with rough psychologic measures about the severity of damage and level of
uncertainty in the damage to take place. If that is the case, it would have been
difficult for many people to accurately understand the risk information about radi-
ation exposure by ICRP. On the other hand, risk communication by the government
through press conferences immediately after the accident repeated there were no
immediate effects on the human body. People were eager to know if they could do
nothing if there were no effects or even if there were no immediate effect would there
be effects in the future and, if so, what preparations they should take.
12.1.2 What Information to Provide with Risk
Communication
Information expected with risk communication is the size of the risk and how to
respond to it. That is not only to inform the risk size to people that are about to or in
the future be exposed to a risk, but also to explain how to avoid and reduce the
influence on people that are being exposed to the risk.
Janis and Mann studied decision-making at times of crisis (Janis and Mann 1977)
and found that people in general tend to judge that the impact of the risk is less if they
cannot find effective responses to the risk or stick to actions they have been taking to
the point, even when they are informed of an approaching risk. Informing only the
size of a risk hampers proper reaction to it, and it is important to explain how to cope
with it with risk communication. The risk communication in Sect. 12.1.1, in addition
to giving information about risks with radiation to people with possible harms to
their health, should have explained, for example, how to measure radiation, methods
of decontamination, how to select uncontaminated food, and the need for evacuation.
Fukushima Prefecture, after the breakout of the nuclear accident, opened a
window and a health consultation hotline for its residents to carry out risk commu-
nication for inquiries about radiation exposure. The residents had a variety of
questions starting from the level of radiation, influence on health, possibility of
food contamination, how to lead their lives, decontamination, evacuation, and so
on. During the early stages, many questions were about sizes of risks from radiation
exposure, but as time passed by, they were more about how to handle radiation
exposure (Osawa et al. 2015).
Osawa et al. summarized the points and problems with risk communication about
radiation exposure based on their experience of answering inquiries from residents at
the consultation window: “Using technical terms like Sievert (Sv) or Becquerel
(Bq) made it difficult to explain and have residents understand the risk of radiation
exposure. At the time, even the specialists and scientists had different opinions about
health hazards from low-level radiation exposure of 10 mSv or less, and it was
difficult for the residents to understand the information we gave. We had to show our
empathy to the residents’ feelings that they hated and were scared of radioactive
material or they would not listen to our explanation. Further, it was most important to
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find and inform what each and every resident, with different situations and circum-
stances, could do in leading life, managing health, and making actions.”
12.1.3 Roles of the Sender and Receiver of Risk
Communication
As we saw with risk communication on radiation exposure caused by the
Fukushima-1 NPP accident, the senders of risk communication were engineers
that developed the technology accompanied by risk, specialists of the utility com-
pany that employed the technology or administration staffs, all with proper knowl-
edge of the risks. The purpose of risk communication, however, was not to persuade
residents that the scientific technology had large advantages with small risks. The
sender of risk communication had the responsibility and duty of providing necessary
and sufficient information to have the residents recognize how the risk affected their
health, lives, and natural environment, so they could make their own judgments
about the needs for preparation and responses.
The audience, on the other hand, were citizens subject to possible exposure to risk
then or in the future, i.e., those directly affected by events that caused risks. They
were not there to receive one-way directions from the senders to accept scientific
technology with risk or to select measures to avoid risk for themselves. People
needed simple and clear knowledge about necessary cost and effectiveness of
measures to avoid or lessen the impact of risks. Risk communication gives the
necessary information to the people so they can judge if scientific technology can
provide benefits they want and if the risks the scientific technology has are accept-
able to them. The audience of risk communication has the rights to know information
about risks and the responsibility to judge whether to accept the scientific technology
with risk or not.
The sender and audience of risk communication have to acknowledge their own
roles and, at the same time, the role of the other party of the communication. A lack
of trust in the role of the other party will never reach common understanding through
risk communication. The audience trust in the sender, i.e., scientists and engineers,
has two facets: the trust about the skills of the sender and the trust about the sender’s
intention. The receiving side of risk communication by the sender cannot sincerely
accept the information unless there is trust that the sender has necessary knowledge
and skills to accurately explain the information in plain words and has the honest
intention in the efforts to transfer the information in ways understandable to the
audience.
The sending side, as well, needs trust in the citizen’s intent and ability. Unless the
audience has the intention to listen seriously to the information about risks and the
ability to make judgments after thorough evaluation of the risk information, scien-
tists and engineers would not spend the time and efforts in preparing information for
risk communication out of their resources in scientific and engineering research.
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12.1.4 Risk Communication of Societal Risk
and Personal Risk
While we handle personal risks by ourselves, some risks are societal and require the
whole society to take actions. Smoking cigarettes and being overweight are risks of
the former type, whereas earthquakes and bird flu are of the latter. According to
Morgan et al., ideal risk communication is different for personal and societal risks as
follows (Morgan et al. 2002):
Risk communication for personal risks, with the assumption that the receiver
citizens have limited time to pay attention, needs to help them understand the risks. It
is, in fact, true that a general citizen is not an expert in specific risks and is not paying
attention to risks all the time. Thus, risk communication has to allow the receivers to
understand the risks in their own language and be able to cope with them for
themselves.
Risk communication for societal risks need to support people having better
knowledge about risks so they can judge whether to tolerate and accept the phe-
nomenon with risk or not as a whole society. People have to reach an agreement for
responding to a societal risk, thus, they have to review their own thinking and
understand why their ideas are different from others in the same society. Risk
communication has to offer opportunities for every citizen in the society to partic-
ipate in discussions to reach a social agreement in responding to a societal risk.
Given the difference in risk communication for personal risks and societal risks,
we can define risk communication as a bidirectional communication between citi-
zens and specialists or citizens and administration for enhancing mutual understand-
ing to reach an agreement about response to a risk.
12.2 Disaster Information
12.2.1 Importance of Disaster Information
Having disaster information is crucial for knowing how close the disaster is and
making proper judgment of which regions are in need of assistance and which
disaster responses can offer effective help. In our high information society with a
variety of media passing global information in real time, the importance of disaster
information is inevitably growing. In other words, whenever and whatever the
circumstances, the quality of risk communication and attentiveness toward disaster
information are always being monitored.
We have to remember that disaster information is first for the disaster victims and
disaster struck areas. Disaster victims, however, are not just those victims at the time
but also include disaster victims in the future. Figure 12.1 shows the three categories
of disaster information for the different stages along the disaster management cycle.
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The cycle of three types of disaster information in Fig. 12.1, emergency infor-
mation, reconstruction information, and information for awareness and promotion, is
just one possible categorization for a single disaster location, and the stages do not
necessarily progress in a single line in an irreversible manner. For example, emer-
gency information and reconstruction information transferred alternatively in small
cycles often mean information for awareness and promotion for disaster victims in
the future.
12.2.2 Transferring Emergency Information
When hazards are about to hit, emergency information are sent out to prevent or
lessen damages. Emergency information, in general, contain three elements of time,
location, and size, that is, when, where, and how severe. Especially, when the hazard
is almost within a reach, time information gains more emphasis, and the emergency
information starts to carry the tone of a race against time.
Today with its advanced scientific technology, the Japanese society has gained
new time margins by sophistication of time-related information. The Earthquake
Early Warning, for example, upon detecting an earthquake occurrence, calculates the
time and magnitude of strong tremors reaching regions throughout the country and
sends the information out through a number of media as quickly as possible all at
once. Upon receiving an earthquake early warning, systems can stop elevators at
nearest floors, factory controllers can automatically stop production lines of preci-
sion machineries, and hospitals can halt surgeries before the earthquake-induced
strong tremors arrive. Earthquake Early Warning is an example of an accomplished
media event (cf. Sect. 3.1) that allows people to take immediate actions, based on
disaster information alone, against damaging events or even before recognizing the
existence of hazards.
In addition to emergency information that predicts time, location, and size of
damages, a number of alerts urge people to take protective actions and evacuations.
Japan Meteorological Agency sends out a large variety of information from weather
Fig. 12.1 Three types of
disaster information
12 Risk Communication and Disaster Information 133
warnings and advisories including emergency warnings, to weather conditions of
record-breaking heavy rain in short periods. It also announces disaster management
information of landslide alerts to tornado advisories, warnings and advisories of
tsunami, eruption notices and warnings about active volcanoes, weather information
like wind profiler (how winds are blowing at high elevations), and even information
useful to our daily lives like dust and sandstorm information (MOE 2008) or
ultraviolet ray indices. Local municipalities also make announcements like “evacu-
ation orders,” “evacuation advisories,” and “prepare to evacuate and start evacuating
elderlies.”
Sophistication and, at the same time, complication of information, however, can
easily lead to insufficient understanding of the information or misunderstandings. It
can also end up causing troubles with people tending to wait for information or
leading to serious distrust against the administration with people not tolerating
failures in announcing proper alerts and making false alarms (Yamori 2013).
12.2.3 Transferring Reconstruction Information
Information about reconstruction are important for supporting disaster victims and
disaster struck areas. Especially with mega-disasters over a wide area, each region
has its own circumstances to follow, and continuous sending and receiving of
information is particularly indispensable. The transfer of reconstruction information,
however, is faced with the difficult problems of “disparity,” “memory fade,” and
“harmful rumors,” and we can hardly see any media coverage that completely meet
what people are looking for.
Disparity of reconstruction information, especially, can directly lead to inequality
in support. Thus, if there were differences in economic power at regions before the
disaster breakout, the news coverage and amount of information sent tend to go out
of balance, and the regions are stuck with the differences in economic power, or even
worse, the gaps often grow bigger. For example, the amount of news coverage
ranking of municipalities along the coast in Iwate Prefecture in Japan, where Disaster
Relief Act applied for the 2011 Great East Japan Earthquake, remained almost
unchanged. Some municipalities with small news coverage received extremely
small donations even though they had suffered rather high ratio of inundation
areas (Kondo 2018).
The quantity of news coverage going down with time is an unavoidable phenom-
enon. The coverage of the Great East Japan Earthquake dropped in the same manner
for the whole and for individual regions (Kondo 2018). The small follow-up
coverage failed to let the people outside of the disaster struck areas learn about
post-disaster problems of lonely deaths in temporary housings or children in need of
care for their mental stress. Also, even when problems of disaster capitalism are on a
rise (Klein 2007), without proper coverage of the problem, people cannot reach out
to provide support.
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In recent years, the problem of harmful rumors is catching attention as not just the
question of news coverage quantity but as its quality. Sending out the news that
“harmful rumors are around” can further spread the rumors in a reproductive manner
making it difficult to improve the situations. Areas struck by nuclear accidents,
therefore, have the air that does not appreciate accurate news coverage of the reality.
Some people displayed strong opinions about the difficulty in getting rid of, over a
long time, the negative evaluation that the area is disastrous (contaminated). Some
victims even showed pessimistic responses that they will just wait for the rumor to
die out.
12.2.4 Information for Awareness and Promotion
One type of information effective for disaster management is detailed records of past
disaster “back then” and graphic description of yet-to-come disasters “in the future.”
Advancements of science and technology these days have made it possible to
manipulate large volumes of information to precisely describe details of past records
and portray future events. Especially in predicting the future, vast amount of
calculation with the supercomputer can simulate the global climate and forecast
climate changes in hundreds or even thousands of years. In addition, technologies of
special effects can visualize social damages including devastating destruction in
urban areas with mega-earthquakes of low frequencies and disaster preparations for
events that are otherwise invisible are now possible.
Efforts are also underway in utilizing information from the past to enhance the
accuracy of future prediction. Records of people’s movement in evacuating from
tsunami attacks on record are subject to big data analysis in seeking important
lessons and solutions for resolving the issues of chaos and stalling. Records of
past disasters are effective for spreading and promoting disaster management efforts;
however, we must understand the available records are in various forms. Old records
are not necessarily replaced by new ones, and some old records are passed on
through generations, or they are reevaluated.
Yamori pointed out that plotting medias that record past disaster information in a
chart with two axes of intentional vs. unintentional and pictorial vs. linguistic gives a
good overview of what they are (Yamori 2013). The categorization of whether one is
intentional or not and linguistic or not is a relative measure, and there is no strict
evaluation. Also, one style is not necessarily superior over the other, and all these
media mutually complement one another (Fig. 12.2).
Let’s look into some records to see if they were made intentionally with efforts to
pass on messages or if we happened to lay our hands on them as byproduct of
disasters. Information collected by museums are usually intentionally edited and
organized. TV special programs and documentary films are also created with the
producers’ intentions. On the other hand, posted notices at evacuation shelters were
not intended for passing on as records; however, they are important information that
vividly recorded what requirements were there “back then.”
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Linguistic information like memorandums, reports, and stories by storytellers are
neatly arranged and easy to understand. Pictorial information, on the other hand, are
easy to empathize with. In fact, paintings and remains have the power to give strong
impacts on the viewers and leave messages deep within their minds. There are cases,
however, that need literal explanation about why such traces of disasters were left
there for the viewers to understand the situations. In other cases, stories by story-
tellers right in front of the remains make the information sharing effective. Another
popular way of record composition gathers new photographs and remarks by visitors
who were exposed to the disaster information to share on the internet or archive
electronically.
Information in a variety of media can thus complement one another, and the
disaster information turns more lively. There is no meaning to disaster information if
they just sit there. When risk communication makes active use of them, they can
have meaning for the first time.
12.3 Disaster Education
12.3.1 Transition of Concept of Learning and Disaster
Education in Need
This section reviews disaster education about natural disasters for citizens including
students at schools and regions since the 1995 Great Hanshin Awaji earthquake in
Japan. Real efforts in disaster education started about 20 years ago, and with its short
history, it still has no agreed definition. The phrase disaster education itself, how-
ever, is often talked about by people and is often understood, with the word
“education” in the phrase, as something similar to school education that we are all
Fig. 12.2 Category of past disaster information, with some additions to Yamori (2013)
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familiar with. Because it was modeled after school education that teaches prelimi-
narily set contents, people generally understand disaster education as an activity that
teaches knowledge and skills about disaster reduction. The lack of basic knowledge
and skills has been pointed out as a factor in damage widening in developing
countries, and thus, teaching knowledge and skills is an important factor in disaster
education. The facts in Japan, however, of low ratio of securing tall furniture to walls
or reluctance in evacuation despite the immediate threat of disaster are problems not
rooted in lack of knowledge or skills. Although important, teaching knowledge and
skills alone does not solve problems in disaster reduction, and we need to review the
way of educational activities in disaster reduction.
There are three types of learner’s viewpoint about the concept of learning;
(1) behaviorism learning, (2) cognitivism learning, and (3) social constructivism
learning. Behaviorism and cognitivism learning focus on changes in individuals; the
former means one can make an action after learning it, and the latter can recognize an
object after learning about it. Social constructivism learning, on the other hand, is
learning about changes in a group. It describes learning of knowledge and techniques
as group sharing by its members through mutual interaction of creating and changing
instead of a one-way transfer. Kariyado pointed out that current school education is
based on behaviorism and cognitivism learning (Kariyado 2012). The Japanese
school education system has everything to teach specified in the course of study,
and understanding the contents and gaining skills to solve the quizzes are evaluated
as accomplishment in education. The abovementioned disaster education is along
these two styles of learning.
Disaster education, however, is different from school education because the
assumption that the teacher knows everything to teach does not hold. The Great
Hanshin-Awaji earthquake taught us that in disaster management, there are a number
of problems with the dilemma that the right answer is not always the sole right
answer. When faced with such problems, those in charge have to select what seems
the best from a variety of options, and even a specialist cannot tell, “This is the right
answer.” At the time of the 2011 Great East Japan earthquake, a number of
“unimaginable” events took place, and even experts voiced this word, for example,
in “Discussions on the Current Status of Seismology” by Temporary Response
Committee for the 2011 off the Pacific Coast of Tohoku Earthquake formed by the
Seismological Society of Japan (SSJ 2012). In other words, we saw that experts,
believed to have knowledge of the right answer, can sometimes possibly make
mistakes.
Although there is no single definition of disaster education, we have to take the
phrase to mean not just a one-way transfer of knowledge and skills if we want to
make it meaningful. If disaster education can capture the difficulty in facing prob-
lems without a unique answer or even without any answer, interrelation of a variety
of people can create, exchange, and share knowledge and skills about disaster
management, and those activities make part of disaster education.
Limiting disaster management to natural disasters is general in Japan; however,
that is not necessarily the case overseas. For example, in the United Kingdom,
disaster education involves, in addition to natural disasters of earthquakes and
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typhoons, transportation accidents and fires that Japan handles as accidents (social
disasters). The range of disaster management, therefore, depends on societies and
times, and disasters that disaster education covers sometimes involve social disasters
in addition to natural disasters.
12.3.2 Disaster Education as an Opportunity for Mutual
Communication
The need for education that is not just one way, i.e., bidirectional education, is not
special with disaster management and is present in fields of state-of-the-art science.
In the field of science communication that deals with the relation of science and the
society, it was pointed out early on that the effect of one-way education is limited,
and the need to break the shell has been emphasized so far. Understanding the
limitations with science, and similarly with disaster management, led to such needs.
Science communication is dealing with problems that science can cast the question;
however, it cannot provide the answer by itself, i.e., trans-science (Weinberg 1972).
What disaster education can learn from science communication is to acknowledge
education as not just a one-way transfer of knowledge and skills but as a mutual
communication. Children taking leads in evacuation drills and informing the problems
they found during the evacuation to adults and specialists is an example of mutual
communication. The objective of science communication, i.e., science, however, is
naturally different from the objective of disaster education. If science
communication and bidirectional disaster education based on social constructivism
learning appear the same, that is because special interrelations in disaster reduction are
taken as granted. Special interrelations in disaster management mean that humans
relate to natural phenomena like earthquakes or typhoons that cause disasters through
science. What this actually means is that humans scientifically explore mechanisms of
natural phenomena and, with their understanding of the mechanisms, take scientific
countermeasures. Basic disaster management measures in Japan have taken this
interrelation as a natural assumption and have discussed uncertainties in hazard
maps or climate change predictions. The method often leads to the understanding
that uncertainties with individual scientific countermeasures alone are the risks. In
reality, however, we are selecting scientific means from a variety of ways to deal with
natural phenomena (disaster management measures) – for example, understanding
them as punishment by supernatural beings like the god or taking them as mere cyclic
events – and our selection of the relation itself has a risk. This viewpoint reveals that
the commonly accepted disaster management measures in Japan have double risks.
With science communication, the objective of communication itself is science, thus,
communication about science itself is possible.
Communication with bidirectional disaster education, however, has to relate not
only humans to science but also humans to natural disasters. In other words, disaster
management involves a number of methods for building relations among humans
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and natural disasters, and whether to select scientific measures for building the
relations is a point to include in the process of disaster education. Like in the case
of the Nile basin before Aswan High Dam was built, a natural phenomenon that
seemed to people, relating to the nature only through science, as flooding was not
necessarily understood as flooding.
In bidirectional disaster education, we shall not assume that relating human to
natural phenomena through science is a condition, and we need processes to think
how we shall build relations with natural phenomena of earthquakes and typhoons,
in other words, what we shall consider as disasters.
12.3.3 Importance of Sharing the Meaning of Disaster
Management
What is important in disaster education is to recognize the problem in trying to solve
issues in disaster management within the existing common framework. We have to,
of course, acknowledge that disaster education is not a one-way transfer of knowl-
edge and skills and, in addition, the reason that it is not so is not just the results of
uncertainties always present with science. The uncertainties with science turn into a
problem when we choose to use science as the method of disaster management,
because uncertainty exists at the time of making the choice. Disaster education
requires mutual communication about these two layers of risk.
For this type of disaster education, we need to set the purpose of disaster
management, that is, to think what the disasters that we want to prevent are. Then
we need to think how we should cope with each disaster, and if we judge that we
need to take scientific measures, we shall choose a countermeasure. These processes
are part of disaster education, and we need citizen participation in the selection
phase. Note that the selected countermeasure has uncertainty in itself. And if the
selected countermeasure is scientific, we need to evaluate the uncertainty of science
in the measure. Disaster education is to build, share, and be prepared against
disasters through processes of making selections with a variety of related parties
about what disasters are and what it means to reduce them. Transferring knowledges
and skills of how-to in case of earthquakes is just a small part of disaster education.
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Abstract The word “crisis” means the turning point of whether one recovers from
illness or the situation worsens; thus, we can map crises into four stages of illness,
i.e., “prodromal crisis stage,” “acute crisis stage,” “chronic crisis stage,” and “crisis
resolution stage.” From the societal safety sciences viewpoint, crisis management
means a situation where an event that threatens safety and security of the society is
close or proper responses at each stage after the event have taken place. For nations,
administrations, and corporations, crisis management is the “processes of
responding to serious situations of major accidents or mega disasters that have
suddenly broken out after some symptoms and calming the seriousness to settle
and situations to recover.”
Keywords Crisis · Crisis management · Crisis matrix · ICS
13.1 What Is Crisis Management?
13.1.1 Meaning of Crisis
Webster, one of the well-known dictionaries in the USA, defines “crisis” as the
turning point of whether a disease is going to heal or to worsen. In other words, crisis
is the time when a moderate disease condition is making a big change.
The origin of the word crisis is the Greek “Krisis (judgment)” or “Krinein
(decision, make selection).” The word has a meaning of a turning point for better
or worse, a decisive moment, or crucial time. The word crisis with its origin in
medicine was introduced into psychology and psychiatry and started to carry the
meaning of “important point” and then generalized into a term for critical danger.
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Since the word has its origin in the medical field, we can describe the four stages
of crisis as Steven Fink (1986) explained as follows:
1. Prodromal crisis stage
2. Acute crisis stage
3. Chronic crisis stage
4. Crisis resolution stage
When recovery is not made from a crisis, there are cases the situation turns into
bankruptcy for a corporation, death for human, and “terminal stage” in medical
terms. Avoiding the terminal stage and entering the recovery stage, that is, to prevent
organizational corruption or human death at times of accidents or disasters is crisis
management, and it is the purpose of societal safety sciences.
“Kiki,” the Japanese word for crisis, means “Time or case when a serious trouble
may take place. Dangerous situation,” and “Kiki kanri” in Japanese, the phrase for
crisis management, means “Policy or organization to counter a sudden large-scale
disaster, accident, or event that was unexpected. Quick and effective measures like
lifesaving or prevention of damage spreading take place.”
From the above, we can say the concept of crisis is a transition of how the
situation progress from a serious turning point (Delbecque and de Saint Rapt 2016).
13.1.2 Significance of Crisis Management
From a viewpoint of societal safety sciences, crisis management means to deal with a
situation that an event that threatens the safety and security of the society is about to
take place or to manage the state after one has happened. Koichi Oizumi, through
researcher’s eyes, defined crisis management as “Predict and prevent dangers that
can break out anytime and at anyplace in unexpected forms and if they take place,
quickly counter them with ‘initial actions’ to minimize the damages” (Oizumi et al.
2015). Steven B. Fink defined “Crisis management, i.e., plans against the turning
point crisis, are the techniques to remove many of the risks and uncertainties to
control own destiny to the extent possible” (Fink 1986).
The above discussions lead to our definition of crisis management; after a “premo-
nition,” when a major accident or disaster “suddenly” breaks out, it is the transitional
process from the “serious situation” to reach a “calming” status and “recovery.”
13.1.3 Relation Between Risk Management and Crisis
Management
There is subtle difference between risk management that originated from insurance
management and safety engineering and crisis management that started from nation
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level crises like the 1962 Cuban missile crisis. Risk management features before-the-
event measures like accident prevention or insurance subscription. Crisis manage-
ment, on the other hand, characterizes countermeasures against emergencies after an
accident or disaster.
The summary of risk management as prior measures is the following six points:
1. Listing up the risks with keen risk sensitivity
2. Identifying risks and carrying out risk assessment of analysis and evaluation
3. Determining measures against risks
4. Setting safety management plans and business continuity plans (BCP)
5. Executing simulated trainings
6. Performing risk communication
The summarizing points of crisis management with emphasis on post event
actions are:
1. Recognizing premonitions with risk sensitivity
2. Having decisiveness, leadership, and good communication when suddenly put
under serious situations after major accidents or disasters
3. Executing resilience after turmoil in steady situations
4. In the recovering stage, reflecting lessons learned from the accident or disaster
into the action plans for the next emergencies
13.1.4 Fink’s Crisis Management Theory
At the time the TMI accident in the USA, Fink was a member of the Pennsylvania
crisis management team and published Crisis Management in 1986. The book was
the first in the USA about crisis management, and it is still in print. In the book, Fink
explained steps in crisis management as follows: in the premonition stage, carry out
“crisis forecasting,” “crisis intervention,” and “crisis management plans.”During the
first acute stage, when a major accident or disaster has broken out, conduct “crisis
survey and crisis identification.” In the second acute stage, execute “crisis isolation
and crisis management.” Throughout the acute stages, “crisis communication” is
important. Crisis communication are divided into “controlling the message” and
“handling hostile press” (Fink 1986).
Among these steps, Fink introduced his unique assessment method for crisis
forecasting in the premonition stage. The method evaluated a crisis with the damage
and an indicator called “crisis impact value (CIV).” CIV evaluates a crisis with its
effect, results, monetary loss, and damage to human, with a number from 0 to 10.
The indicator is the average of the scores (0–10) to the following five questions:
Question 1: Might the crisis intensify and if so, how fast?
Question 2: How observable is the crisis by outsiders such as media, regulatory
agencies, or customers?
Question 3: How much does it interfere with operations?
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Question 4: Is the company the victim or culprit of this crisis?
Question 5: How damaging is it to the bottom line (however one defines bottom
line)?
Fink explained the risk forecasting with a coordinate plane divided into four
quadrants with probability of occurrence in the horizontal axis from 0% to 100% and
CIV in the vertical axis with values 0–10. The intersection of the horizontal and
vertical axes is where the occurrence probability is 50% with CIV 5. Fink named the
quadrants with high probability and high CIV the red zone (dangerous area), low
probability and high CIV the yellow zone (caution area), high probability but low
CIV the gray zone (intermediate area), and low probability with low CIV the green
zone (safety area). Fink’s method was visual and easy to understand, and it has now
developed into “risk map” in wide use.
13.2 Crisis Management of the Administration
Crisis management developed around national emergency situations and large-scale
accidents and disasters. It, thus, has an important position in administration by the
national government and so.
13.2.1 Origin of Crisis Management: Cuban Missile Crisis
While post World War II insurance management by private companies in the USA
shaped risk management, the government established the concept of crisis manage-
ment as a method of countering emergency situations starting from the 1962 Cuban
missile crisis.
Cuban missile crisis was triggered when the USA demanded the Soviet Union
back then (Soviet) to remove the midrange nuclear missiles Soviet had deployed in
Cuba. At the time, the USA and Soviet were in a strong military conflict, and the risk
of a nuclear war was at its peak. On 16 October 1962, a US reconnaissance plane
spotted a nuclear missile deployed in Cuba. A number of discussions were made on
whether to bomb Cuba or not, and on 24 October, the USA started a blockade and
boarding of ships headed for Cuba. On 27 October, a US U-2 reconnaissance plane
was shot down by Soviet expeditionary force in Cuba. The warning issued by
President Kennedy of the USA lifted up the confrontation level, and the entire
world was at a risk of nuclear war. The Soviet leader Khrushchev announced on
29 October, in reply to Kennedy’s final warning, that the missiles will be removed
from Cuba. President Kennedy’s leadership, firm determination, and quick action
added with the First Secretary Khrushchev’s decision at the critical moment
prevented the nuclear war.
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Even during such a national emergency, the four stages apply the “prodromal
stage,” cold war; “acute stage,” discovery of missile site construction; “chronic
stage,” USA and Soviet confrontation; and “resolution stage,” winding down with
decisions by the two leaders.
During the 1970s the world experienced national emergencies of currency crisis
and oil crisis. In 1979, the TMI accident in the USA broke out. Also 1984 was the
year when the Union Carbide had a gas leakage accident in its Bhopal factory in
India. Occurrences of such large-scale accidents at the corporate level led to people
watching corporate crisis management as well.
13.2.2 Crisis Management by the Japanese Government
We will next overview crisis management by administration and the government in
Japan. Japan, in the 1970s, experienced currency crisis, oil crisis, terror attacks, and
hijacks by the extremists and started to discuss the need for crisis management at the
Cabinet level in the early 1980s. A Korean Airlines flight was shot down in 1983, the
Glico-Morinaga case took place in 1984, and in 1990 the Gulf War started. After the
burst of bubble economy, the Tokyo subway was attacked with sarin in 1995, and
the concept and phrase crisis management spread to the public. Also in the field of
natural disasters, the 1995 Great Hanshin Awaji earthquake triggered strong aware-
ness of crisis management against large-scale natural disasters.
Under these circumstances, the Cabinet Law was amended in April of 1998, and
the Japanese government formally made its system of crisis management. The
amendment of the Cabinet Law added Article 15 that defined crisis management
as “response to an emergency that has caused, or is likely to cause, material damage
to the lives, persons or property of citizens, or the prevention of occurrence of such
emergencies” (The Cabinet Law 1998; Yasuda 2006). The amendment newly gave
the secretary for crisis management the duty of, upon occurrence of an emergency
situation, making the first decision about necessary actions by the Cabinet and
arranging with related ministries and agents about initial actions. In January of
2001, the Cabinet National Security and Crisis Management Office were closed,
and one of the three Assistant Chief Cabinet Secretaries was assigned to take charge
of national security and crisis management. The Assistant Chief Cabinet Secretary
(in charge of national security and crisis management) is supported by over 100 staff
members like Deputy Director General of Crisis Management, Deputy Director
General of the Cabinet, and Councilor of the Cabinet. The system adds staff from
ministries and agents on temporary transfer for support.
Figure 13.1 shows the flow of initial actions upon breakout of emergency
situations. Once the Cabinet Information Collection Center collects information
from private information organizations like the media, public organizations, and
related ministries and agencies, the first notification is sent to (A.) Prime Minister,
Chief Cabinet Secretary, Assistant Chief Cabinet Secretary; (B.) Secretary for Crisis
Management, Assistant Chief Cabinet Secretary (in charge of national security and
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crisis management), Deputy Director General of Crisis Management; and (C.) Crisis
Management Center at the Office of the Prime Minister. A gives instructions to B
and B to C. B reports to A and C to B. C establishes D, Office of the Prime Minister
Response Office (Chief is Secretary for Crisis Management), and makes calls to
gather E, Emergency Assembly Team (Presiding Official is Secretary for Crisis
Management). D consists of Secretary for Crisis Management, three Assistant Chief
Cabinet Secretaries, Cabinet Public Relations Secretary, Director of Cabinet Intelli-
gence, Director General of Cabinet Affairs Office, Deputy Director General of Crisis
Management, and staff members from National Security and Crisis Management
Office, Public Relations Office, Cabinet Intelligence Office, and Cabinet Affairs
Office. This organization is in charge of collecting information, reporting to the
Prime Minister, arranging communications among related ministries and agencies,
and overall arrangement of initial actions by the government. E calls an emergency
assembly of already listed Director General class officials from related ministries and
agencies to the Office of the Prime Minister and gathers information about initial
actions by the government (Kato and Ota 2010).
The Japanese government modeled its crisis management system after the Inci-
dent Command System (ICS) in Europe and the US disaster crisis management by
Fig. 13.1 Initial response upon emergency outbreak by the Japanese government
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the administration has important factors of (1) organization, (2) information,
(3) evacuation, (4) self and mutual support, (5) incidence reduction, and (6) recon-
struction. Especially about information, disaster information that reports what has
happened and disaster management information about what to do to lessen the
damage are the keys. Leadership is important for crisis management by the admin-
istration, and since quick decisions are needed, leaders have to prepare to make
decisions even with insufficient information. As regulated in the Disaster Counter-
measures Basic Act, when disasters break out in prefectures, the prefectural governor
takes the leader role of the Head of Local Disaster Management Headquarter for
crisis management. When the incident turns into a mega-disaster, the national
government supports the prefectures by establishing the Major Disaster Manage-
ment Headquarter headed by the Ministers of State and the Extreme Disaster
Management Headquarters headed by the Prime Minister. Upon an emergency
situation of a mega-disaster, the Cabinet Crisis Management Center in the basement
of the Prime Minister’s Office carries out the initial action of information gathering
and analysis, and a team is assembled around the Deputy Chief Cabinet Secretary for
Crisis Management. When the time shifts to the phase of recovery and reconstruc-
tion, the Cabinet Office then makes actions (Kawata 2008).
13.2.3 USA that Learned Its Lesson: Summary of Disaster
Crisis Management
It has been pointed out that the Japanese government lacks leadership and unification
of information compared to Europe and the USA. This section discusses the disaster
crisis management by the role model of the US government. The 2005 hurricane
Katrina left huge damages to the USA, and from the lessons learned then, the USA
reviewed its disaster crisis management. Especially by thorough review of the
failures during the “prodromal” and “acute” stages after things settled in the
“chronic” and “resolution” stages, the USA prepared itself for the next strike by
modifying the forecasting system for the “prodromal” stage and the decision-making
and communication systems in the “acute” stage (POGO 2006). As a result, good
effects surfaced here and there, when hurricane Sandy hit the country.
In the following seven lessons, Yoshiaki Kawata (2013) summarized what the
federal government of the USA learned from failures in its response to hurricane
Katrina and what improvements it implemented.
Lesson 1: From the stage when a major disaster was possible, the leader of
administration carried out risk communication that warned residents and disaster
prevention organizations to prepare for a disaster and make measures along disaster
response programs (timeline). This action had certain effects.
Lesson 2: In the USA, federal organizations like the Federal Emergency Man-
agement Agency (FEMA) with specialized engineers and the US Army Corps of
Engineers (USACE) responded to disasters in the field. The federal government gave
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these organizations the authorities of execution and the budget responsibilities to
establish systems that could make proper disaster emergency responses based on
quick decision-making.
Lesson 3: The verification system thoroughly studied lessons and failures in past
disasters and did not hold individuals responsible for failures in disaster responses.
The system turned the failures to knowledge and worked them into disaster response
programs. The Executive Office of the President, the House of Representatives, the
Congress, FEMA, and USACE independently carried out After Action Review
(AAR). The system stored lessons from failures as systematic “knowledge” for the
organization, so it was useful for future disaster response plans (timeline).
Lesson 4: Prepare against disasters never experienced before, and verify that
lessons and failures of disaster responses are useful for future disaster response.
Lesson 5: Build structures at normal time, so when a disaster is about to strike or
has struck, the head of administration can take leads and consult with specialists.
Lesson 6: Discuss measures to protect lives and economic foundations of resi-
dents in metropolitan areas with the assumption that disasters at all sizes can strike.
Lesson 7: Enhance resilience, that is, ability to recover, throughout the societies
in preparation for the risks, dangers, or difficulties that threaten safety hit.
13.3 Crisis Management of Corporations
Corporate crisis management means corporations to respond properly to sudden
changes in external environment, breakout of emergencies, major accidents, or
natural disasters. In fact, events like terrorism, war, nuclear plant accidents, earth-
quakes, volcano eruptions, and tsunami are exemptions with regular insurance
policies, i.e., premiums will not be paid against those events. These events, therefore,
are not topics of risk management that started from insurance management, but they
are topics for crisis management. Corporate crisis management differs from that of
administration or a nation because if something goes wrong with it, in the worst case,
it can lead to bankruptcy and the organization may disappear.
A number of studies have been made about corporate crisis management:
1. Leadership theory about how a leader makes decisions upon breakout of crisis
2. Theory of organizational crisis management that hypothesizes a crisis outbreak
and discusses how to build an organization that responds to it and functions at
difficult times
3. Crisis information theory to collect and properly spread information when a crisis
is about to strike or has struck
4. Theory of crisis communication for both stakeholders outside the corporation and
members within, about how to communicate what the crisis is about, and how to
cope with it in the future
5. Theory of finance in relation to crisis management that avoids bankruptcy and
balances cost and effect of crisis management
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6. Study of failure that identifies lessons from major accidents and disasters and
learns from failure in crisis management
Fink (1986) and Tedlow (2010) talked about the 1982 Tylenol incident as an
example of best practice in crisis management. The event started with someone
lacing poison in Johnson & Johnson’s prime product painkiller Tylenol and killed
seven people. In the “prodromal” stage, the top management upon receiving inquiry
from the media took immediate actions without hesitation. They rushed in a heli-
copter to inspect the manufacturing factory, set crisis management headquarters,
gathered all collectible information from the field, and set the fundamental guideline
of “how to protect the consumers and how to protect the product.”
Tedlow wrote that corporations fall into crisis when the head of operations hides
inconvenient facts. In case of Johnson & Johnson, the company sincerely faced the
facts without denying the inconvenience that poison was mixed in their product
(Tedlow 2010). Actions by the top management was appropriate when the incident
took a sharp turn in the “acute” stage.
Johnson & Johnson’s corporate policy “Our Credo” lists it responsibility to the
customers, employees, local communities, and shareholders. The top management
placed the highest priority on social responsibility of the corporation and under the
policy of “for the citizen’s reliance, speak all that is known and immediately speak
new information,” carried out crisis communication to all stakeholders outside the
company.
In the “chronic” state when things started to settle, communication inside the
company also received attention. Top management wrote a letter to all employees
explaining how they reacted to the crisis and what they intended to do. After the
turmoil settled in the “resolution” stage, the social reputation of the company went
up with its sincere crisis management despite seven deaths and additional cost of
100 million US dollars.
The framework of crisis management starting from the “prodromal” stage, then
the “turning point” of an outbreak of a major accident or disaster, and then making
transition through “acute,” “chronic,” and “resolution” stages also applies to nations,
administration, and corporations. This chapter overviewed crisis management with
nations, administration, and corporations, and the methodology is, of course, also
applicable to individuals. Today, expressions and ideas of special incidences and
crisis management for the living are widely spread.
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Chapter 14
Public Systems for Disaster Management
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Abstract In a law-abiding nation, the law plays a big role in maintaining social
peace and people’s safety. This chapter overviews the document system of laws and
guidelines and roles of administrative organizations and corporations.
Keywords Design standards · Standardization · Watchman state · Welfare state
14.1 Societal Safety and Legal System
14.1.1 What Is Law? System of Law
Japan has a system of various laws with the Constitution at the top. Legal regulations
that the National Diet set include the Civil Code that regulates relations among
private individuals, the Penal Code that is the substantive law about crimes and
penal, the Administrative Code that is the positive law about actions of administra-
tive rights and corporations, and so on. Details of laws are often regulated by Cabinet
Orders by the Cabinet Office and Ministerial Orders by each ministry. Cabinet
Orders and Ministerial Orders are often collectively called governmental and min-
isterial ordinance. Governmental and ministerial ordinances can be issued by the
administration without discussions in the Diet, and since they are commissioned by
the law, they have legal bindings. In addition to orders, administrative organizations
can issue notices, manuals, guidelines, and alike, but they are not legally binding. On
the other hand, local governments can issue municipal ordinances based on Local
Autonomy Act, as long as they do not violate laws and orders of the nation.
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Administrative organizations enforce ex ante regulations for securing safety of
products, services, facilities, and so on. For example, Article 1 of the Travel Agency
Act requires registration of travel agencies to “secure safety of travel.” Article 1 of
the Electricity Business Act sets its purpose to “assure public safety and promote
environmental preservation.” Administrative entities supply the details like the
safety standards through governmental and ministerial ordinances that are commis-
sioned by these acts. Ex ante regulation in most cases is arranged through licensing
systems for the business entities. Recent interpretation, however, with the exception
of special fields like nuclear power safety, by comparing citizen’s rights and public
welfare, is “Minimum set of regulations appropriate for countering risks should be
enforced” (Furuta and Nagasaki 2016). In the complex modern society, ex ante
regulation means direct rise of administrative cost. So, in recent years, ex ante
regulations are relaxed to the extent possible, and the idea is to provide means of
ex post rescues in the form of litigation in case of conflicts. Relaxation of ex ante
regulations allowed corporations to carry out businesses in a freer manner than
before; however, they must prepare systems to prevent affairs and accidents before-
hand so they can prove they had prepared reasonable prevention measures in case of
lawsuits.
14.1.2 Corporations and Societal Safety
Corporations that provide goods and services around us have heavy responsibilities
about keeping our societies safe and secure. Corporations have to prevent product
malfunctions and accidents by employees’ errors. Companies that produce goods
and hire employees have a number of legal liabilities about safety management.
Recently, with the ex post rescue system, laws have been enforced to require
companies to build autonomous safety management systems. The Companies Act
enacted in 2005 states that the director has to construct an internal controls system
and commissioned the Ministry of Justice Order (Ordinance for Enforcement of the
Companies Act) enacted in 2006 to set the details. The ordinance imposes the duty to
corporate groups to build “a system to regulate the management of risks of loss”
across the entire group, i.e., a risk management system (Article 100, Paragraph
1, Items 2 and 5).
The level of risk management systems required with Companies Act is, according
to judicial precedents, “A management system that fits the size and characteristics of
the business” or “an adequate risk management system that were deemed standard
(at the time it was built).” The judicial precedents show the contents of risk
management systems are within the discretion of the executives (Daiwa Bank
Shareholder Case, Osaka District Court, 20 Sept. 2000; Yakult Honsha Shareholder
Case, Tokyo District Court, 16 Dec. 2004). “Manuals” and “guidelines” by the
administration work as standards at the time provide incentives for companies to
refer and follow them.
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Laws that hold the director of businesses responsible after breakouts of disasters
or accidents are the negligence of management and supervision in Punishment for
Causing Death or Injury through Negligence in the Pursuit of Social Activities
(Penal Code Article 211). This punishment applies to the direct offender; however,
according to judicial precedents, while the death or injury could have been
prevented, when the director or supervisor neglected “management or supervision”
of the direct offender, ruling of violence of duty of care has been made depending on
the degree of malicious intent. This is probably because by holding the director of
the facility or the company in case of a large facility fire or product accident, the
Penal Code is expecting corporations to polish up their safety management system.
The conditional requirement foreseeability, however, needs “actual concern”; thus, it
is difficult to say that the director or supervisor, who is not the direct offender, has
foreseeability. The ruling with Morinaga Milk arsenic poisoning incident adopted
the vague anxiety “feel of concern” for foreseeability (Takamatsu High Court Ruling
31 Mar. 1966); however, it is no longer supported.
14.1.3 Central and Local Governments and Societal Safety
The central and local governments have the first mission of maintaining and securing
societal safety. They put a number of administrative methods in practice to accom-
plish the requirement: supervision and regulation; benefit, support, and compensa-
tion payments; administrative legislation; administrative planning; administrative
guidance; administrative contracting; information gathering; management; provi-
sion; administration enforcement and penal punishment; building and operating
facilities; and so on. Many of these practices are based on regulations and ordi-
nances, and the congress and councils control the administration with laws, i.e., the
“principle of law (ordinance) based administration” is in effect. The laws and
ordinances spell out the concepts of administrative practices by the nation, prefec-
ture, and municipalities for maintaining and securing societal safety. We can even
say that the laws and ordinances describe how societal safety is secured and
maintained.
Traditionally, the central and local governments put efforts in maintenance and
securing of societal safety by prohibiting businesses and actions that pose threats to
societal safety and licensing systems to allow the operation under some conditions or
applications. Most activities by corporations require approval or licenses, and the
governments and corporations are in regulator and regulated relations, but we can
say they cooperate in keeping and securing societal safety. The Administrative
Procedure Act (2005) states to set the review standards (Article 5), make efforts to
set standard processing time (Article 6), ban return or denial of flawless applications
(Article 7), post the reason in case of denying an application (Article 8), provide
information necessary for application and the review progress (Article 9), and make
efforts to organize public hearings if interest of people other than the applicants
needs consideration (Article 10).
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Taking public health, for example, the Community Health Act states to build
prefectural health centers and municipality health centers, set basic guidelines for
local health measures, and build plans for supporting the securing of enough human
resources to execute the measures. The Act on Prevention of Infectious Diseases and
Medical Care for Patients Suffering Infectious Diseases sets the basic guideline for
infectious disease prevention, collection and publication of information about infec-
tious diseases, instructing people about hospitalization, restriction of employment,
and so on. The Act Concerning the Measures for Protection of the People in Armed
Attack Situations, etc. sets basic guidelines for protecting the people of Japan,
establishment of prefectural and municipal council for resident protection, and
evacuation and rescue of residents.
Since the decentralization reform started in the mid-1990s, many authorities
about regulation held by the central government were delegated to local govern-
ments. The move made local governments set their own ordinances, interpret and
carry out the laws, and in cases find themselves in the midst of litigations. The terms
“political legal affairs” and “regional legal affairs” are phrases born from the
delegation of authorities from the central government to the local governments.
14.2 Administrative System and Societal Safety
14.2.1 Concept of Nation and Societal Safety: Watchman
State and Welfare State
The concept of nation that it should keep the necessary minimum duties, primarily of
defense, security, diplomacy, jurisdiction, and public projects (roads, rivers, ports,
and so on), is called the concept of night-watchman state (minarchism, or small
government). F. Lassalle (1884) of Germany criticized night-watchman state con-
cept in the UK at the time and demanded government intervention into wider areas.
Beveridge Report (1942) in the UK also claimed the needs for a social security
system by the state and a public mutual support system. Since around the time of
World War II, the theory of welfare state (active state, large government), i.e., the
concept that the government should actively be involved in socioeconomic areas,
was on the rise.
While the concept of nations shifted from minarchism to active states, T. H.
Marshall (1950) of the UK argued that social demand for citizen’s rights will shift
from basic rights (body, opinion, ideology, conscious, property, freedom to sue) to
basic political rights (rights to vote) and eventually to basic social rights (live,
social). The trend is to value basic social rights, and the roles of the state and the
executing organization the administration has been gradually expanding to today.
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14.2.2 Societal Safety and Administrative Offices
14.2.2.1 Police and Administration
Police is the administrative organization in charge of maintaining public peace and
securing safety of civil life. Police activity, in general, is separated into administra-
tive policing (traffic control and patrol) and judicial policing (criminal investigation,
arresting, and house searching) based on the principle of separation of the three
functions of the government. The general police force and self-defense army are
separate organizations in Japan; however, some countries over the world have
military police with the function to maintain orders in military organizations but at
the same time also hold the general policing functions of administrative and judicial.
The national police of the Home Ministry Police Affairs Bureau was in charge of
police administration in Japan until World War II. After the War, the administration
organized local government police (municipality police) under the former Police Act
(1947); however, their capacity to counter wide-area crimes went down, and the
organizations corrupted (lack of motivation with the policemen and collusion with
underground criminal organizations). To counter the situation, the new Police Act
was enacted in 1954, and with the establishment of the National Police Agency,
prefectural police system went into effect.
14.2.2.2 Self-Defense and Administration
Protecting the country against military threats from foreign countries with military
force is defense. To counter military threats with full power including military force
added with politics, foreign diplomacy, economics, and scientific technology is
called national defense. In Japan, the Ministry of Defense (MOD) is in charge of
defense, and the National Security Council, newly established in 1986 after
abolishing National Defense Council, is in charge of national defense.
After World War II, the Japanese military was demobilized, and in 1954, the Act
for Establishment of the Defense Agency (currently the Act for Establishment of the
MOD) and the Self-Defense Forces Act were enacted to establish the Defense
Agency (currently the MOD) and Self-Defense Forces. The Self-Defense Forces
and three forces of Air, Maritime, and Ground have an overall count of about
240,000 people.
14.2.2.3 Natural Disasters and Administration in Japan
Responding to nature’s threats is an important function of the policymaker since
ancient times, and today, it is called disaster management administration. Disaster
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management administration works on preparations for reducing and controlling
damages caused by disasters before they break out, on preventing damages upon
disasters, and further on recovery from the suffering from disasters. In prewar Japan,
the Home Ministry Police Affairs Bureau was in charge of disaster administration at
the national level. The postwar disaster management administration was first
assigned to the Office for Disaster Management of the General Administrative
Agency of the Cabinet and then was transferred to National Land Agency in 1974
and then to the Cabinet Office in 2001. Disaster management administration
involves a wide administrative area, and other ministries and agencies carry out
disaster management administration that relates to their own administrative fields.
Triggered by the 1959 Isewan typhoon, the Basic Act on Disaster Control
Measures was enacted primarily to counter wind and water disasters with local
governments (mainly municipalities) at the center of response. Under this law,
municipality governments are the primary players in responding to actual disasters
(principle of municipalities having the first responsibilities). In recent years, how-
ever, more disasters with different sizes and types compared to the time of the Basic
Act on Disaster Control Measures are revealing limits to disaster response with
municipalities as the main players.
14.2.2.4 Advancement of Scientific Technology and Administration
Advancement of scientific technology in the modern era brought a number of
benefits to human; however, at the same time, it caused industrial injuries and
destruction of the environment and elevated the risk of nuclear disasters. There is
now, therefore, new administrative needs to secure the safety of the workers and
citizens.
The history tells us the industrial injuries increased with the development of the
industrial revolution. Factory laws in the UK and other countries in the nineteenth
century later developed into labor safety administration and labor health
administration.
In Japan before World War II, Engineering Bureau of the Ministry of Agriculture
and Commerce was in charge of labor safety administration. After the War, labor
safety administration was transferred to the Ministry of Labor, and the 2001 reform
placed the responsibility with the MHLW. Labor health administration, on the other
hand, had been under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Health and Welfare before
and after the War, and since 2001, the MHLW is in charge.
The postwar high economic growth in Japan caused pollutions at various loca-
tions in the country. Pollution countermeasure administration and pollution preven-
tion administration started with the 1967 Basic Law for Environmental Pollution
Control developed into environmental administration. The Environment Agency
was in charge of pollution countermeasure administration and pollution prevention
administration, and in 2001, it was promoted to a ministry, and now the Ministry of
the Environment (MOE) is in charge. Waste management administration was also
transferred from the Ministry of Health and Welfare to the MOE.
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Nuclear safety administration, on the other hand, was under the jurisdiction of the
Science and Technology Agency. In response to the 1999 JCO criticality accident in
Tokai-mura (IAEA 1999), the administration office function of the Nuclear Safety
Commission was transfered to the General Administrative Agency of the Cabinet.
Further, the 2001 reformation placed the commission and administration office
under the Cabinet Office, and “Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency” was
established within the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI). Nuclear
and Industrial Safety Agency, however, was closed together with Nuclear Safety
Commission after the 2011 Fukushima Daiichi NPP accident. In 2012, a new
organization Nuclear Regulation Authority to handle all of nuclear safety adminis-
tration started as an affiliated agency of the MOE.
14.2.2.5 Health Maintenance and Administration in Japan
Once we entered the modern era, urbanization worsened the living environment, and
systematic health administration was in need. In general, systematic health promot-
ing activities by the public and private organizations for the health maintenance and
promotion of people is called public health. The public health administration in the
broad sense in Japan has three activities: (1) general public health administration for
households and local societies, (2) school health administration for schools, and
(3) labor health administration for the workplace.
General health administration which the MHLW is in charge of is carried out at
health centers based on the Health Center Law revised in 1947. The Community
Health Act was enacted in 1994 and municipalities are now in charge of basic health
services. Prefectural health centers were set in prefectures and ordinance-designated
cities, and recently core cities also have the duty to set health centers.
The Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology (MEXT) is
in charge of school health administration. Activities to manage health of students and
school personnel and school health activities are carried out under the School Health
and Safety Act. The Ministry of Labor was in charge of labor health administration;
however, the function was transferred to the Labor Standards Bureau of the MHLW
since the 2001 reform. Activities include 347 Labor Standards Offices throughout
the country to monitor and instruct proper protection of worker’s health.
14.2.2.6 Traffic and Administration
The advancement of scientific technology developed means of transportation that
move with mechanical energy, giving birth to the needs of safety in transportation.
Accidents that take place with transportation, including traffic accidents on the road,
railway accidents, marine accidents, and aircraft accidents, are called transport
accidents.
In Japan, the number of deaths with traffic accidents on the road exceeded 15,000
in 1969. To counter, the Basic Act on Traffic Safety Measures was enacted in 1970,
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and the Cabinet Office is, since then, in charge of overall arrangement of transpor-
tation safety administration (formerly duties of the Management and Coordination
Agency of the General Administrative Agency of the Cabinet). Practical safety
administration for the railway, marine, and aircraft is primarily carried out by the
Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport, and Tourism (MLIT) who has jurisdic-
tion over these industries. The National Police Agency is in charge of prevention of
traffic accidents on the road and maintenance of orders on the road.
14.2.2.7 Consumers and Administration
The basic social rights we discussed in Sect. 14.2.1 expanded, and it gave rise to the
social need that administration should protect safety of the consumers to give birth to
a new administrative field of consumer administration (consumer protection admin-
istration). After World War II, Japan and other countries over the world recognized
the need to protect consumers, and ministries and agencies took on consumer
administration. Organizations to specialize in consumer administration, however,
started mainly after the year 2000. In other countries, there are cases that consumer
administration and industrial administration are carried out in a single organization,
or the agency in charge of economy and industry is also looking after consumer
administration.
In Japan, choking on hard and small jelly candies, poisoning with China-made
frozen dumplings, Paloma gas water heater-caused deaths, and other accidents
revealed delay in administrative responses, and enhancing consumer administration
turned into an urgent matter. In 2009, as a result, the Consumer Affairs Agency
affiliated to the Cabinet Office was established.
14.3 Standardization and Standards
14.3.1 Value and Convenience of Standardization
14.3.1.1 What Is Standardization?
ISO/IEC Guide 2 (2004) defines “standard” as “document, established by consensus
and approved by a recognized body, that provides, for common and repeated use,
rules, guidelines or characteristics for activities or their results, aimed at the achieve-
ment of the optimum degree of order in a given context.” Further, “standards should
be based on the consolidated results of science, technology and experience, and
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aimed at the promotion of optimum community benefits.” Similarly, “standardiza-
tion” is defined as “activity of establishing, with regard to actual or potential
problems, provisions for common and repeated use, aimed at the achievement of
the optimum degree of order in a given context.”
“Standards” define the rules about how products and other matters should
be. When standards spread in the society and people take actions following the
standards, they will guarantee quality to the set levels no matter who makes the
products or who works on them. For the society, standardization is absolutely one
way of securing safety (Russel 2005). Not just standards and authentication but also
languages and units (measures) are also results of standardization. The first Emperor
Qin Shi Huang of the Qin dynasty is historically famous for unifying measures. In
our daily life, we are surrounded by standards like cylindrical batteries (A, AA,
AAA, etc.), paper size (A4, B4, etc.), USB cable connector shapes (Type A, Type B,
etc.), and so on. We can even say that our societies are filled with products and
services made with standardization. “Standards” are explicitly written down so their
contents spread without misunderstanding. Depending on the geographic, politic, or
economic level of the organization conducting standardization, standards are cate-
gorized into four levels of hierarchy of international, regional, national, and
organizational.
14.3.1.2 Value of Standardization and Problems
Wide transfer of precise information promotes better mutual understanding. The
consumer can be assured of safe and secure lives with proper maintenance of product
qualities. Companies can widely spread technologies they developed to enhance
production efficiency, strengthen competitiveness in the industry, and contribute to
environment protection. Further, the products will be assured of compatibility and
interface consistency for international competition, and export will grow. In a sense,
standardization is a process for gaining initiative in the market. In other words,
standardization itself is the result of the competition for gaining initiative.
Members of the World Trade Organization (WTO), with the 1995
WTO/Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT) Agreement, will start to set their national
standards in accordance to international standards. In general, rules are advantageous
to the one that set them. If one fails to push international standards to one’s claim, the
products cannot enter the international market, and additional cost to adjust the
products to international standards is unavoidable. Japan, with its high technology,
can easily clear the international standards; however, for the Japanese industries to
continue their prosperity, Japan has to actively take part in developing international
standards and strengthen its international influence.
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14.3.2 International Standards: Organization and Activities
of ISO
14.3.2.1 International Standards and International Standardization
Organizations
Well-known organizations that develop international standards are the following
three:
ISO (International Organization for Standardization)
All fields except electronic and electronic communication
IEC (International Electrotechnical Commission)
All fields of electrotechnology
ITU (International Telecommunication Union)
Information and communication technologies
14.3.2.2 Organization and Activities of ISO
ISO established in 1947 has 163 member countries as of July of 2017. Only one
organization from each member country can participate in ISO. Japanese Industrial
Standards Committee (JISC) joined ISO from Japan in 1952. The organization of
ISO consists of General Assembly, ISO Council, Technical Management Board,
Technical Committees, subcommittees, and working groups. The process of devel-
oping ISO standards is proposal stage, preparatory stage, committee stage, enquiry
stage, approval stage, and publication stage. Primary groups that approve the
standards are the Technical Committees. As of July 2017, there are 309 Technical
Committees for the various fields.
14.3.2.3 National Standards of Japan
A well-known national standard in Japan is the Japanese Industrial Standards (JIS).
JIS is a set of standards based on Industrial Standardization Act. The purpose of
Industrial Standardization Act (1949) is to:
Promote industrial standardization by enacting and disseminating appropriate and rational
industrial standards and, thereby, improve the quality of mineral or industrial products,
increase productivity and otherwise rationalize production, simplify and make transactions
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fair, and rationalize the use or consumption of mineral or industrial products and also
contribute to the enhancement of public welfare. (Article 1)
JIS has three standards of product, methodology, and basics. The Minister of the
primary industry discusses setting JIS standards to JISC, and based on the discus-
sions and responses at JISC, the Minister sets them. When a product is certified to
conform to the product standards by a registered certification organization, the
producer can display JIS logo on its products.
14.4 Design Standards for Structures and Systems
for Securing Safety
14.4.1 Design Standards for Structures
Our lives are supported by a number of structures including the residence that we
reside in, roads, railway bridges, water supply and sewage, and so on. Sudden
destruction of these structures from insufficient strength due to a design flaw or
degradation over time or unexpected damage caused by a natural disaster is socially
not tolerated. These structures, therefore, are subject to control by applicable gov-
ernment offices which enforce design standards so they hold set levels of strength.
For example, buildings are administered by MLIT, and the Building Standards Act
for “the purpose of protecting the lives, persons and property of the public, thereby
contributing to improvement of public welfare” defines “minimum criteria for the
site, structure, facility, and intended use.”
In addition to buildings, e.g., road bridges, railway bridges, port facilities,
tunnels, and gas tanks, there are a variety of structures, and each of them has design
standards (technical standards) enforced by an applicable government office.
Depending on the type of structure, their physical properties of sites, shapes,
dimensions, and necessary strengths vary and different design standards (technical
standards) apply to different types of structures. For example, highway bridges,
administered by the Bureau of Public Roads of MLIT, follow “Specifications for
Road Bridges,” while designs of railway bridges, administered by the Railway
Bureau of MLIT, are based on “Design Standards for Railway Structures,” and
port facilities administered by the Port and Harbor Bureau of MLIT are designed
based on “Technical Standards for Port and Harbor Facilities.” Structures and their
design standards are, thus, primarily administered by MLIT, whereas the METI
administers industrial tanks, and the Fisheries Agency administers fishing harbors.
Design standards (technical standards) have legal backings. For example, Article
30 of the Road Act regulates that Cabinet Orders determine highways, national
roads, and structures of national roads. The corresponding Cabinet Order, the
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Government Order on Road Design Standards, Article 35, Section 4, specifies that a
MLIT Order determines necessary specifications about standards of road structures.
And the MLIT Order, Order for Enforcement of Road Design Standards, regulates
that road bridges and so have to hold sufficient safety against earthquakes and
so. Specifications for Road Bridges is a Circular Notice that explains methods and
standards for judging “sufficient safety,” and in general, road bridges are actually
designed by referring to “Specifications for Road Bridges and Their Descriptions.”
For buildings, the Building Standards Act (2018), Article 20, requires that “to
meet technical standards defined by orders about structures and methods necessary
for safety.” Actual requirements are specified with orders or Circular Notices,
instead of laws, because in that way, contents can be reviewed and revised as
necessary. Regulations about aseismic design are especially important among design
standards in Japan with frequent earthquakes. Foreign countries have a variety of
design standards with magnitudes and frequencies that vary with location. With the
standards, Japan builds structures with higher strength against earthquakes.
Adding cost will allow building a robust structure. In general, however, structural
design balances the cost and benefit, and there is no clear answer to how robust a
structure has to be in terms of withstanding an earthquake. Nevertheless, important
structures like those built for NPP require extremely high earthquake resistance. The
level of earthquake-caused damages socially allowed on structures depends on how
the economics have advanced and on past experiences of damages. The criterion is
not that easy to determine.
In modern Japan, whenever an earthquake caused major damage, the standards of
aseismic design were reviewed. For example, the Building Standards Act enacted in
1950 had new aseismic standards with a secondary design added in 1981. The
addition was the results of experiencing the 1968 Tokachi-oki earthquake and the
1978Miyagiken-oki earthquake so the building would not collapse or fall even in the
case of earthquakes with intensity 7. The 1995 Great Hanshin-Awaji earthquake
disaster led to introducing a new performance-based standard for easier approval of
new construction methods.
14.4.2 Introduction of Performance-Based Design
and Qualification/Certification of Engineers
The design process of structures determines material to construct the structure with
and the shape of the structure. The less constraints there are about material and
shape, the easier it is for the designer to build the structure to his idea; however,
assuring safety with the finished structure turns harder. Conventional design stan-
dards were based on regulating the specification so safety was assured with the
design specification. The idea was limiting the range of the designer’s free selection
would lead to material, shape, and construction methods that were conformant to the
specification in the standard, so safety is assured without elaborate calculation.
164 K. Takano et al.
In recent years, sophisticated calculation spread to the actual fields to foresee
structural response to earthquakes and assure safety. A number of design standards
(technical standards), thus, have adopted the concept of performance-based design to
allow high level of freedom with the designs. Performance-based design is a method
that sets the performance requirement about structures and verifies that the structures
meet them. The 1995 Great Hanshin-Awaji earthquake in Japan recorded surpris-
ingly large seismic shakings, and the practice of aseismic design then recognized the
need to plan against huge earthquakes at the time of design even if such earthquakes
are extremely rare but they can cause serious damages. Building structures that
remain completely undamaged upon such earthquakes, however, is not practical, and
controlling the predicted damages (structural members that suffer damages and their
levels) is effective. Then functional design with higher degree of design freedom but
with structural damages within tolerable ranges is now in demand.
Performance-based design with sophisticated numerical analysis is now possible;
however, verifying the design is still difficult. We cannot deny possible numerical
errors especially with design calculations using computer programs; however, ver-
ifying there are no data-input errors or if the program has no bugs is a tedious work.
How structures respond to earthquakes requires insights of dynamics based on
technical knowledge; thus, only some skilled engineers have chances to recognize
flaws in designs. The needs are high, therefore, about systems for qualifying design
engineers, approving computer programs for design, and certifying the design
results.
14.4.3 Nonconformance of Existing Structures and Fraud by
Engineers
Properly designing new structures can meet the required safety level at the time of
design. Requirements of design standards (technical standards) are the “minimum
levels” at the time when the standards were set, and as the society moves forward,
requirements about levels of safety often go up. As a result, existing structures that
do not meet the current required design standards (technical standards) are scattered
here and there. Such structures are called “existing and nonconforming.”
The Building Standards Act of Japan states that for “buildings that currently
exist,” “These standards do not apply.” Therefore, buildings that do not meet
earthquake resistance requirement with current design standards (technical stan-
dards) can continue to exist for occupancy as “existing and nonconforming build-
ings.” To demolish and rebuild buildings every time the aseismic requirements of the
design standards are revised is practically impossible, and thus the regulation may be
so for realistic reasons. From the safety standpoint, however, the existence of a
number of buildings with low earthquake resistance is a concern. If a building was
built without meeting the standards of the time, however, it is illegal and it requires
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correction. Also, in case of large-scale repair, extension, or reconstruction, the new
standards apply (in principle).
In terms of securing safety for the society, even structures owned by individuals
or corporations should go through seismic diagnosis and aseismic reinforcement. In
1996, the Act on Promotion of Seismic Retrofitting of Buildings was enforced, and
efforts for enhancing seismic resistance have been to be made with buildings with
weak earthquake resistance like existing and nonconforming buildings through
seismic diagnosis and adequate aseismic reinforcement based on the diagnosis
results. The 2013 revision of the above Act specified “buildings for a large number
of unspecified people like hospitals, stores, hotels, or so, and large-scale buildings
that require special attention during evacuation of their occupants like schools,
nursing homes, and so have to go through mandatory seismic diagnosis and the
results are published.”
As design standards (technical standards) shape up and seismic diagnosis and
aseismic reinforcement are promoted, those who actually carry out the safety
evaluation are engineers. In 2005, a first-class registered architect was found to
have forged a number of structural strength reports. It was assumed he wanted to
lower the construction cost by saving parts and materials by falsifying the design
calculation. Motivations to falsify aseismic evaluation constantly exist; thus, it is
important that engineers need to have the right understanding of rules and conform
with standards (engineering ethics) that engineers have to follow. Also, a system to
have a third party verify the design and structural calculation and the construction
progress so engineers cannot be involved in fraudulent actions is also in need for
securing safety of structures.
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Chapter 15
Government Systems for Disaster
Management
Tomofumi Koyama, Seiji Abe, Seiji Kondo, Yoshihiro Okumura,
Hideyuki Shiroshita, and Toshio Takatorige
Abstract This chapter gives an overview of disaster prevention and mitigation, i.e.,
disaster management, activities by the government. Such activities by the central
government involve a number of tasks including maintenance and management of
infrastructures, building disaster prevention plans, and research for promoting disas-
ter management. The central government is also involved in accident investigation
for securing safety and security for the people of Japan and arranging systems for
public health. Local governments also carry out administration work for securing
safety for the residents.
Keywords Accident investigation · Disaster prevention · DMAT · Health center ·
Local government
15.1 Disaster Management Activities by the Government
15.1.1 Maintenance and Management of Infrastructures
Triggered by the Sasago Tunnel ceiling collapse on the Chuo Expressway of Japan
in December 2012, the MLIT started serious countermeasures for old infrastructures.
In January of 2013, the MLIT established the Committee on Aging of Social Capital,
and in November of the same year, the Relevant Ministries and Agencies Liaison
Conference on Aging of Social Capital announced “Action Plans for Life Extension
of Infrastructure” (MLIT 2015). The life of infrastructures is, in general, 50 years;
however, some keep good conditions even after 50 years since their constructions.
The measure extends the life of infrastructures by proper maintenance and repairs
without immediately replacing those that have surpassed 50 years since their
constructions.
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A recent trend in maintenance of aging infrastructures is a method called asset
management. The Japan Society of Civil Engineers, Construction Management
Committee, defined asset management as “systemized practical activities for effi-
cient and effective management of social capital, which are shared properties of the
people of Japan, for enhancing profit for the people on a long-term basis,” and the
committee is committed to “continued efforts applying overall knowledge from
fields that cover engineering, economics, and business management.”
One of the basic concepts of asset management is the “concept of life cycle”
(Fig. 15.1). Asset management targets minimization of life cycle cost (LCC) that
includes maintenance cost of infrastructures over its entire life cycle in addition to
the initial construction cost. First in Fig. 15.1, defining the “function/performance”
for the vertical axis is important. Load, strength, and volume are easily quantified;
however, such measures like usability or appearance are difficult to quantify objec-
tively. “Function/performance” is a measure for the user to quantify serviceability of
whether the social infrastructure can provide the intended “service” or not. “Func-
tion/performance” is initially at a level above the required standard; however, it
degrades with time. There are cases when the level suddenly drops below the
standard with an unexpected event like a natural disaster (A). The level shows a
large improvement with reconstruction (B); however, uncertainty in material or
construction may cause rapid decrease after level B. A rise in the requirement
standard (a) forces reinforcement (C) to raise the level. At level D, implementing a
measure to delay the speed of degradation succeeds, however, with a predicted life
when the level falls below the requirement standard (E’). The figure shows life
extension to level E by lowering the requirement standard by, for example, limiting
the use. The margin of an infrastructure is defined as the current level minus the
requirement standard, and proper margin against the situation surrounding the
infrastructure is in need. The evaluation of current “function/performance” and its
forecast of decay determines the time for maintenance. The definition of a decay
Fig. 15.1 Concept of life cycle. (Modified and redrawn based on Hashimoto et al. 2016)
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model requires clarification of the decay mechanism and accumulation and manage-
ment of measurements and monitoring data.
Continuing maintenance management of aging infrastructures involves the fol-
lowing concerns: (1) Make use of information and communication technology to
build a construction system that can perform total management of evaluation, design,
and maintenance data and at the same time conform to the international standards of
asset management ISO 55000 series. (2) Clarify the responsibilities of the facility
manager and make further use of civilian power for sufficient maintenance systems.
(3) Pass down information about maintenance management of infrastructures and
train human resources. (4) Secure sufficient budget maintenance for developing
robots or unmanned aerial vehicles, technologies for efficient maintenance with
nondestructive testing, or laser scanning measurement, real-time measurements,
and monitoring systems.
15.1.2 Government Plans of Disaster Management in Japan
With over 100 laws, Japan’s national disaster management administration failed to
mark sufficient effect with individual agencies tackling problems on disaster man-
agement separately up until the mid-twentieth century. The problem surfaced with
the first wide-area mega disaster of the postwar period in Japan, Isewan typhoon in
September 1959. The flooded area reached about 310 km2 along the coast of Isewan
(Ise Bay). During the disaster, over 1000 people were dead or missing in the two
prefectures of Aichi and Mie. On the fifth day from the disaster breakout, the central
government established the on-site disaster management headquarters within the
Aichi Prefectural Government Office building where the deputy prime minister, vice
ministers, head of departments from ministries, and staff members of the prefectural
governments and Japanese National Railways (currently Japan Railways Group)
gathered. The intention was to allow quick decision-making about guidelines and
special measures at the headquarters to counter various problems that kept arising.
Later, the central government decided to build the Basic Disaster Management
Plan, and prefectures and municipalities the local disaster management plans, so as
to promote a comprehensive planned disaster management administration instead of
an inconsistent disaster management administration on a one-on-one basis. The
national plan completed in 1963 and those by prefectures and municipalities
followed. Disaster management committees at the national and local levels arranged
discussions among varieties of members from different fields for continuous reviews
of the plans. The Central Disaster Management Council has the prime minister as the
chairperson and all cabinet officials, heads of primary public institutions, and
academic experts as its members. Since the council has leaders of central ministries
and public institutions as its members, the nation’s Basic Disaster Management Plan
can incorporate functions for mutual arrangements of disaster management admin-
istration plans by each organization from long-term viewpoints (Cabinet Office
2015). The Basic Disaster Management Plan defines “comprehensive long-term
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plans for disaster management,” “emphasized measures in the central and regional
disaster management plans,” and “standard measures in preparing central and
regional disaster management plans.” The actual disaster management measures
are carried out based on the Disaster Management Operation Plan and the Local
Disaster Management Plan.
The Basic Disaster Management Plan underwent a major revision after experienc-
ing the 1995 Great Hanshin Awaji earthquake to clarify responsibilities for the
central and local governments and public institutions. The measures to take in
each phase of prevention and preparedness, emergency response, recovery, and
reconstruction were spelled out for different disasters of earthquake, storm and
flooding, volcano eruption, and so on. Experiences from the 2011 Great East
Japan earthquake led to the addition of a new chapter for tsunami disaster
management.
Upon a wide-area mega disaster like the Great East Japan earthquake, wide-area
support activities are needed. At the same time, local residents have to survive the
state when public support is insufficient, and thus disaster management activities in
the local communities are extremely important as well. For this reason, a community
disaster management plan started since April 2014 to promote disaster management
activities among residents (including both individual and corporate residents). The
Union of Kansai Governments, with eight prefectures and four ordinance-designated
cites in Kansai (area surrounding Osaka and Kyoto) area, has built Kansai Disaster
Management Plan under coordinated efforts of its member organizations. The
current Basic Disaster Management Plan specifies the need for these regional plans.
The Basic Disaster Management Plan further specifies the need to discuss mea-
sures for specific types of disasters and regions as needed. The Central Disaster
Management Council, in 2014, established the policy framework for large-scale
earthquake disaster prevention and reduction that summarized measures to take for
disaster management against the specific mega-earthquakes of Nankai Trough and
Tokyo Inland. Further efforts are underway to build comprehensive policies that
involve national land policies and industrial policies beyond “disaster management”
to build national resilience over the entire nation against major disasters (National
Resilience Promotion Office 2014).
15.1.3 Researches on Disaster Management
The Japanese government, with its Basic Disaster Management Plan, promotes
researches on science and technology on disaster management. The Basic Disaster
Management Plan has a target to “Promote researches, and enhance and reinforce
forecasting and observation” of disasters by, in addition to earthquakes, tsunamis,
storm and flooding, volcano eruptions, heavy snow, maritime, aviation, railways,
roads, nuclear power, hazardous material, large-scale fires, and forest fires. The rest
of this section describes researches on earthquake disasters.
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Science and technology researches about disaster management involve scientific
and engineering researches about the disasters themselves and sociological
researches about human actions or information transfer at times of disasters. The
Basic Disaster Management Plan places emphasis on promoting coordination among
research institutes and administrative bodies through research institutes providing
information to disaster management institutes, so outcome of the researches can
apply to enhancement of disaster management systems and disaster management
policies. Related agencies and ministries and designated public institutes like the
Japan Meteorological Agency, MEXT, Cabinet Office, and the like have set their
actual research guidelines in their disaster management operation plans based on the
Basic Disaster Management Plan.
The 1995 Great Hanshin Awaji earthquake was a big turning point of our
researches on disaster management. The impact of the earthquake disaster revealed
that accomplishments of investigation and researches on earthquakes had not been
sufficiently transferred to the residents and institutions in charge of disaster man-
agement. In July of the same year, the Headquarters for Earthquake Research
Promotion headed by Director-General of the Science and Technology Agency
was established in the General Administrative Agency of the cabinet (the headquar-
ters were transferred to the MEXT with the 2001 reform, and the head is the
minister). The government intended to have a single line of promoting efforts that
clarified the responsibilities of the investigation and research organizations, so their
results can directly make effects on the administration policies. The budget for
earthquake investigation and research for the fiscal year (started in April and
ended in March of the following year) that followed the Great East Japan earthquake
had an increase to reach 35.6 billion Japanese yen (JPY) (about US$430 million),
and the annual budget in recent years has been about 11 billion JPY (about US
$100 million).
The Headquarters for Earthquake Research Promotion carries out the following
research activities: (1) Arrange and analyze observation results of ground motion,
study them, and make overall evaluations to publish them monthly. (2) Perform
long-term evaluations to estimate probabilities of earthquake occurrence within set
timespans and their sizes primarily along major active faults and ocean trenches.
(3) Carry out strong ground motion evaluations to estimate the seismic intensities in
the surrounding area in cases of specific earthquakes. (4) Publish “National Seismic
Hazard Maps for Japan”with probabilistic earthquake prediction maps of probability
numbers for regions to suffer seismic activities with timeframes and earthquake
movement prediction maps with earthquake source faults identified. Further, for
specific probable earthquakes, publish “long-period earthquake ground motion
hazard maps” that forecast long-period earthquake ground motions that can cause
major damages to structures far from the earthquake sources.
The Headquarters for Earthquake Research Promotion also takes on the role of
promoting establishment of the seismic observation network. The seismic observa-
tion network is going through the arrangement of setting observation points over the
nation land managed by the National Research Institute for Earth Science and
Disaster Resilience, Geospatial Information Authority of Japan, Japan
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Meteorological Agency, and so on. The 562 high-sensitivity seismographs in 1996
greatly increased to cover 1498 points over the nation in 2016. Similarly, broadband
seismographs went from 82 points to 189, strong motion seismographs from about
2809 to 2853, and GPS continuous monitoring facilities from 716 to 1492.
15.2 Public Systems for Societal Safety
15.2.1 Accident Investigation
15.2.1.1 Significance and Purpose of Accident Investigation
An effective way in preventing reoccurrence of an accident is to investigate and
analyze the accident cause to prevent similar accidents from repeating and learn
knowledge and lessons effective in preventing other types of accidents (Abe 2011).
The world’s first commercial jet plane Comet in the UK went through accidents of
falling apart while in-flight from 1953 to 1954. The accident investigation identified
the cause of metal fatigue of the fuselage with repeated pressurization and depres-
surization. The knowledge gained from the investigation greatly contributed to
enhancing safety of airplane operations that followed. Accident investigation is so
effective in accident prevention and safety enhancement (Ministry of Transport and
Civil Aviation 1955).
15.2.1.2 Types of Accident Investigation
Categorizing accident investigation based on the organizations that carry them out,
we have accident investigations by (1) permanent public organizations, (2) temporary
public organizations, (3) government or administrative organization as part of its
duty, (4) the organization responsible for the accident, (5) third party from the
civilian section, and so on. Also, separately from these accident investigations,
many countries in the world, including Japan, have their police force investigate
accidents in case of deaths or injuries. The police investigation is intended for
criminal prosecution of causing death or injury through negligence in the pursuit
of social activities; however, since it sometimes identifies the cause to certain levels,
it can be deemed a type of accident investigation.
The most important type of investigation among the above is that by permanent
public organizations that aim not at pursuing the responsibility but at finding the
accident causes, extracting the lessons, and preventing repeating the same accident
again. The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) of the USA is internation-
ally well known to be an investigation organization with such purposes.
The NTSB was established in 1967 as an organization under the US Department
of Transportation. The board, however, to keep independence in its accident inves-
tigation, demerged from the Department of Transportation into an independent
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federal institution. Accident investigation is nothing but serious work to identify
flaws and weaknesses of organizations or systems. At times, it functions to point out
defects in administrative regulation. Accident investigation, therefore, has to keep
independence not only from those responsible but also from related administrative
organizations.
15.2.1.3 History of Accident Investigation
Accident investigation by permanent public organizations started early in transpor-
tation. In 1951, the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) adopted an
article from the Convention on International Civil Aviation about the Standards and
Recommended Practices for Aircraft Accident Inquiries and designated it as Annex
13 (ICAO 2016). When an aviation accident breaks out, contracting countries to the
convention carry out accident investigation following this annex. Japan, in 1974,
established the Aircraft Accident Investigation Committee within the Ministry of
Transportation (now part of the MLIT).
A number of countries in the world started investigations of maritime accidents
since before World War II. In Japan, the Marine Accident Inquiry Agency (formerly
Marine Court) was established in 1949, and it continued its investigations into
accident causes and disciplinary actions to marine personnel as an affiliated agency
of the Ministry of Transportation up until 2008. For railway accidents, on the other
hand, investigations were made by railway companies or administering agencies
since old times, however, not by permanent organizations. Investigations of railway
accident by a permanent organization in Japan started in 2001 with the establishment
of the Aircraft and Railway Accidents Investigation Commission (JTSB 2018).
In recent years, with the growing international social concerns for safety, move-
ments to establish permanent accident investigation organizations are on the rise
among advanced countries. Especially for transportation accidents, the International
Transportation Safety Association (ITSA) was established in 1993 as an interna-
tional union for accident investigation. As of June 2017, accident investigation
organizations from 16 countries, including Japan, have joined this association.
15.2.1.4 Permanent Accident Investigation Organizations in Japan
Not all accidents in Japan undergo investigation by permanent accident investigation
organizations. Fire departments and the Fire and Disaster Management Agency
investigate fires that amount to about 40,000 annually, and the police looks into
the 500,000 or so annual automobile accidents that cause deaths or injuries. An
extremely rare accident takes a temporary investigation committee each time. For
example, the 2011 Tokyo Electric Power Company (TEPCO)-owned Fukushima
Daiichi NPP accident led to separate investigation committees, one by the central
government and one by the diet.
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As of now in October 2017, we have four permanent accident investigation
organizations: the Japan Transport Safety Board, Consumer Safety Investigation
Commission, Commercial Vehicle Accident Investigation Commission, and Medi-
cal Incident Investigation Support Center. The Japan Transport Safety Board
established in 2008 with the merger of the Aircraft and Railway Accidents Investi-
gation Commission and part of the Marine Accident Inquiry Agency carries out
investigation of aviation, railway, and maritime accidents and serious incidents to
identify the causes, prevent recurrence, and reduce damages. The Consumer Safety
Investigation Commission started in 2012 for accidents related to consumer prod-
ucts, food, facilities, and services. The 2014 Commercial Vehicle Accident Investi-
gation Commission investigates accidents with commercial vehicles of buses, taxis,
and trucks and the 2015 Medical Incident Investigation and Support Center medical
accidents (Medical Safety Promotion Office 2016).
15.2.2 Public Health Systems
15.2.2.1 Establishment of Public Health Systems
Hippocrates from the fourth century BC described that clean water and air and
proper housing have strong correlation with the health. In the fourteenth century,
Europe faced an outbreak of plague, and quarantine started at newly placed health
offices in the northern Italian cities of Florence and Venice (Cipolla 1981). The
system of public health that carried on to date started in the nineteenth-century
UK. In the UK, commerce and industries showed rapid growth, and with the increase
in city populations, the health environment in cities declined. Large cities like
London suffered outbreaks of infections like cholera entering the vicious spiral of
poor hygiene, disease, and poverty. The social systems at the time could not handle
the situation, and Edwin Chadwick built the new system of the Health of Towns
Associations in local communities with professional staff to perform duties and
established the Public Health Act in 1848. This system spread to the rest of the world
as a public health system (Tatara 1999).
15.2.2.2 Definition of Public Health
The forming of systems for providing medical services deemed the public health
system established in the nineteenth century unnecessary. Even with such systems
shaped, however, medical service alone could not solve many health problems like
dealing with spread of infections. Since around the 1980s, many countries went
through reforms of their public health systems. The UK redefined and promoted
public health to mean “Science, technology and policies to assemble various forces
of the societies to promote and protect health of the people for their health and peace,
to prevent illnesses, and extend their lives” (Acheson 1988).
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15.2.2.3 Public Health in Japan
The “Medical System (1874)” promulgated in early Meiji era started with an article
on health administration to introduce the system of public health into the country.
Public health system, however, made its way clear for the first time with the
Constitution of Japan in 1947 (Prime Minister of Japan and his Cabinet 1947).
Article 25, Section 2 of the Constitution clarified the nation’s responsibility in
improving and promoting public health and further assigned local public organiza-
tions to carry out public health operations. The postwar public health operations
developed around public health centers based on the 1947 Health Center Act. Since
1978, the change in the policy made municipalities build their health centers and
increase their municipality health center staffs, so the municipalities could play the
central roles in public health. In 1994, the Health Center Act was amended to
“Community Health Act,” and municipalities were legally assigned the central
roles for providing basic public health functions of health, welfare, and nursing
servicing for the citizens (Tatara and Okamoto 2009).
Cities with health centers (ordinance-designated cities and core cities), in addition
to health centers, have “Local Research Institutes of Hygiene” (Tatara and Okamoto
2009). The MHLW has built “quarantine stations” in primary ports and airports. We
also have a number of special institutions and research centers, e.g., the National
Institute of Infectious Diseases, National Institute of Public Health, National Institute
of Health Sciences, and so on. In addition to these administrative institutes and
organizations, the private sector has built the Japan Public Health Association, Japan
Food Hygiene Association, and so on to support the public health system.
15.2.2.4 Health Center Operations as Defined in Community Health Act
Health centers are specialized institutions for public health activities with medical
doctors, public health nurses, public health inspectors (environment, food, pharma-
ceuticals, and inspections), and so on. Article 6 of the Community Health Act defines
the following 14 tasks as duties for health centers:
– Enhancing concepts of community health
– Dynamic regional population and other statistics about community health
– Improving nutrition and food hygiene
– Environmental health concerns like living space, water supply, sewage, garbage
disposal cleaning, and other matters related to environmental hygiene
– Medical and pharmaceutical concerns
– Matters about public health nurses
– Improvement and promotion of public health activities
– Health of mothers, infants, and elderlies
– Dental health
– Mental health
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– Health of those with infections without established cures and those in need of
long-term treatment due to other special infections
– Prevention of AIDS, tuberculosis, venereal diseases, contagious diseases, and
other diseases
– Hygienic testing and examination
– Other matters for protection and promotion of health of community residents
15.2.3 Establishment of Emergency Lifesaving System
15.2.3.1 History of Emergency Medical System in Japan
The 1947 Fire Defense Organization Act triggered the establishment of emergency
medical service systems in Japan with municipalities in charge of administration of
defense against fires. The year 1961 marked the establishment of a universal
healthcare system, and the number of medical institutions greatly increased to
accommodate emergency patients. In 1963, fire departments were assigned with
the tasks of emergency transportation. In 1964, the notification system of emergency
medical institutions started, and patients with first-degree emergencies (mild cases)
and second-degree emergencies (moderate cases) were subject to emergency med-
ical service within municipalities.
Patients with severe cases of third degree, however, needed institutions special-
ized in lifesaving with specialized medical doctors trained for emergency medical
service. Such systems were not organized until university hospitals that were training
such medical doctors started to accommodate third-degree patients. In 1967, the
Osaka University Hospital established the emergency department to accommodate
third-degree emergency patients. It was the first among all university hospitals in
Japan. It also started a course on emergency medical service for education and
training of doctors specialized in emergency medicine. Osaka Prefecture in 1979,
starting with the Osaka Prefectural Senri Lifesaving Emergency Center, built third-
degree lifesaving emergency medical centers in blocks that divided the prefecture.
The emergency medical administration by Osaka Prefecture spread throughout the
nation (Kidokoro 2001). Currently further specialized “Advanced Lifesaving Emer-
gency Centers” for extensive burns, severed limbs, acute intoxication, and so on are
spreading throughout the nation.
The probability of saving an emergency patient is limited with only the doctor’s
treatment after reaching a hospital, and in 1991, the system of emergency lifesaving
technician started, so the technician can perform lifesaving treatment during trans-
portation of emergency patients. Many ambulance team members now carry the
qualification of emergency lifesaving technicians to provide resurgent and lifesaving
treatment.
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15.2.3.2 Base Hospital upon Disasters and Formation of Medical Teams
When a major wide-area disaster like the 1995 Great Hanshin Awaji earthquake
breaks out, the regular emergency medical service system based on municipalities
cannot handle the large number of injured patients. A detailed analysis of response
cases to emergency patients at the time of the Great Hanshin Awaji earthquake led to
the conclusion that such a situation needs a “Disaster Base Hospital” and a “Disaster
Medical Assistance Team (DMAT)” (Kondo et al. 2009). Arranging hospitals that
can serve as bases of lifesaving emergency medical service and organizing DMAT
for the time of disasters are underway since 1996.
A disaster base hospital, in response to a request by the prefectural governor,
accepts the injured immediately after the breakout of a disaster and dispatches
medical teams as needed. DMAT is a medical team with various members including
doctors, nurses, and specialists (emergency lifesaving technician, pharmacist, clin-
ical engineer, clinical laboratory technician, physiotherapist, occupational therapist,
radiology technician, social welfare counselor, healthcare professional, clerk, and so
on). It carries medicine and medical equipment to disaster-struck areas with medical
staff to perform independent emergency medical service.
Prefectures have “Prefectural DMAT” in preparation for medical needs upon
disasters, and the MHLW has “Japan DMAT” to respond to major disasters. The two
cooperate in disaster-struck areas in providing medical support of long- and short-
range transportation, setting up temporary medical camps, and supporting local
hospitals.
At the time of the Great Hanshin Awaji earthquake, hardly any helicopters
transported emergency patients for lifesaving. The administration, thus, started to
deploy Doctor-Heli (doctor helicopter) around the nation, so they can transport
patients to remote medical facilities with a doctor, a medical nurse, or an emergency
lifesaving technician onboard. The 2011 Great East Japan earthquake was the first
major disaster for the emergency medical facilities and medical teams to go fully
operational.
It is now clear that setting up lifesaving emergency medical service systems is
insufficient in saving victims of disasters. After the Great Hanshin Awaji earthquake,
people found that although emergency medical service immediately after the disaster
outbreak is important, people tend to worsen their medical conditions or in some
cases decease, during the mid- to long-term evacuation that followed. The need for
teams for mid- to long-term medical and health-supporting activities arose in
disaster-struck areas to follow DMAT after its departure after several days of action.
After the Great East Japan earthquake, the Japan Medical Association formed the
Japan Medical Association Team (JMAT) and dispatched them, for the first time, to
areas struck by the earthquake. Upon outbreak of a disaster, not just Japan Medical
Association but national and public hospitals and private medical institutions like the
Japan Red Cross Medical Center form medical teams for entering disaster-struck
areas to perform medical services.
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15.3 Local Government and Societal Safety
15.3.1 Safety Securing Duties of Local Governments
Article 92 of the Constitution of Japan states that “Regulations concerning organi-
zation and operations of local governments shall be fixed by law in accordance with
the principle of local autonomy.” The principle of local autonomy consists of
organizational autonomy and residential autonomy. Organizational autonomy
acknowledges local governments, independent from the nation, at regions, and it is
the principle of voluntary administration under the responsibility and intention of the
local governments for securing safety and security for the residents. Residential
autonomy means that local autonomy is based on intentions of the residents. Under
local autonomy, we have to “protect safety and security of our community with our
own hands.”
Administration by local governments cover a wide range of policing, firefighting,
disaster response, environment protection, public health, health management for the
residents, and welfare policies. For fairness and equality over the entire nation, these
administrative services by the basic local autonomies and the municipalities work in
coordination with prefectures responsible for wide-area administration, under the
control by the central ministries and agencies.
For example, we have the Consumer Affairs Agency (CAA) that started in 2009
as a national institution for protecting consumer’s safety. The agency has centralized
control of claims from consumers filed at consumer affairs center in prefectures and
municipalities. Problems reported to consumer affairs centers cover a wide range of
incidents, in fact, almost everything, like purchases through the Internet, fraudulent
businesses for the elderly, fraud in home remodeling, accidents with playground
equipment, troubles with home medical devices, troubles with cosmetic medical
treatment, dangerous drugs, loan sharks, forged credit cards, and malignant business
deals (CAA 2017).
Organizational charts at entrances of city halls show that local governments have
varieties of departments. For example, a department in charge of crisis management
supports activities by disaster management organizations or carries out activities for
promoting consciousness about disaster management among the residents, so the
power of disaster management is enhanced in the community. The firefighting
department keeps daily activities to immediately respond to firefighting and rescue
requests for saving lives of the residents. A welfare-related department carries out
fine operations to support those in need, like elderlies or handicapped. A department
in city planning keeps roads, parks, and public areas in good conditions for keeping
the safe and secure community. The board of education works on the safety
management systems at school, so children are not involved in incidents.
Our modern societies have to face a large number of risks, and the responsibilities
for local governments are growing. The staff are busy carrying out their duties in
protecting the safety for the residents. And once a major disaster breaks out, the staff
has to quickly gather at their positions and conduct disaster response under the
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instructions from the headquarters. Most people used to think of local governments
as terminal nodes in the top-down system with the central government at the top;
however, in fact, they have the heaviest responsibilities in keeping safety of local
regions.
15.3.2 System for Securing Safety by Local Governments
This section overviews the level of involvement by local governments to securing
safety for the residents. Through this analysis, we will try to roughly grasp the
current problems. We will especially compare the police and fire stations in Sect.
15.3.1 that are somewhat close entities to the residents in their efforts of protecting
safety and security for them.
Police headquarters are set for each prefecture, whereas fire department head-
quarters are located for municipalities. A police headquarter then places police
booths, police boxes, and police stations in its prefecture, and a fire department
headquarter places fire stations and substations in its municipality. The system
allows police officers and firefighters, familiar with the regional roads, to swiftly
and accurately carry out their missions.
In Japan fiscal year (starts every April of the year) 2016, all the police station staff
accounted 288,000 with all prefectures combined and fire department staff from all
municipalities 163,000. They, respectively, amount to 10.5% and 6.0% of all local
public employees. The Japan fiscal year 2015 expenditure amounted to, in JPY,
3231 billion (about US$30 billion) for the police force and JPY 2097 billion (about
US$20 billion) for the firefighters (MIC 2017). The figures, respectively, amounted
to 3.3% and 2.1% of total local government expenses. The numbers tell us that local
governments spend huge amounts of manpower and cost in securing safety for the
residents.
Revenue shortages in local finances these days are forcing each department to
streamline (rationalization and higher efficiency) the administration. The transition
of local expenses during 10 years of 2005–2015 showed consistent ratio for the
firefighting expenditure; however, the police spending declined in its ratio to overall
local expenses. Revenue shortages for local finance affect local government opera-
tions of securing safety for the residents and raise big concerns (MIC 2017).
As the societies grow complex and advanced, operations for securing safety for
the residents are turning internationalized, advanced, and complex as well. The
reality is demanding preparedness for the following concerns (FDMA 2016):
(a) Internationalization: Local administration is undergoing rapid internationaliza-
tion. Crimes and troubles by foreigners are problems not just for the police but
also for emergency transportation for the firefighters. We are also concerned
about terror attacks by foreign terrorist groups, and the police and firefighters
have to quickly prepare against nuclear, biological, and chemical disasters (NBC
disasters).
15 Government Systems for Disaster Management 181
(b) Advancement: Crimes that take highly advanced knowledge for suppressing
them are increasing these days. They are cyberterrorism targeting weaknesses of
information security, fraud over international networks, money laundering, and
so on. Equipment and systems for fire extinguishing and rescue are highly
advanced and sophisticated. The measures that require high costs are demanded
just like with internationalization in (a).
(c) Complication: In case of a mega-scale disaster, we can foresee added complica-
tion in the disaster-struck areas with trains overturning and multiple collisions,
explosions at chemical factories, and terror attacks. We thus need to be prepared
to apply “triage” that prioritizes how to apply limited resources to the troubled
events. The streamlined organizations with short budget have no margin and will
have to make hard decisions.
As we described above, systems for protecting safety of citizens have to make
continuous efforts to reform themselves with the changing requirements of the time
and societies. Otherwise, the systems will be quickly outdated and weakened. There
are expectations toward the buzzwords “New Public Commons” or “Government
2.0” (Chen 2011) based on “residential autonomy” for local autonomy that makes
use of cooperative efforts by many of the residents.
15.3.3 Local Governments and Emergency Drills
Administrative bodies of the nation and governments make disaster management
activities primarily targeting natural disasters. With disasters of larger magnitudes,
however, that is, the more we acknowledge the situation as severe, response and
recovery by the administration fail to provide sufficient functions. A white paper on
disaster management in Japan also pointed out limits to public aid: “It was clear that
administration alone had difficulties in providing quick support for all the disaster
victims and there were cases that administration functions suffered damages and
were paralyzed in providing their intended functions in case of mega-scale wide-area
disasters like the Great East Japan earthquake” (Cabinet Office 2015).
With the assumption that disaster management measures by administrative orga-
nizations are limited, promoting disaster management activities in households and
regions is one of the important activities for local governments. Disaster education
and emergency drills are activities for promoting disaster management activities in
households and local regions.
The most common emergency drills by local governments are regional overall
emergency drills. Regional overall emergency drills are trainings for a number of
disaster management-related organizations, and thus participants are often limited to
experts. These events, thus, often end up being just chances for local residents to
observe results of training by experts. The drills need to involve more regional
residents by, e.g., having them experience earthquake simulator trucks or initial
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actions in fire extinguishing or having them walk from their homes to the training
ground.
In recent years, communities organize “shakeout drills” that involve wide areas
like the whole prefecture or municipality to coordinate emergency drills at compa-
nies, schools, and households at the same time on the same day. Shakeout drills are
major-size emergency drills that started in 2008 in California, USA (Jones and
Benthien 2011), and they are spreading throughout the world. In addition to shake-
out drills are “plus one drills” that have the participants add one additional disaster
management activity like checking the emergency supplies or dangerous spots.
Shakeout drills and plus one drills are one of the most important trainings led by
the local governments for the promotion of self-support and mutual support by
regional residents.
These emergency drills are often carried out in Japan during a specific period. The
most popular is the “Disaster Preparedness Day” on September 1st. September 1st is
the day the Great Kanto earthquake hit in 1923. It is also the time of the year when
typhoons hit. The cabinet meeting set the day in 1960 as the Disaster Preparedness
Day to promote training to understand the threats of disasters. In addition to Disaster
Preparedness Day, we have from past disasters, Disaster Reduction and Volunteer
Day (January 17), World Tsunami Awareness Day (November 5), and so on.
Local governments need, in addition to simply remembering past disasters on the
above specific days related to disaster management, to have regional residents to
actually realize that disaster management is accomplished for the first time upon
everybody’s cooperation.
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Chapter 16
Systems for Disaster Management
in the Private Sector
Mashiho Suga, Kinzo Kuwana, Shingo Nagamatsu, Takahiro Nakamura,
and Kazuhiko Takano
Abstract Disaster management is not just for the government. Various sections of
the private sector carry out disaster management activities. At the time of disasters,
volunteers and NPOs are well known. Corporations, on one hand, prevent accidents
within and at the same time take measures to respond quickly in cases of emergency
situations. The insurance system is another method of risk management that has been
around since old times.
Keywords BCP · Insurance · Labor safety · Mutual aid · NPO · Volunteer
16.1 Natural Disasters and Nonprofit Organizations
16.1.1 Disaster Relief and Nonprofit Organizations
When a natural disaster that exceeds a certain level strikes, prefectures and munic-
ipalities that suffered damages set up disaster response headquarters according to
local disaster management plans. The headquarters take the lead in the system for
emergency response and later measure up to the point of recovery and reconstruc-
tion. In case of small disasters, the top-down organization within administration can
provide effective response. The 1995 Great Hanshin Awaji earthquake in Japan,
however, revealed the limits of administrative response. Large-scale disasters pro-
duce a large number of situations that require quick judgments and decisions at the
same time, and administrational entities, which place priority on fairness of their
response, hesitate in distributing the resources at hand until the entire picture of the
damages becomes clear and the responses end up being late.
Initial fire extinguishing, grasping the damage levels and running evacuation
shelters, in general, are tasks for self-support by family members or mutual support
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by residents in the areas. At the time of the Great Hanshin Awaji earthquake,
however, families and residents had lost their capacities for problem-solving with
declining birthrate, aging population, and urbanization, and many of the regional
communities could not properly provide self- or mutual support by themselves.
What made up for these gaps of limits with public support and self-/mutual
support were “goodwill citizens.” Once images of devastating damages went on
air, huge amounts of people, supply, and relief donations poured into the disaster-
struck areas. Especially noteworthy were the “disaster volunteers” that exceeded
about 1,380,000 a year (estimate by Hyogo Prefecture). They entered the disaster-
struck areas and offered their labor in place for the functionally failed administrative
organizations.
The regions, however, were not prepared to accept the volunteers, and a number
of problems arose. This experience led to a system to have a window to accept
general volunteering citizens separate from registration of skilled supporters in the
disaster response system in the regional disaster management plan revised after the
earthquake. Further, the volunteer center (VC), set by the Council of Social Welfare
and operated through ordinary times, expanded its function to start “Disaster Relief
VC” when needed to register volunteers and dispatch them to proper places.
Disaster Relief VCs turned into organizations for disaster response systems of
Japan to promote “cooperative support” that compensates the limits of public
support and also helps self- and mutual support. While social movements were on
the rise to promote the establishment of foundations for socially contributing
activities by goodwill citizens, the Act on Promotion of Specified Nonprofit Activ-
ities was enacted in March 1998, and a large number of NPOs, specialized in disaster
support, were born. Earthquake volunteer activities during the Great Hanshin Awaji
earthquake placed large effects on the arrangement of disaster response systems in
Japan and the formations of the private nonprofit sector.
The years that followed the Great Hanshin Awaji earthquake suffered disasters at
regions, and every time, “cooperative support” centered about Disaster Relief VCs
made significant activities. The foundation of activities for Disaster Relief VCs
gradually shaped with procurement of activity funds and management training;
however, around 10 years after the earthquake, limits of the system started to emerge.
Disaster Relief VC activities that dispatched large number of citizens that may lack
experience or skills but were highly motivated have been highly praised. In fact, in
2004 when 10 typhoons landed on Japan, over 80 Disaster Relief VCs were set within
the single year, and, at one time, 60,000 volunteers worked in disaster-struck areas.
Coordinating the work of a variety of volunteers, however, that required large
management work and running Disaster Relief VCs were large burdens to Council
of Social Welfare offices. Another drawback was that Disaster Relief VCs had general
citizens playing the central roles of activities, thus could only accept support requests
possible for anyone and had to turn down requests that required special skills.
The 2011 Great East Japan earthquake caused damages over a wide area crippling
the public organizations in the area, and expectations were high from the beginning
for “cooperative support.” The real needs, however, were more for organizations that
could move large amounts of resources or specialists that could work under severe
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work conditions, rather than civilian support for individual victims. In addition, lack
of resources in the disastrous areas caused difficulties in building activity centers for
the volunteers and delayed the startups of Disaster Relief VCs. The needs for special
skills and large resources were met by private companies, nongovernmental organi-
zations (international NGOs), and domestic disaster-related NPOs that had accumu-
lated experience before the earthquake disaster (Suga 2018).
Cooperative support for disaster-struck areas today is shifting toward coordinated
activities through liaison meetings among NGOs, NPOs, administration, and the
Council of Social Welfare. At the time of Kumamoto earthquake in 2016, the
governments and private sectors provided a new form of support to the disaster
areas and victim liaison meetings among a variety of organizations and entities.
16.1.2 Disaster Recovery and Rise of Social Business
During the Great East Japan earthquake, as we discussed in the previous section,
NPOs with specialized skills came to play important roles, and a number of
organizations and companies started support for disaster-struck areas in business-
like fashions. Examples of large private corporations that applied its own business
strategies, as part of its corporate social responsibility (CSR) activities, to support
disastrous areas include Amazon that provided relief goods using “wish lists,”
Honda that gave road traffic status information using its own automotive navigation
system, and so on. There were a large number of other organizations and companies
that posted goals to meet social needs. NPO Katariba applied its know-hows in
career learning programs for high school students to start a private academy for
disaster victim children in the city of Onagawa in Miyagi Prefecture. NPO Florence
that provides childcare for children with illness started an indoor playing facility for
children in Fukushima Prefecture. The Music Securities, Inc. applied the system of
microfinance to start a service to solicit general investors to invest into disaster
victim companies and collect reconstruction funds.
These business entities offer their services at cost, and they are continuing their
businesses by receiving compensation from the users. Their abilities to carry on the
reconstruction support activities without having to rely on grant money from the
government or charity donations give them solid strength compared to other NPOs
or volunteers.
The Great East Japan earthquake damaged a large number of companies mainly
along the coast, and many employments were lost as well. Social business compa-
nies, like we described above, receive compensation from the users. Therefore, they
are expected to offer employments in addition to providing services to support
disaster victims. The METI, with the objective of reconstructing the regions from
the disaster, started to support social business startups, and a large number of them
started and contributed to reconstruction of the areas and employment offerings.
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16.2 Accident Prevention Activities by Companies
16.2.1 Accident Prevention Activities
Accidents and disasters that happen through corporate activities are industrial
accidents if workers contract sickness, are injured, or are dead. Even if the effects
of an incident are only physical, it may cause long-term influences on the surround-
ing areas. If an event causes harm to a third person unrelated to the corporate
activities, it turns into a social issue. For this reason, whatever the industry is and
in whatever form, corporations need to work on accident prevention in various
forms, so they will not harm their workers with employment and also will not
cause bad effects on the societies and regions around them.
Accident prevention activities with companies, in general, develop through
building proper safety and health management systems, conforming to regulations
about labor safety and health, and promoting voluntary activities in safety and
health. The activities and methods differ with companies and job types, and further
improvements are implemented to continue enhanced activities for accomplishing
better accident prevention.
Educating the employees about safety knowledge is also important in accident
prevention. The Industrial Safety and Health Act of Japan obligates the employer to
provide safety and health education to its employees upon their employment and
start of hazardous operations. The act also requests employers to make efforts in
education for skill improvement and health for safety managers.
Depending on the type of work and sizes, corporations conduct a variety of
accident prevention activities. In recent years, activities in accident prevention are
on the table for different businesses (manufacturing, service industry, disaster
recovery and reconstruction, and so on), accident types (explosion, chemical sub-
stance, heat attacks, and so on), and the actual concern (elderly worker and over-
work, long working hours, and so on).
Accident prevention activities alone, of course, cannot fully stop accident break-
outs. For example, the “close call reporting” that has workers’ report about their own
experiences tends to end up being a collection of reports of actions like “slipped” or
“fell down” that the worker can recognize, and the reporting system seldom picks up
cases that are hard to recognize like “misunderstanding” or “slip of memory.” Only
alerting the operators by writing to “be careful” in the operation manual has
difficulty in its effect of preventing errors. Further, whatever the process is, new
operations can expect a certain level of effect because they are new to the operators;
however, as time passes, the operators get used to the operations and tend to forget
cautions in the manuals (Oiri 2008). Thus, not suffering from disasters or no legal
violation for now is not a good enough reason to carry on the current accident
prevention activities. We should all continue aiming at further safety by identifying
and organizing problems and concerns in our efforts to implement improvements.
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16.2.2 Safety Management
Companies with their involvement in accident prevention activities lowered the
number of industrial accidents; however, the drop has leveled off since about the
1990s. Now the movement is to implement occupational safety and health manage-
ment systems (OSHMS) for preventing industrial accidents and improving levels of
corporate safety and health.
Discussion has been made about the reason for the leveling off of decline of
industrial accidents. What were pointed out include the following: (1) Accident
prevention activities are left to those in charge and post-accident measures are
merely for formality, (2) retirement of baby boomers (born 1947–1949 in Japan)
has made it difficult to carry on the know-how of safety in the fields, and (3) advance-
ment in the industry diversified the risk factors that conventional measures cannot
handle. When OSHMS guidelines were underway by the International Labour Office
(ILO), MHLW of Japan announced Guidelines on Occupational Safety and Health
Management Systems in 1999 to introduce, spread, and have companies implement
OSHMS. The guideline was revised in 2006, and risk assessment, the central
contents of OSHMS, has included the actual implementation of “Guidelines for
Investigation of Danger and Harm, etc.”
OSHMS has the following four features:
1. Company-wide promotion
Roles, responsibilities, and authorities are defined for system managers at each
level (overall manager, department manager, and safety and health manager) to
properly operate the system, periodically audit and review the system, and reflect
opinions of workers in the operation.
2. Performing risk assessment
Investigate dangers and harm to estimate the risks. Set priorities for reducing
risks, examine the risk reduction methods starting from higher priorities, and
execute the measures.
3. Autonomous system based on PDCA cycle
Continue execution of the autonomous activities of (plan, do, check, act, etc.).
Target improvement of safety and health standards at the workplace in a spiral
manner through the checked items during system audit.
4. Procedural, written, and recorded
For clarifying “when, who, what, and how,” write out safety and health
guidelines, roles, responsibilities, and authorities of managers at each level, and
procedures of reflecting workers’ opinions, risk management, investigation of
accident causes, and system audits. Also record necessary steps taken along the
execution.
Introducing OSHMS was not easy in both terms of implementing a new method
and coordinating it with existing measures. OSHMS are hardly in full operation,
especially with small- to mid-sized companies with limited resources, and there are a
number of concerns left until it is fully spread and implemented.
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16.2.3 Labor Safety and Health
After the industrial revolution, advancement of mechanical technologies and mass
production systems led to employment of women and even children. At the time, the
concept of protecting workers was weak, and a number of problems arose including
long hours of labor of 12–13 h a day, poverty with low wages, a number of infections
caused by these reasons, and so on. In 1833, the UK government passed the Factory
Act to restrict labor by women and children. Daily work hours, however, had to wait
until 1947 when a limit of 10 h a day was enforced.
Also in Japan, the rapid modernization and industrialization that started in the
Meiji era caused serious problems of accidents and infections at factories. The social
mood at the time, however, placed priority in economic growth to compete with the
European and American leaders, and activities for workplace safety and accident
prevention were not well accepted. On the other hand, engineers, dispatched to trips
to Europe and America to learn know-how of modern industries, came back with
knowledge about safety and accident prevention and tried to spread the methods in
Japan. Some new leaders emerged who led efforts in assuring safety after experienc-
ing distressful accidents that involved close people to them. The birth of modern
labor regulation in Japan was its Factory Act enforced in 1916 that was over 30 years
since it was first drafted. Then the Labor Standards Act was enforced in 1947 and the
Industrial Safety and Health Act in 1972 for establishing the framework for
protecting workers from job-related injuries, illness, and deaths.
The modern society has a big variety of industry types and job types and so are
the systems for safety and health management. The business owners and workers,
therefore, not only have to conform to the regulations, but it is important for them to
continue efforts for improvement by building systems that suit the business
operations.
16.3 BCP and Crisis Management
16.3.1 Internal Control Systems for Corporations and Crisis
Management
The Great East Japan earthquake that broke out on May 11, 2011, caused enormous
damages to companies. “Research on Effects of ‘Great East Japan earthquake’ on
Publicly Listed Companies” (Tokyo Shoko Research 2011) reported that of the 1908
publicly listed companies, 652 (34.2%) had “partial shutdown of sales or operation.”
Corporations have to continuously operate their businesses, and preparing crisis
management against large earthquakes and accidents is indispensable for them.
Crisis management is defined: “Strategic protective actions taken within a com-
munity to prepare for, respond to, or recover from the occurrence of a crisis” (Penuel
and Statler 2010). Risk management is a measures to prevent occurrence of risks,
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whereas crisis management is a concept about countermeasures after a crisis like a
disaster has occurred.
A corporation prepares its crisis management system as follows: First is the
setting of escalation rules. Set a rule, so when a disaster or an accident breaks out,
the field quickly transfers the information to the top management. Second is the
formation of a crisis response group. The top management forms emergency crisis
response headquarters when it receives information about a disaster or an accident
and judges if the incident is a crisis. Members and the location of the emergency
response headquarters should be set beforehand and defined in the crisis manage-
ment manual. Third is action plans have to be prepared. At the time of a crisis
breakout, there will be confusion, and measures for the emergency crisis response
headquarters to take should be defined and compiled beforehand. Fourth is the crisis
simulation training. Periodically conduct simulation training with a hypothetic crisis
to extract problems and to review the crisis management system.
Internal control system is a name for a combined corporate group system for risk
management, crisis management, and compliance. The Companies Act enacted in
2005 obligated business owners to construct internal control systems. The Financial
Instrument and Exchange Act enacted in 2006 enforced internal control reporting to
publicly listed companies. The two acts urge business owners to organize crisis
management systems, and they affected the spread of guidelines by the government
as we will discuss later.
16.3.2 Crisis Management and BCP
Business continuity planning (BCP) is defined as “Plans identifying all the process
and actions necessary to permit an organization to perform its crucial functions and
activities during and after a disaster” (Penuel and Statler 2010). In other words, BCP
is plans to prepare during regular times, about how to continue or quickly recover
from a major disaster or accident that is a predictable risk that stops the business.
An actual BCP is prepared in the following manner: First is risk analysis. Identify
risk events that will stop the business, and determine the worst scenario for the
corporate group. Second is to set the basic guideline and identify the important
businesses, that is, to identify the business important for the business group and ones
that are demanded socially. Third is to set the recovery target. Once important
businesses are identified, set the time to recover them from the outbreak. And fourth
is to set the plans for restarting the business. Identify necessary resources for the
restart, and build plans for the business restart. Once the four steps are complete,
periodically carry out crisis simulation training to identify problems by reviewing
the BCP.
Recovery from disasters are said to be the origin of BCP. Recovery from disasters
is a concept started primarily in the USA in the 1950s when companies stored
backup documents and electronic data on alternate sites. When the simultaneous
terror attack took place on September 11, 2001, in the USA, financial institutions
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moved to their alternate offices to continue trading, and their minimizing of the loss
from business interruption caught the eyes of the world. This incident caused the
spread of BCP as total plans for business continuation.
Later in the USA, after the devastation by hurricane Katrina, “Implementing
Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007” (Public Law 110-53
2011) was approved in the Congress in August of 2007. Based on Title IX “Private
Sector Preparedness” of this act, the “voluntary private sector preparedness accred-
itation and certification program” was established with the Department of Homeland
Security being the primary government department. The program encourages private
businesses to establish voluntary disaster measures with the government setting the
certification standards.
16.3.3 BCPs in Japan and Their Future
Companies in Japan have been hit by a number of crises in the past. They were the
1995 Great Hanshin Awaji earthquake, the 2003 spread of SARS that started from
Guangdong in China, the 2007 Chuetsu offshore earthquake, the 2008 outbreak of
avian influenza (H5N1), and so on. Ministries and agencies in Japan have shown the
guideline and encouraged companies to set their BCPs and start applying them.
Guidelines for natural disasters like earthquakes have been published by the Central
Disaster Prevention Council of the Cabinet Office in 2005 (first edition) and 2009
(second edition). An English version of “Business Continuity Guidelines – Strate-
gies and Responses for Surviving Critical Incidents – Third Edition” (Cabinet
Office 2013) is now available. For infectious pandemics, MHLW has published
“Guideline for Pandemic Influenza Preparedness at Business Entities and Estab-
lishments” in 2007 and for interruption of information communication. The METI
published “Guidelines on Formulating and Implementing BCPs” in 2005 as an
appendix to “Report: Information Security Governance at Corporations.” For small-
to mid-sized corporations, the Small and Medium Enterprise Agency published
“Guidelines on Formulating and Implementing BCPs for Small and Medium
Enterprises (METI 2005).”
Large corporations in Japan are carrying out leading efforts in implementing
BCPs. According to “Survey of Corporate Implementation of Measures for Business
Continuity and Disaster Prevention in 2015” (2016) by the Cabinet Office, 60.4% of
large corporations answered they have set their BCP plans, whereas only 29.9% of
small- to mid-sized companies responded they have. Reasons for BCP plans not
spreading into small- to mid-sized companies are their lack of resources to spare in
preparing against natural disasters and probably the business owners’ low level of
consciousness about disaster prevention.
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16.4 Market Economy-Based Disaster Management
Activities
16.4.1 Insurance System
16.4.1.1 History of Insurance Systems and Their Structure
There are two roots for what is called insurance today. One root is the maritime
insurance that started in Italy in the fourteenth century when trading in the Mediter-
ranean developed. This type has now developed into property and casualty insurance
and life insurance. Those that offered this type of insurance organized what are
insurance companies now. They are businesses of insurance. The other root is
mutual aid against fires that started in the fifteenth-century Germany. They are
now called mutual aid or social insurance. The insurance is mutual aid among the
policy holders.
The insurance premium for the entire world in 2015 was JPY 304 trillion (about
US$ 3 trillion) and JPY 242 trillion (about US$ 2 trillion), and their sum of JPY
546 trillion (about US$ 5 trillion) is greater than the Japanese GDP of JPY 532 tril-
lion (about US$ 5 trillion) and was equivalent to 6.23% of the entire world GDP
(Swiss Re 2016). These figures include premiums for mutual aids.
Life insurance makes payment upon death or survival of a person and property
and casualty insurance upon occurrence of damage. Thus, there are a number of
property and casualty insurance policies for various risks in the market. Property and
casualty insurance may cover airplane accidents or large-scale plant accidents when
a single accident causes a huge insurance payment with a single policy. It may also
have to face huge payments upon a large natural disaster like an earthquake or
typhoon for making multiple insurance payments at the same time. In other words,
there is a possibility that a single insurance company cannot cover the huge insur-
ance payment. To cope with such situations, insurance companies over the world are
policyholders of reinsurance, i.e., insurance of insurance, to share risks of such
cases. Such reinsurance has been around for many years. The oldest of such
reinsurance contract on records is one about a cargo on a ship in 1370 (Carter
1983). Hearings with reinsurance companies, Munich Re, Swiss Re, and Lloyds,
revealed that insurance companies in Japan also entered reinsurance contracts with
overseas reinsurance companies since the late nineteenth century. Currently, there
are 41 life insurance companies and 52 property and casualty insurance companies
with licenses to operate in Japan (GIAJ 2017; LIAJ 2017).
16.4.1.2 Disaster Management Functions with Insurances
Many of us think that the function of an insurance is to make insurance payments
upon outbreak of accidents, i.e., functions to recover the original state. Premium for
insurance policyholders that engage in activities with large risks are naturally high.
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Making use of this fact, policies over the world are leading to disaster reduction with
increase in compulsory insurance premium for conducting activities that may cause
damage to social properties. Forcing insurance to the business owner leads to
assuring saving of the victims as well in case a damage breaks out. Also, for
example, worker’s compensation to cover the responsibility of business owners
stated in the Labor Standards Act of Japan has its premium affected by history of
accidents with the business. This policy leads to efforts by business entities to reduce
work-related accidents. The total amount of worker’s compensation paid in 2015 in
Japan amounted to JPY 792.1 billion (about US$ 7.2 billion) (MHLW 2017).
On a separate issue, automobile liability insurance, a compulsory insurance for
automobile drivers, made insurance payment of JPY 792.1 billion (about US$
7.2 billion) in fiscal year (starting in April) 2015 (GIAJ 2017). The amount of
voluntary insurance payment made for automobile caused personal injuries and
property damages amounted JPY 163.7 billion (about US$ 1.5 billion) in the same
fiscal year (GIROJ 2017). These insurance payments are made for the damages to the
victims caused by the policyholders that caused the accidents. Without these insur-
ances, the victims have to receive liability payments from the driver through private
settlements or litigations causing high costs to the victims to receive relief. Insurance
is something we cannot live without.
Furthermore, disaster management measures are subject to reviews by those
investing into overseas reinsurance companies. Measures that seem questionable to
the reviews would raise the premium payment for the reinsurance that covered the
measures. An increase in the reinsurance premium results in an increase in the
insurance premium in Japan, and the monetary incentive would correct the disaster
management measures that looked questionable to the eyes of the reinsurance
company investors.
16.4.2 Disaster Management Activities by Other Private
Sectors
16.4.2.1 History of Disaster Management Activities by Other Private
Sectors
The private sectors besides insurance companies involved with disaster management
are insurance brokers, insurance agents, and risk-consulting companies affiliated
with insurance companies. Insurance brokers, independently from insurance com-
panies, have been providing advices for long years to the policyholders about
disaster management. One of the broker company giants Marsh & McLennan
Companies has been around since the mid-nineteenth century. Other than insurance
brokers are risk-consulting companies affiliated to general construction companies
or banks. New venture businesses in risk-consulting with no affiliation to insurance
companies, general constructors, or banks are starting to come to existence.
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16.4.2.2 Outline of Disaster Management Activities by Other Private
Sectors
Giant insurance brokers today analyze damages from natural disasters with simula-
tion models and issue risk-linked securities. The annual sales in fiscal year 2015 for
the publicly listed five major insurance brokers (Marsh & McLennan, Aon, Arthur
J. Gallagher & Co., Willis Tower Watson, Brown & Brown Insurance) summed to
about JPY 4250 billion (about US$ 39 billion). Note that insurance brokers make
their profits primarily from commission for insurance sales; thus, sales from disaster
management activities make part of the JPY 4250 billion sales. Risk-consulting
companies related to large corporations have been involved in consulting for disaster
management activities for large private companies. On the other hand, risk-
consulting ventures offer more elaborate services with adjustments based on cus-
tomer locations. In any case, consulting by these private sectors will allow various
users to effectively carry out disaster management activities.
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Abstract This chapter opens by discussing what effects disaster victims suffer from
in their lifestyles and psychology. Then it will summarize what support systems are
available in supporting victims that suffered large damages in terms of legal systems,
public support, and psychological caretaking. The chapter closes with discussions on
life and psychological effects of those that suddenly 1 day turned into crime victims
and various supports for them.
Keywords Disaster relief · Disaster victims · Legal system · Psychological
recovery · PTSD · Reconstructing livelihood · Victim support
17.1 Suffering Damages
A large number of lives have been lost with natural disasters in Japan. This section
reviews problems about disaster victims.
17.1.1 Effects on Disaster Victims
When we are faced with natural disasters, the most important thing is to protect our
own lives. We tend to apply the word “disaster victims” to mean those that suffered
from a disaster but managed to survive it; however, we must not forget the many
victims that lost their lives for the event. We would like to reconfirm that saving lives
has the highest priority at the time of disaster.
Victims that survived a disaster, however, have a number of hardships waiting for
them. Under the situation of being unsure of what effects the strong blast caused to
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their bodies, the lifelines stop immediately after the disaster, and they have to face a
number of hardships under the lack of supplies and information. Kimura (2007)
defined four phases of post-disaster situations that the victims have to go through.
The first 10 h is the “disorientation” where no one in the disaster-hit area is sure
what is happening and not sure what action to take. Systematic disaster response by
public organizations like local governments, the fire department, nor the police have
not started, and the victims have to survive the disaster on their own. During this
time immediately after a disaster, self-sustaining actions are most important. To
minimize confusion in our lives and to keep our minds in peace, we shall plan
beforehand what situations we will face during the disorientation period and plan
preparations to overcome the difficulties.
After several hours are past since the point of disaster outbreak, the victims can
grasp what happened to themselves and start mutual support actions like lifesaving,
rescue, and safety confirmation activities. This is when the “Acceptance of New
Reality,” totally different from ordinary societies, takes shape. With recent disasters,
public organizations like self-defense force, police, and fire department start sys-
tematic disaster response in stages as early as possible; however, for wide-area
disasters, such public responses take time.
Still within days after the breakout of a disaster, building and roads are still
destroyed, and lifelines of gas, water, and electricity are still unavailable. In case of
wide-area disasters, communication infrastructure takes long time to recover, infor-
mation supplies are short, and many disaster victims are forced to live in evacuation
shelters. People under these circumstances help each other to survive the inconve-
nient living conditions irrespective of their social status or jobs, and this time is
called “disaster utopia.”
When the social infrastructures like lifelines are recovered and the societies
gradually regain calmness, people start on the road to “Reentry to Everyday Life.”
They have to overcome their griefs and hardships to reconstruct their lives although
it may take very long times. Some of the disaster victims, however, find their
directions and paths to recovery and reconstruction and quickly rebuild their lives.
The power to recover relatively but smoothly from disasters is called “disaster
resilience,” and it is catching attention these days. They depend on public support
for their recovery and reconstruction. For faster recovery and reconstruction, the
societies need enhanced individual resilience as well as resilience of the whole
society.
17.1.2 Effects on the Psychology of Disaster Victims
Immediately after being hit by disasters, we sometime encounter effects to the body
like, headache, stomach pain, loss of appetite, or worsening of chronic diseases. We
may also face mind or psychological effects like anxiety, fear, irritation, or loss of
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interest. Adults may find effects on their habits like increased alcohol consumption
or smoking and, in case of children, maybe degenerative behavior. These are normal
reactions for people faced with abnormal conditions and are called “normal stress
reactions.” We need to understand that anyone can experience normal stress reac-
tions after receiving some shocks, and they are not behaviors to be alarmed about.
Many people with normal stress reactions gradually return to their states before the
shocks as time passes by.
Some people, however, if they suffer traumatic events like serious injury that
almost took their lives, may continue to suffer from the stress reactions for long
times, and their psychological pain may prevent them from returning to their social
and occupational activities. These symptoms are called “post-traumatic stress disor-
der (PTSD).” Typical symptoms of PTSD are sudden and repeated dreams or
flashback of the traumatic event, being not able to have positive sensation of
happiness or love, dissociative disorder for no reason, avoidance symptoms of the
traumatic event, sleeping disorder, turning hostile, or arousal symptoms like exces-
sive wariness or startle reaction. If the pain makes it difficult to lead regular daily
lives, the advice for the victim is to consult with a doctor or counselor.
17.2 Systems for Victim Support
Disaster victims are subject to a number of effects on their lives, and their minds,
however, still have to recover their lives before the event. Systems to support disaster
victims in their efforts for recovery have gone through improvements throughout the
history of disasters. This section summarizes systems for supporting disaster victims
in Japan in three categories of law, public systems, and caring for the mind.
17.2.1 Legal Systems to Support Disaster Victims in Japan
When a natural disaster strikes, we lose a number of foundations for our lives and
enter a state where our fundamental rights assured by the constitution are damaged.
Rearrangement of legal systems, therefore, is on the way to support disaster victims.
Disaster Relief Act (1947) is the oldest of them all set in 1947 after the 1946
Nankai earthquake. Article 1 of the law states that “The purpose of this Law is to
protect victims of disaster and maintain social order by causing the central govern-
ment to provide needed relief services on an emergency basis in cooperation with
local government and the Japan Red Cross, other entities, and the people of Japan.”
That means for disaster victims with difficulties in maintaining their livings imme-
diately after the breakout of a disaster, the central government provides emergency
rescue and protection as necessary. The rescue involves setting evacuation shelters
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or temporary housing; emergency repair of houses; food preparation and supply of
food and drinking water; providing school supplies, clothes, and beddings; medical
and maternity services; search for corpses and their disposition; burying; and
removal of obstacles like rocks and mud near housings. The Great East Japan
earthquake revealed new problems of deemed temporary housing, wide-area evac-
uees, former residents in the difficult-to-return zone, and welfare evacuation shelters.
Systems of rescue and protection responses immediately after a disaster need
flexibility in their applications.
The 1995 Great Hanshin Awaji earthquake triggered the setting of Act
Concerning Support for Reconstructing Livelihoods of Disaster Victims (1998).
After its amendment in 2007, the purpose of act is to support the reconstruction of
livelihoods of persons who have suffered substantial damage to the foundations of
their livelihoods due to natural disasters, by providing measures to pay them support
grants for reconstructing their livelihoods with the use of funds contributed by
prefectures from the perspective of mutual support and thereby helping stabilizing
livelihoods of residents and promoting the prompt recovery of affected areas.
Households whose housing units have been totally destroyed or suffered large
damage will receive support grants. The 1973 Act on Provision of Disaster Condo-
lence Grant, set after the 1967 Niigata Uetsu flooding, states that it grants disaster
condolence money to family members of the deceased or consolation money for
serious disaster injuries. Victims that suffered damage to their housing units or
property can receive loan necessary for rebuilding their livings as disaster
support fund.
17.2.2 Public Systems to Support Disaster Victims in Japan
There are also a number of public systems to support disaster victims. Loan System
for Life Welfare Fund loans necessary expenses for rebuilding livings for
low-income households with difficulty in setting loans with banks or households
with disabled or care receivers. There is also a system for single-parent households,
i.e., single mother widows or single father widowers, welfare fund loans to support
their independence, and special measures will be taken for disaster victims to delay
their return of loans.
In terms of supporting child education, the kindergarten attendance promotion
program reduces the entrance and attendance fee depending on the guardian’s
income. There are also systems for free textbooks (school textbooks in Japan are
usually purchased at fee) or discount or exempt tuition for children, students, or their
guardians in elementary, middle, high school, or special needs schools. Most
universities also offer tuition discount, emergency scholarship, or student loans.
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In terms of jobs, there are systems for reimbursement of unpaid salary from
bankrupt companies, unemployment benefits payment from employment insurance,
free job training, and support system for living during training periods. Also, there
are special reduction of local tax and national tax, discount or exemption from
medical and nursing insurance fee, public fees, facility usage fees, nursing fees,
and exemption from NHK reception fee for a certain period.
As we saw above, there are a number of various systems to support disaster
victims; however, most people learn about them for the first time after they suffer
from disasters, and there are even cases when the information about them do not
reach the disaster victims. Sometimes new systems are set after occurrence of
disasters. At the time of a disaster, specific and useful information supports the
disaster victims, and administrative consulting is needed to quickly deliver such
information to disaster victims so they can make use of the systems for rebuilding
their lives.
17.2.3 Caring for the Minds in Disaster Victim Support
Disaster victims, immediately after the disaster, suffer normal stress reactions of
feeling anxiety, having hard time sleeping, losing appetite, being irritated, and losing
motivation to do anything. A way to support disaster victims immediately after the
strike is psychological first aid (PFA) (National Child Traumatic Stress Network and
National Center for PTSD: NCTSN/NCPTSD 2006). PFA is a method, based on
researches so far on trauma recovery, which collected effective caretaking practices
in reducing psychological pain for disaster victims with consideration to life stages
and cultural factors. Application of PFA first secures safety for the disaster victims,
watches them without pushing support services upon them, and provides practical
specific supports and information to them.
After supporting the disaster victims with PFA, it is the turn for Skills for
Psychological Recovery (SPR) (NCTSN/NCPTSD 2010). SPR is a training to lessen
pain for the disaster victims and support them in gaining skills to cope with the
number of difficulties they face like post-disaster stress. The purpose is for the
disaster victim to gain self-confidence in recovery from the disaster. SPR emphasizes
supporting forward moving actions through worksheet exercises to enhance the
problem-solving skills.
PFA and SPR are not well shared among the people that actually carry out support
activities in disaster-struck areas. PFA and SPR aim at supporting the disaster
victims to stand on their own without putting pressure on them or pushing support
service on them. Support without imposing it is the key, and we need to spread
support activities that follow guidelines of support activities.
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17.3 Being a Victim
17.3.1 Effects on Disaster Victims
Systems for supporting natural disaster victims and their psychology are immature;
however, with the history of disasters, a number of support practices are shaping
up. In comparison, systems for supporting victims of crimes and airplane and
railway accidents still have shallow history. Crime victims, 1 day out of the blue,
suffer death, injury, or property loss from crimes like manslaughter, violence, sex
crime, child abuse, or drunk-driving. Victims of airplane or railway accidents
suddenly encounter the accident and suffer death or bodily injury.
Victim Support Center of Tokyo (2007) reported on its study of family members
of criminal victims that they are burdened with medical, transportation, and court
expenses; lose sufficient time to perform housework, child care, or nursing; enter
financial difficulty from retiring or taking leave of absence from work because of the
incident; and forced to relocate to avoid curious eyes from the neighbors. Their daily
lives suffer great influences from the crime. They also suffer large mental shocks that
their family member was a crime victim, and sleeping disorder and loss of appetite
persist over a long time. Many are forced to receive medical treatment for the stress
symptoms, sufferings that are especially frequent with female family members.
Family members of the victim not only have lost their irreplaceable family member,
but they have their lifetime plans totally turned over from the bottom. Mental
suffering is also extremely significant with their lives facing overall changes, and
they are forced down to the bottom of grief and pain. They also often feel anxiety,
burden, and pain with questioning from the police and prosecutor, testimonies in
court, and discussions with the lawyer. In some cases, interviews from the mass
media ignore privacy and sometimes cause confusion. The suffering is not just direct
from the crime, but family members are drawn into a number of events to suffer
secondary damages. The report pointed out that about 90% of family members of
criminal victims answered they suffered secondary damages and that we need to
have social understanding for criminal victims and their family members.
17.3.2 Legal Systems for Supporting Criminal Victims
in Japan
A legal system for supporting crime victims is the Benefit System for Crime Victims,
set after the 1974 bombing of the Mitsubishi Building, Tokyo. The system intends to
mitigate the financial damages with benefit payments from the central government to
family members and victims who suffered death or serious injury by intended crimes
like random attacking and have no hope for receiving any compensation. The system
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went into effect in 1981 and is said to be the first policy to support criminal victims.
This system of mere financial support does not make much effect for a long time, and
in the meantime, private activities to place first priority on human rights of the
victims turned active. After the 1995 Tokyo subway sarin attack, National Police
Agency established Office for Crime Victims in 1996. In 1998, a number of
organizations that were active in providing criminal victim support over the nation
formed National Network for Victim Support. As criminal victims voiced their call
for comprehensive support, the central government, at last, started to take measures
for protecting rights and benefits of criminal victims. The measure, Promotion of
Policies for Crime Victims, involves recovery or mitigation of damages the crime
victims or their family members suffered and support them so they can recover their
calm lives. It also calls for the victims and family members’ proper participation into
the criminal case processing. In year 2004, when the trial jury system started, Basic
Act on Crime Victims was set. In 2008, Victim Participation System was introduced
so criminal victims could take part in criminal trials. Further in March of 2011, the
Cabinet Office of the Japanese government set basic plans for crime victims, and the
legal system to value rights of criminal victims finally shaped up.
17.3.3 Public Systems for Criminal Victim Support in Japan
Promotion of policies for crime victims led to stationing supporting staff and hotlines
for criminal victims in public prosecutor’s office over the nation. These measures
allow the staff in responding to consultation requests from criminal victims, guiding
and escorting them to courts, helping them with procedures for case records review,
or having evidence returned, i.e., the support not only covers financial conditions but
also psychological aspects and life recovery processes. Victim support centers are
designated by Prefectural Public Safety Commissions as private organizations to
support criminal victims. Japan Legal Support Center (JLSC) also provides support
for criminal victims.
In addition to the above public organizations, criminal victims are starting
movements to gather and form networks for mutual support among themselves as
self-supporting organizations. More supporting organizations have formed, e.g.,
Child Guidance Offices for response to child abuse and Spousal Violence Counsel-
ing and Support Centers and Counseling Center for Women in response to domestic
violence.
The movement is not limited to criminal victims, but programs for supporting
traffic accident victims and victims of public transportation accidents like airplanes
or railways are taking shapes. All these programs and systems have purposes of
providing information or necessary support in active manners so the victims or their
family members can gather and take steps toward recovery from their deep grieves or
harsh experiences.
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17.3.4 Psychological Care for Supporting Victims
Victims of crimes and accidents can experience normal stress disorder. Among those
with traumatic experiences, some end up with PTSD with the stress reactions not
disappearing even after long times after the events. Sexual crime victims tend to
develop PTSD (Kessler et al. 1995).
WHO in 2011, published “Psychological First Aid: Guide for Field Worker.”
This guideline explained what caregivers need to know in supporting victims, e.g., to
respect the needs and intentions of the victim; to keep the response flexible to meet
different needs of individual victims; to provide support to meet victim’s pace, not to
insist on support the victim does not want, the importance of giving specific supports
to meet the situation and needs of the victim in the early stage; and to make proper
intervention if the victim cannot make decisions or is facing dangers that can
threaten their lives. Supporters and doctors that were actually involved in victim
support based the guideline on their empirical knowledge; however, scientific
evidence of what support is effective is still insufficient. Scientific research and
more knowledge are crucial for the future of victim support.
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Part V
For Advancement of Societal Safety
Sciences
Chapter 18
Governance and Forming Agreement
for Societal Safety
Yukio Hirose
Abstract This chapter reviews problems that surround high-level radioactive waste
(HLW) and discusses what the governance of societal risk is. Governing all the risks
scattered throughout the society takes multidimensional evaluations of trade-offs
among multiple benefits and risks, and fair decision-making is essential for reaching
agreements among members of the society on risk governance.
Keywords Agreement formation · Ignorance · NIMBY · Risk governance · Risk
trade-off
18.1 For Governance of Societal Risk
18.1.1 What Is Risk Governance?
One of the purposes of Societal Safety Sciences is to study how to reduce risk. For its
safety and security, our society has to take on reducing risks that are present here and
there within. For identifying, analyzing, evaluating countermeasures, and properly
performing tasks at each stage, scientists, governments, the industrial sector, and
citizens have to complete their roles. Renn (2008) reported the necessity of cooper-
ation among public and private actors in managing risks related to them for risk
governance, i.e., the society to control risks. Societal risk governance means for each
stage of societal risk control, the society selects proper members to perform the
tasks; therefore, it requires agreement with trust and faith on which organizations
and individuals assume the role of risk control.
This book, so far, explained how the society properly performs analysis,
countermeasures, and evaluation of risks based on agreements by the whole
society at times. The book, however, also revealed cases when the society failed
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to share common understanding of analysis, evaluation, and control for risk
governance due to reasons like uncertainty and complexity of risks themselves
or conflict of interest and different sense of values among the society members.
Typical examples of the latter are the problems of global warming and handling
high-level radioactive waste (HLW).
18.1.2 HLW in Need of Governance
There are about 400 nuclear reactors in the world. Brunnengräber et al. (2015)
pointed out that spent HLW so far sums to 270,000 tons and is increasing at a rate
of 100 double-deck buses annually. Most of HLW are stored within nuclear power
generation facilities or storage plants; however, proper processing of them for
permanent disposition is an urgent issue to solve because of possible risks of
radioactive contamination caused by terror attacks or natural disasters. It takes
several tens of thousands of years for HLW to decay to safe levels. The most
desirable risk control, currently, is to bury them to depths of several hundreds of
meters.
Governance about deep geological HLW repositories involves a number of
problems including extremely long-term risk analysis of HLW, evaluation of effect,
and reliability in technologies for underground burying, checking the economic
effect in estimating the cost, and dealing with uncertainty. We also have to face
the ethical issue of passing down the negative legacy of HLW to the future
generation in turn for gaining the convenience of nuclear energy. One of the factors
that make risk governance of HLW extremely difficult is that the residents in the area
to build risky facilities often develop the attitude called “not in my backyard
(NIMBY)” that they think building such facilities near where they live is trouble-
some although they recognize the social needs for them. In fact, regions near the sites
to build final underground-burying facilities have to carry the burden of direct risk
and harmful rumors of HLW and other accompanying risks to the stigma. An overall
social agreement is hard to reach because people would rather not have the final
location of deep HLW repository near where they live, even though they acknowl-
edge and agree to the overall argument of deep HLW repositories.
The needs for cooperative and step-by-step approaches between residents of the
proposed site and the stakeholders are internationally recognized (NEA 2010) for
forming an agreement of geological disposition of NIMBY-type risks. A cooperative
approach here means opportunities for the residents in deciding whether to accept or
deny the construction plans through early and frequent participation to hearings of
the stakeholders’ plans so they can ask questions and voice their opinions. A step-
by-step approach means to prepare a number of stages in forming the agreement with
ample time at each stage so the decisions are rational and adequate based on
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thorough discussions. Among the EU countries that apply cooperative and step-by-
step approaches, none have finalized agreements about deep HLW repository loca-
tions other than Sweden and Finland.
18.2 Trade-Offs About Societal Risks
18.2.1 Dilemma with Risk Governance
One of the problems to solve for governance of societal risks is to balance out the
number of risks and cost. Graham and Wiener (1995) brought people’s attention to
the trade-off relation of reducing one risk factor that can raise another risk with the
example that banning chlorine in drinking water can lower the risk of developing
cancer; however, the act can raise the risks of other water-caused infectious diseases
like cholera. Wolf (2011) showed that efforts in AIDS prevention saved a large
number of lives; however, allocating medical staffs to AIDS prevention programs
led to shortage of personnel in other medical activities causing weakening of the
entire health system in Africa with higher health risks. These cases are facing the
dilemma of whether to counter a specific risk or to leave it alone so other risks do not
have to increase. Another common dilemma is whether to spend on a specific risk or
not to spare the expense so other risks are under control.
18.2.2 Risks and Their Trade-Offs
Graham and Wiener (1995) warn about the problem of risk trade-off that has
surfaced frequently. It is a problem that reducing a target risk can give rise to new
risks that conflict with the target. They categorized risk trade-offs into four types
depending on whether the target and the conflicting risks are of the same nature and
whether the socials groups that the risks affect are the same or not. When the same
risk starts to affect another social group, it is called “risk transfer.” Intergenerational
risk transfer is the form of risk transfer with risk reduction for the contemporary
generation causing the same risk to the future generation. Problems that we face also
include risk transfer from a certain social group leading to the same risk to another
group.
Risk of HLW involves the problems of risk management for the whole society
pushing the risk to a specific region and of transferring the cost and risk down to
future generations so the contemporary generation can avoid the risk. These prob-
lems involve ethical questions of whether risk transfer is fair or what our responsi-
bilities are against our future generations.
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18.2.3 Dilemma of Distributing Cost of Diverse Risks
Risk governance also has to solve the problem of cost distribution against diverse
risks when the whole society has limited resources of cost management. Solving this
problem involves political judgments of putting priorities on multiple risks. Shrader-
Frechette (1991) pointed out the dilemma about conflict of social costs that spending
cost on one risk management led to shortage of management costs for other risks.
She claimed that solving the dilemma requires controlling societal risks to levels
acceptable to the whole society.
Judging the amount of cost and level of risk control takes comparing diverse risks
with common metrics. There are two common metrics: one to compare the levels of
social acceptance and one to estimate the necessary costs in lowering risks to
acceptable levels. First, we need a scale to compare magnitudes of risks that take
different forms to evaluate the levels of risk reduction acceptable to the society. In
the fields of environmental risks in Europe, the USA, and Japan, risks of death
caused by environmental contamination with chemical substances have targets of
1 in 1 million. If a specific risk is present today, we have to lower its level to one
accepted by the society.
For comparing costs of risk reduction, we need to calculate monetary spending in
saving one life from each risk event. Wolf (2011) estimated the cost for saving a
single life, i.e., the value of preventing fatality, at 1.4 million pounds in the
UK. Based on this value of preventing fatality, we can evaluate whether a regulation
for reducing risk is a cost-effective policy or not. In any case, how to distribute cost
for management of diverse risks and what evaluation standards we base the distri-
bution on are problems that need agreement by the whole society.
18.3 Forming Agreements for Risk Governance
18.3.1 Movement of Citizen Engagement in Public Plans
Europe and the USA have formed systems to seek citizen agreement to government
policies by offering stages with citizen participation to discuss scientific technolo-
gies, policies, and regulations with societal risks. For example, Denmark is organiz-
ing consensus conferences to discuss regulations on risks that accompany
introduction of scientific technologies like genetic engineering to form an agreement
with all its people. EU countries have also engaged citizens into policies about deep
HLW repositories as part of their cooperative and step-by-step approaches. Europe
and the USA have formed a variety of citizen engagement meetings for citizen
participation in determining public policies that affect the environment and health
because citizen or resident oppositions had turned down more public policies and the
administration offices started to lose credibility among the citizens.
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More citizens, not satisfied with representative democracy leaving decisions
about public plans to elected officials, these days demand direct democracy that
involves citizens into decision-making or deliberative democracy that allows citizen
participation into thorough discussions. Public plans that involve risk cannot win
social agreement unless information is made available to the citizens early on, and
public opportunities are offered to involve citizens into the discussions.
Citizen engagement in forming agreement on public plans with societal risks,
however, can have disagreement not only between citizens and administrations but
also disagreement among civil groups from differences in their senses of value about
the environment or economics, and at times social agreements are hard to reach. For
example, in trying to establish a public plan with environmental risk, some affected
citizens believe the value of environmental preservation cannot be traded off with
economic-based monetary compensation and, at times, the society cannot reach
unanimous agreements (Skitka 2002). One reason for the difficulty in forming a
social agreement is for those involved, recognizing the need to make mutual
concessions is sometimes unacceptable.
18.3.2 Difficulty in NIMBY-Type Risk Governance
For public plans that involve NIMBY-type risks, the administration has to look for
procedures that all social members of the affected area can accept. The procedure, in
fact, is one that everyone recognizes that the selection process is fair without
discrepancies and acknowledges decisions made through such procedures are rea-
sonable results that everyone has to agree with.
When trying to develop an unbiased procedure, a method proposed by Rawls
(1999) that places citizens in original positions under veil of ignorance is effective.
Rawls explained that the fundamental principle for unbiased distribution of social
resources takes the condition that all social members are unaware of their own
individual attributes. The method creates a hypothetical condition that places a veil
of ignorance on everyone, so no one knows where he stands and can accept an
unbiased distribution that maximizes benefit to the most suffering.
Rawls focused on fairness in the distribution method of social resources; how-
ever, we can also apply the veil of ignorance in assuring fairness in procedures of
forming agreements. Applying Rawls’ veil of ignorance to selecting the location of
deep HLW repository leads to the following: All members of the society, after
recognizing the need for deep HLW repository for the society as a whole, acknowl-
edge that anyone can end up living in the region that is determined as the final
location of deep HLW repository. If all citizens are under the veil of ignorance that
hides whether their regions can meet geological safety or economical requirements,
they can start unbiased discussions about what are important as evaluation standards
for deciding the final location. Selecting the region suited as the final location based
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on the evaluation standards that were so determined will have the citizens decide to
accept the results because they had agreed that the selection process was unbiased.
Reaching an agreement about NIMBY-type risks requires proposing actual
citizen engagement based on veil of ignorance followed by deliberation by the
whole society.
18.3.3 For Risk Governance
Risk governance means cooperative activities by the whole society to make use of
limited resources for well-balanced control of all risks scattered throughout the
society.
As we discussed earlier, the problem of necessary resource distribution needed
for risk management strongly affects risk governance. As we have to plan how to
distribute the budget for preparations against earthquakes and global warming, we
are faced with the problems of distributing cost for measures against diverse societal
risks. Our budget is limited, and we, of course, have to form a balance between the
cost of risk preparation and the convenience of risk reduction, but at the same time,
we have to consider different evaluation standards like fairness in risk-taking and
urgency in risk reduction for settling the budget distribution. Placing priority on
which standard takes not just scientific evaluations, but it requires agreement by the
whole society based on ethical and political judgments.
It is important that all social members share a common recognition that forming
agreements about societal risks requires diverse evaluation of the trade-offs among
multiple benefits and risks. In addition, governing societal risks requires all those
affected to take steps beyond their own interests and agree on the procedures of
making decisions that all can recognize unbiased.
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Chapter 19
For Deepening of Societal Safety Sciences
Yoshiaki Kawata
Abstract This summarizing chapter of this book gives a total view of the need for
deepening societal safety sciences that the Faculty of Societal Safety Sciences of
Kansai University first started. The chapter also looks at the future of societal safety
sciences.
The reason why we need deepening of societal safety sciences is because events
that concern safety and security of our constantly changing society do not always
take places in the same manners. There are cases, of course, of the same damage
repeating over; however, the reality keeps exposing us to new types of damages, one
after another, that we never had faced before. When faced with them, we often end
up only taking passive measures. Deepening societal safety sciences means to make
moves ahead of the changing disasters and avoid or reduce the damages so it can
contribute to building safe and secure societies.
Keywords Academic terms · Evolving disasters · Mega disasters · Urban disasters
19.1 Evolving Natural Disasters
Two major features of natural disasters are their historic nature and regional nature.
Historic nature of natural disasters means that the same disaster repeats. As Fig. 19.1
shows, Japan has suffered 99 mega-disaster attacks since the year 500, i.e., at the
pace of one every 15 years, each with fatalities of over about 1000. For example, at
the ocean bed south of southwest Japan is Nankai Trough running parallel to the
coastline with an average depth of 4000 m. There, plate boundary earthquakes with
magnitudes of 8 or more have taken place 9 times since the year 684; in other words,
they occurred on the average, once every 100–150 years. As the figure shows, each
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of the four major disasters, earthquake, tsunami, flooding, and storm surge, has taken
place 20–30 times throughout our recorded history. And they will continue to do so.
Regional nature of natural disasters means the damages change with different
locations. For example, storm surge disasters occur in the Netherlands, the USA, and
Bangladesh; however, the forms of damages are quite different. The difference in
damages comes from not just different characteristics of the tides but also the
suffering societies having different forms.
Natural disasters have characteristics of historic nature and regional nature;
however, the forms of damages change with the evolution of the societies. Among
the factors that lead to differences, what makes the most difference is the population
and its density of the hit area. For example, an avalanche in the woods of Canada
with hardly anybody living in there would bring down trees, but the damage is
limited. If, on the other hand, an avalanche takes place in the heavy snow area in
Japan, a variety of damages come with it in general. The reason is heavy snow areas
in Japan have residents that run timber industries, grow fruits, and engage in
agriculture and tourist agents that operate ski areas and resorts, and the regions
have social infrastructures of roads, railways, electricity, and water supply to support
such activities.
Extent of damages caused by disasters depends on magnitudes of natural forces
with earthquakes or typhoons and the level of the society’s vulnerability in disaster
prevention. Let’s look at earthquake disasters for an example. Figure 19.2 relates the
number of deaths to the earthquake magnitudes with past earthquakes over the
world. When an earthquake directly hits a populated area, the death toll is high;
however, the number of deaths is small for underpopulated areas. The straight line in
the figure shows the maximum death tolls, and if, for example, the earthquake
magnitude is 7.3, the danger can cause the number of deaths to reach as high as
about 57,000. The Tokyo Metropolitan earthquake feared to take place in the near
future will have a magnitude of 7.3 with an estimated death toll of 23,000; however,
if the level of social disaster reduction strength falls, the number can possibly go
higher. For example, rush hours in the morning or in the evening or the time of 2020
Tokyo Olympics will be when people from in and out of the country are densely
Fig. 19.1 Major natural disasters in Japan (death toll1000). (Source: Kawata 2015)
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packed. Although these hours or timeframes are temporary congestions, we have to
pay attention to the undoubted lowered level of disaster prevention strength then.
Next, we will explain how a disaster with constant external strength changes the
scenes of damages with the social change of urbanization.
1. Rural disaster: If social infrastructures of electricity, water, communication,
railway, and roads are not sufficiently constructed like in farming villages in
developing countries, the magnitude of external force and damages to the bodies
and social economy are proportional. In Japan, up to the point before the 1923
Great Kanto earthquake, situations with disaster damages were roughly so. The
1896 Great Meiji Sanriku Tsunami took away 22,000 lives; however, there were
no measures in place for damage reduction then.
2. Urbanizing disaster: When a city is forming with increase in the residents, if the
social infrastructures have not caught up with the growing population, the
undeveloped infrastructures cause the disaster damages to go up. The Great
Kanto earthquake, for example, caused 105,000 deaths, and 90% of them were
killed in fires. The penetration level of waterlines was about 20% back then in
Tokyo, and it was difficult to put out the fires in the city. Waterline penetration
was still at 26.2% in 1950, and until the late 1970s, after the time of high
economic growth, wide area spreading of fires in cities in Japan was typical
among other types of disasters. A typical example of an urbanizing disaster in
recent years is the 2015 Nepal earthquake that left serious damages in Katmandu.
The Third United Nations World Conference on Disaster Reduction was held in
the City of Sendai (UNISDR 2015) at around the same time, but if a disaster had
broken out in one of the capitals of a developing country like Manila, Bangkok,
Jakarta, Dacca, Hanoi, or Yangon, it would have probably shown the scenery of
an urbanizing disaster.
3. Urbanized disaster: Once a city is formed and social infrastructure almost com-
plete, a disaster to strike the area causes great damages to the social infrastruc-
tures, and the social economic activities will be crippled. The 1978 Miyagi
earthquake had a death toll of 28; however, urban life in the City of Sendai,
with a population of 650,000 at the time, was paralyzed when gas lines,
Fig. 19.2 Death
tolls vs. earthquake
magnitude of earthquakes in
the world
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waterlines, railway, and other lifelines stopped. The 1994 Northridge earthquake
had its epicenter at about 30 km northeast from the center of Los Angeles and
caused 57 deaths. The depth of the earthquake source was extremely shallow at
14.6 km, and accelerations over 1 G were felt at several locations. The earthquake
tremor destroyed main freeways within 30 km from the epicenter. The traffic,
especially, could not go through Santa Monica Freeway with the heaviest traffic
in the USA. and the social economic damage amounted to JPY 3.3 trillion (about
US $ 30 billion).
4. Urban disaster: When an active fault earthquake takes place in a modern city,
bodily and social economic damages reach unprecedented levels. The 1995 Great
Hanshin Awaji earthquake that hit the City of Kobe was a typical disaster of this
type. About 90% of the roughly 5500 deaths were victims of collapse or falling of
old houses. The 2016 Kumamoto earthquake had a direct death count of 50 with
collapse or falling of houses; however, the disaster-related deaths reached 213 as
of now in June of 2018. There are a number of factors for related deaths; however,
the number of related deaths far exceeding the number of direct deaths is a new
symptom of urban disasters. By the way, the Kumamoto earthquake caused some
level of damages to about 90% of the new and old apartment complex buildings
in the City of Kumamoto.
5. Super-urban disaster: The Tokyo Metropolitan earthquake feared to break out in
the near future is of this type. In addition to scenes of urban disasters, the capital
functions including administration, economics, culture, and so on of the interna-
tional city Tokyo will be paralyzed, and the social economic damages will
propagate throughout the country and are forecasted to give great impacts to
the international societies as well. The reason for not implementing any serious
measures against direct hit earthquakes under the metropolitan area is due to the
deeply rooted perceived notion from experience with the leaders of the govern-
ment and economics, and ignoring risks of a new type disaster is now a common
practice.
19.2 Advancing Societal Safety Sciences to Precede
Phenomena
Studies on disaster and accident instantly increase after they actually take place.
Social requirements for the studies go up, and at the same time, new data are
supplied, and research funds increase as well. We shall, however, not forget that
regions and cities change with time, and outbreaks of disasters and accidents produce
new damages in addition to the same old damages. For Japan, especially with its
aging society, we need to recognize that our power of reducing disasters is dropping.
Table 19.1 shows new academic terms Kawata has defined in preparing academic
papers. Kawata proposed many of the terms here before the disasters took place.
Once the disaster broke out, many of the phenomena that he had predicted turned
into reality. Logical and practical predictions that damages will be magnified or new
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damages will break out due to social systems weakened against disasters seem hard
to understand even for the specialists. The fact that these predictions or forecasts do
not reach the central or local governments is regrettable.
In the future, by the way, scenes of disaster will be further complicated, and it will
be difficult to distinguish social disasters and natural disasters including accidents.
Under such circumstances, we believe damages related to AI or IoT will far surpass
others in the future. For example, the state-of-the-art AI technology is concentrated
on automated driving, and makers are in serious head-to-head competition about its
development. Drivers currently control the automobile; however, once the driving is
automated, it will be like riding a “horse” named an automobile. Horses on the road
do not collide with trees or power poles on the street and not even with another
coming from the other way. When a lightning runs or thunder strikes in the vicinity,
a surprised horse will stand on its hind legs and shake the rider off the saddle. We can
never say that a similar phenomenon will not happen with automated vehicles. It is
the subject for societal safety sciences to find how to secure safety with automati-
cally driven vehicles, or if such safety cannot be secured, or what factors are there
that hinder safety. Thus, pursuing the possibility of automated driving at times of
disasters, for example, is an important topic.
Table 19.2 summarizes how external force (hazards) from natural disasters over
Japan will change in the future. Global warming, currently in progress, will increase
the vapor over oceans in tropical areas and intensify the size and strength of tropical
depressions like typhoons, cyclones, and hurricanes. Rise of the seawater tempera-
ture will make itself clear with increase in rainfall on land. For example, if typhoons
of the same size landed on Taiwan and Japan, Taiwan will suffer far more rainfall.
The reason is about 2 K higher surface water temperature of the sea that surrounds
Taiwan. Also, analysis of data from Automated Meteorological Data Acquisition
Table 19.1 Technical terms by Y. Kawata before the disaster breakouts
Year Technical term
1986 Disaster evolution, rural/urbanizing/urbanized/urban disaster, disaster culture
1988 Disaster reduction, social vulnerability, soft and hard countermeasure, disaster
management
1989 Catastrophic disaster
1995 Compound disaster, acceptable risk, tolerable risk
1998 Vicious cycle of disaster and poverty
2003 Super-extensive disaster (Nankai Trough earthquake), super-urban disaster (Tokyo Met-
ropolitan earthquake)
2005 Worst damage scenario
2008 Ubiquitous disaster reduction society
2010 Survival evacuation, national catastrophe
2013 Phase transition
2015 Disaster resilience, total suitability, displacement disaster
2016 Super-contaminant disaster (Tokyo Metropolitan submergence), compound vulnerability
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System (AMEDAS) reveals statistically higher frequencies of concentrated rain and
guerilla rain.
When tropical depressions like a typhoon intensify, the threat of storm surge
disasters is of concern. The tendency was clear with the 2005 hurricane Katrina and
2012 hurricane Sandy that attacked the USA. Concerns of storm surge damages in
Japan come from the following three facts: first is the continuing lifting of seawater
level. Second is the aging of the tide-control facilities. Areas with frequent storm
surge attacks are Tokyo Bay, Ise Bay, and Osaka Bay, and many of the tide-control
facilities there were built in the 1960s, i.e., about 60 years have passed since they
were built. Storm surges are not just rises of the sea surface, but they come with high
ocean waves, and tide-control facilities receive great wave pressure and overtopping.
The facilities, thus, require maintenance; however, they have been insufficient. The
third reason is the continued land sinking on artificial islands. Sakishima in Suminoe
ward in the City of Osaka has been subsiding since its completion in 1980. So far it
has subsided, on the average, about 60 cm. The reason is the continued subsiding of
the diluvial layer under the alluvial layer. Similar land subsiding is a problem at
Kansai International Airport as well. Every year, the terminal buildings are jacked up
for the sunken depth, and the runways are taken care of with raising of the seawalls.
Earthquakes and volcanos active now will continue that way until about the year
2100. Subjects of modern scientific disaster analyses have only been disasters that
took place within only the past 100 years or so in long human history. We, thus, have
to take the risk into account that earthquake tremors or volcanic eruptions that we
have never experienced before are possible. Otherwise, if such disasters actually
happened, the damages will be devastating.
What we really have to be concerned about is the fact that civil engineering and
architecture have set the maximum external force or factors of safety for social
infrastructures or buildings based on past experience. Designs of high-rise buildings
need aseismic or earthquake-control facilities, and as long as calculated events are
within the tolerated performance of them, the designers can add the number of floors
and improve the construction cost performance. If, however, the tolerance ranges
Table 19.2 Changes of concern in external force of natural disasters in the future in Japan
Escalation of storm and flood disasters caused by global warming
1. Stronger typhoon with heavier rainfall
2. Frequent locally concentrated rain and guerilla rain
Increased threat of storm surges
1. Continued lifting of seawater level causing higher danger of storm surge
2. Insufficient function with existing disaster reduction facilities
3. Continued land subsidence of artificial islands (e.g., Sakishima in Osaka)
Growing activities of earthquakes and volcanos
1. Earthquakes along Nankai Trough and Tokyo Metropolitan earthquake
2. Active fault earthquakes in inland areas
3. Increase in risk of volcanic eruption including Mt. Fuji
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have been set with maximum external force based on past experience, a major
disaster with unprecedented severity may come with an external force that exceeds
the tolerance. Today in the center of Tokyo, however, buildings after buildings are
on the rise as if they are competing to put up the tallest of them all. We can see that
urban development is still going on with priority on economic performance rather
than on safety.
19.3 Challenges of Societal Safety Sciences to Accomplish
Safe and Secure Societies
The reason for societies to lag behind in their measures for safety and security
concerns can be summarized into the following: (1) no measures are taken until
actual social problems arise; (2) even when a clue to solving the problem is found,
nobody develops it into a solution; and (3) we lack the courage to tackle problems
before they break out and make innovative actions.
The above reason (1) may be tolerable for small damages; however, it cannot be
ignored with large-scale damages. Environmental pollution that has been a problem
with Japan for over 50 some years is a typical example. They first started out locally;
however, the delayed countermeasures let them spread throughout the country.
Environmental rights to live in a good environment have been catching attention.
France has the rights guaranteed for its people in the constitution, and Germany has
clearly stated them in its federal laws, and they are enforced. Japan has been
discussing about them; however, they have not been established as legal rights yet.
For reason (2), we have the following case: When the Great Hanshin Awaji
earthquake occurred in 1995, people recognized that geographical information
system (GIS) is the key technology in disaster response. In the years that followed,
Japan was the leading country in its development; however, our development only
concentrated on the hardware and software development of how to make use of the
technology was slow. At the end, other countries like the USA took the lead. In terms
of reason (3), the sense of responsibility in solving the problems stays at the
individual levels. The problems that we are facing or will face about safety and
security do not have simple solutions. We need to systematically tackle the
problems.
The people of Japan have a hard time understanding the “principle of self-
responsibility.” The principle of self-responsibility makes an important viewpoint
when planning measures to reduce disasters and accidents. To accomplish safe and
secure societies, we need to make changes so self and mutual-aid are at the center of
the societies.
In analyzing disasters and accidents, we need to look at the societies and their
changes in the background with history in mind. It is a pity, however, that there are
so many researchers and those responsible that discuss now and the future without
knowledge of the past. For example, the concept of disaster measures changed, in
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response to the changes in the societies, from disaster prevention to disaster reduc-
tion and to disaster resilience. The transition means that our view of the suffering
social systems changed from part to the whole. When Kumamoto earthquake hit in
2016, the support for the disaster-struck areas targeted total suitability and that was a
sign of this change.
Accidents, on the other hand, are called social disasters, and when planning
measures against them, we need to evaluate, not just the physical weaknesses of
the artificial machines, but we now have to also think about the size of the impact on
the societies when an accident breaks out. In fact, social impacts are extremely large
with aviation or railway accidents as well as with NPP accidents. Food poisoning
and infections are no longer mere regional problems. In terms of problems with the
environment, as “An Inconvenient Truth” raised much concern, accident analyses
need scientific explanation for their causes and results opened to the public.
To counter and prepare against disasters and accidents, societal safety sciences
with combined analysis of natural science and social science need further deepening
to meet the target of accomplishing safe and secure societies.
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